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ecclesia reformata sed semper reformanda—“a church reformed but always needing
reformation.”
“And the Church must be forever building and always decaying, and always being restored.”
T.S. Elliot
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
As this project is being written, the third largest “religion” in the world has become no
religion at all. More importantly, the most recent national survey reports suggest the largest
religious category in the United States is now the religion of Nones, those that identify as having
no religious affiliation.1 The number of those who self-identify as having no religious affiliation
has hit an all-time high in America since Pew Research Center has been measuring this metric.
The recent rapid increase of those who have been called religious “Nones” in America has been
consistently evidenced in data in all major national polls. In a nation that has for so long selfidentified as a “Christian” society, this seismic shift in the American religious landscape has
been called by Time Magazine one of the ten most significant trends changing American
society.2
Some contend America is on the same trajectory of religious decline as major European
countries.3 The 1960s and 1970s was a moment, especially in Europe where there was an

1

“The 2017 study, polling 3,000 Americans, found that 34 percent of Americans now identify as 'nones':
atheists, agnostics or 'nothing in particular', overtaking Protestants (33 per cent) and Catholics (21 per cent) as a
social group.” See Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University. “National
Survey Examines Marriage, Family, Immigration, Health care and Technology in the Age of Trump,” Deseret News,
2017. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-survey-examines-marriage-family-immigration-healthcare-and-technology-in-the-age-of-trump-300557068.html (Accessed February 25, 2019).
2

Amy Sullivan, “The Rise of the Nones,” in 10 Ideas That Are Changing Your Life,. Time Magazine,
March 12, 2012. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2108054,00.html Accessed February 20,
2019).
3

Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States.” Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion (2018): 0:1–22.

1

acceleration of the numbers of people choosing to disaffiliate from religion. This is significant
given the latest survey data in the UK suggesting a less than one percent religious service
attendance in the Church of England and a greater than fifty percent of the population selfidentifying as religiously unaffiliated.4 The religiously unaffiliated population in the UK has
surpassed the population that identifies as Christian to become the majority religious identity in
the country.
Overall, global levels of religious affiliation declined during the Twentieth Century,5 with
some suggesting this trend appears to be slowing and global religion is experiencing a significant
season of growth.6 Though it can be argued there is a global resurgence of Christianity
specifically7 and a resurgence of Evangelical expressions of Christianity is certainly not the case
in the United States. As such, this project focuses entirely on the American religious context.
Currently, there are a handful of countries where religiously unaffiliated are the majority
“religion.”8 China has the largest population, per capita, of religious Nones. Britain is not far

4

Now, the Church of England churches are no longer required to hold religious services on Sunday.
Commenting on the change of the over 400 year old law, the Reverend Rose Hudson-Wilkin stated, “Times are
changing- it is not just about a shortage of clergy but also the fact that people work on Sunday.” See, “Churches no
longer have to hold Sunday services,” BBC News, February 22, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47326993
(Accessed February 27, 2019).
5

According to the World Christian Database, nearly one hundred percent of the global population
identified with a religion in 1910. This number has fallen to eighty seven percent in 2010.
6

Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth
Projections 2010-2050,” April 2, 2015. http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf (Accessed January 2, 2019).
7

The World Christian Database reports the global population of those identifying with no religion
declining by three percent by 2050 and the global population of those identifying as Christian as growing by
approximately three percent by 2050. https://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/#/results/1747 (Accessed
February 20, 2019).
8

See “The Global Religious Landscape,” Pew Research Center December 18, 2012,
https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated/ (Accessed August 29, 2019). “The
largest populations of the religiously unaffiliated outside China are in Japan (6% of all unaffiliated), the United
States (5%), Vietnam (2%) and Russia (2%). There are six countries where the religiously unaffiliated make up a

2

behind with half of the nation’s population identifying as religiously unaffiliated. Importantly
now, thirty four percent of Americans reported no religious affiliation9 in the 2017 American
Family Value Survey and only twenty eight percent reported being “born again” Evangelical
Christian.10 Pew Research reports that the number of unaffiliated totaled 36 million adults in
2007 and grew to 47 million in 2012.11 General Social Survey data from 1972–2008 showed an
increase in the percentages of Americans who never attend religious services from about thirteen
percent in the early 1990s to twenty two percent in 2008.
Regarding traditional religious beliefs, currently, about one-third of Americans strongly
believes churches “have their best interest at heart,” and one in four (twenty five percent) are not
confident in pastors’ insights on the issues of the day.12 Only fourteen percent of Americans
report using the Bible on a daily basis and thirty five percent of Americans admit to never
picking up a Bible.13 Most Americans claim some belief in God; however, fewer Americans than
in the past are certain about their belief. Those who are absolutely sure God exists dropped from
sixty six percent of adults in 2003 to fifty four percent in 2013 in Harris Poll surveys.14 These

majority of the population: the Czech Republic (76% are religiously unaffiliated), North Korea (71%), Estonia
(60%), Japan (57%), Hong Kong (56%) and China (52%).”
9

Defined as Atheistic, Agnostic, or Nothing in particular.

10

Christopher F. Karpowitz & Jeremy C. Pope. The American Family Values Survey: 2017 Summary
Report: Marriage and Family in the Age of Trump. 2017, 46-47. http://csed.byu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/AFS-Report-2017_Full_Embargoed.pdf (Accessed January 29, 2019).
11

Pew Research Center, Polling and Analysis, “Nones on the Rise.” October 9, 2012.
https://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (Accessed January 29, 2019).
12

Ibid.

13

LifeWay Research: Americans Are Fond of the Bible, Don’t Actually Read It. April 25, 2017.
https://lifewayresearch.com/2017/04/25/lifeway-research-americans-are-fond-of-the-bible-dont-actually-read-it/
(Accessed on January 16, 2019).
14

“What do Americans Believe?” The Harris Poll, November 2013.

3

statistics highlight a shift toward less religious activity and belief in the past two decades. These
churchless people becoming the nation’s largest “faith" category leads Simon Brauer to state,
The United States and Europe appear to be on a similar trajectory of religious decline,
with some variation in the rate and expected maximum size of the fuzzy middle. While
the United States has traditionally been thought of as an exception to this process, it
might better be described as being comparatively early in it. Despite its placement
relative to European countries, the United States appears to be in a transitional state in
which the fuzzy population has reached a critical mass. It is ultimately unknown whether
these majority-fuzzy cohorts will change this trend. But if in the 21st century, the United
States experiences the same changes that majority-fuzzy European nations did during the
20th century, the United States will be decidedly more secular by its close.15
The fuzzy middle comprised of the moderately religious is not only shrinking, but the
vortex-like decline is also draining the number of intensely religious. Brauer’s fuzzy middle is a
synonymous concept with what Pew has identified as the “spiritual but not religious” population,
the majority of who are more closely mirroring the beliefs and actions of those who confidently
identify as Nones.16 The spiritual but not religious are more highly educated and lean Democrat
more than Republican, politically. Moreover, this religious middle ground has been shrinking
over the recent decades providing further evidence for the widening gap between the devout and
spiritually indifferent where it is clear empirically that “the religious beliefs and practices of the
affiliated and unaffiliated have become more dissimilar since 2000.”17

15

Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” 20.

16

Religious service attendance is lower among this group compared to the general population with many of
the spiritual but not religious, saying religion is not too or not at all important in their lives. Of note here, GSS data
shows that only 8.1% of Americans attended a religious service more than once a week. That has dropped to 6.6% in
2016, see Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is Declining in the United States,” Sociological Science,
(November 15, 2018), 698.
17

Aaron Gullickson, "The Diverging Beliefs and Practices of the Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated in
the United States," Sociological Science 5 (06, 2018): 362.

4

Typically, patience is required when analyzing and measuring these changes in religious
belief as shifts in primary beliefs and practices take time and are frequently quite minimal.18
That is, unless one is examining recent shifts in religious affiliation in the west. Even until the
early ‘90s, trends in religious affiliation were relatively stable and predictable, evidencing
minimal change. Since 1991, the population of those identifying as religiously unaffiliated has
dramatically increased.19 Because a primary concern of this project is the decline in Evangelical
affiliation, it is significant to note that though Evangelicalism experienced a surge of growth in
the ‘80s it has experienced a steady decline since as has the population of those who hold what
Voas and Chaves term “intensely religious”20 beliefs such as viewing the Bible as the literal
word of God and frequent church attendance.21
While some argue that the general population of Protestants is getting smaller, others
argue the core, represented by those who attend religious services regularly and hold what can be

18

Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is Declining in the United States,” Sociological Science,
(November 15, 2018), 5:969.
19

Gallup, "Religion", Gallup.Com, Last modified 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx.
Accessed January 20, 2019. See also, Frank Newport, “5 Things to know about Evangelicals in America,” Gallup,
May 31, 2018. See also, ARIS, “Americans Who Don’t Identify with a Religion No Longer a Fringe Group,”
American Religion Survey (ARIS) in the Media, September 22, 2009. “The 1990s was the decade when the “secular
boom” occurred – each year 1.3 million more adult Americans joined the ranks of the Nones. Since 2001 the annual
increase has halved to 660,000 a year.”
20

Voas and Chaves define intense religiosity as identifying as strongly religiously affiliated, frequent
prayer, biblical literalism, and frequent church attendance. Voas and Chaves. Even Intense Religiosity. 695.
However, religious service attendance is a less reliable metric for determining religious affiliation as it does not
necessarily reflect religious belief(s) or lack thereof. With the “unchurched” being defined as Pasquale does
provides a much higher percentage of the American population as, “all who report that they do not affiliate with
religious institutions or have not regularly attended formal services for a period of time (such as six months or a
year), regardless of beliefs. The category is therefore quite broad, including both religious believers and unbelievers.
Depending upon definitions, year of study, and sampling techniques, estimates of the unchurched range from 35 to
50 percent of the US population.” See, Empirical Study and Neglect of Unbelief and Irreligion. Excerpted from The
New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, Tom Flynn (Ed.) Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007. Pages 760-766. Entry by
Frank L. Pasquale. 762. A substantial majority of the unchurched in the United States, for example, pray, believe
that Jesus Christ was the son of God, and desire religious training for their children. 762.
21

Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is declining in the United States,” 697.

5

considered traditional Evangelical beliefs, is getting stronger;22 however, research from Barna
Group reveals that paralleling the rise of the Nones is a diminishing popularity of traditional
Evangelical faith values and beliefs among those that might identify as Evangelical. Where
Barna research reveals more than half of American Christians embrace at least one foundational
element of the postmodern epistemology regarding the relativity of truth and the percentage of
Americans that described themselves as Christian fell eight percentage points from 2007 to
2014.23
The relatively recent interest with Nones has led to studies on the genesis of unbelief,
disbelief, and misbelief in attempts to identify not only sociological causes but also formulations
useful for predicting unbelief.24 Identifying as unaffiliated could be just more about identity than
beliefs since a majority of the unaffiliated still report having religious beliefs in general and
some traditional Christian beliefs in particular. This could indicate Nones simply prefer to cease
identifying with an established religion rather than cease believing in God or some form of
higher power. Although the number of atheists and agnostics are growing, they do not make up
a substantial number of the None population.25 Instead of completely renouncing belief in a

22

Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme, “Protestant and Catholic Distinctions in Secularization,” Journal of
Contemporary Religion, (2016) 31:2, 165.
23

“Competing Worldviews Influence Today’s Christians,” Barna Research Group, May 9, 2017.
https://www.barna.com/research/competing-worldviews-influence-todays-christians/ (Accessed December 18,
2018).
24

G. Pennycook, et al.”Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief” Cognition, 123
(2012), pp. 335-346. See also, Will M. Gervais and Ara Norenzayan. "Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious
Disbelief." Science 336, no. 6080 (2012): 493-96. See also, Shenhav, Amitai,Rand, David G.,Greene, Joshua D.
“Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Vol
141(3), Aug 2012, 423-428.
25

Thirteen percent of religiously unaffiliated Americans claim the label “atheist”; fourteen percent define
themselves as “agnostic.” Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and
Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” Public Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, 11. See also Will
Gervais who suggests the number of atheists in America could be as high as twenty six percent of the population.
Some would suggest the significantly lower number of reported atheists in America is due to the still-present social

6

higher power, religious Nones still hold beliefs regarding a higher power with varying degrees of
personability.26 Those that have left the church (disaffiliated) have not inoculated the beliefs of
the Nones, instead there is a quickly growing gap between the beliefs in God, belief in the
afterlife, and frequency of prayer where these beliefs are strengthening in the declining
population of the affiliated and quickly weakening amongst the growing number of Nones.
The recent tipping point for the widening chasm in beliefs between the affiliated and
unaffiliated appears to have occurred around the turn of the millennium. With, the affiliated and
unaffiliated becoming “more like each other in beliefs and practices before 2000. After 2000, the
affiliated and unaffiliated became less like each other in beliefs and practices.”27
It is not just the general population that is becoming less religious, the share of those who
used to be considered to be intensely religious is also declining. As mentioned, some would
argue that the increasing distance in similarity of beliefs between the religious and unaffiliated is
a consequence of the lessening of belief among the unaffiliated and a strengthening of belief
among the intensely religious; that religiosity as a whole is not in decline in America but rather
“only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States;”28 however, Voas and Chaves

stigmatism surrounding the general, negative opinion of atheists; a perpetual cycle where poor/inaccurate
perceptions of atheists is caused by the relatively low number of atheists in a population. When, conversely, the
more prevalent atheism is the more favorable perception of atheism in general. Will M. Gervais. “Finding the
Faithless: Perceived Atheist Prevalence Reduces Anti-Atheist Prejudice.” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 37(4) 543–556. Atheists are included in Nones data but are more accurately defined as irreligious. Pasquale
delineates the definition of Nones vs Nots by stating, “In other words, “nones” include, but are not equivalent to,
“nots” (the affirmatively irreligious).” See, Frank L. Pasquale, “Empirical Study and Neglect of Unbelief and
Irreligion,” Excerpted from The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, Tom Flynn (Ed.) Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
2007, 765.
26

Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving
Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” 11. has fifty nine percent of unaffiliated believing in a
personal God (twenty two percent) or impersonal force (thirty seven percent).
27

367.

Gullickson, “The Diverging Beliefs and practices of the religiously unaffiliated in the United States,”

28

Schnabel, Landon, and Sean Bock. 2017. “The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American
Religion: A Response to Recent Research.” Sociological Science 4:686.

7

provide conclusive evidence that a characteristic of the None population is their rapid conversion
rates from affiliated to unaffiliated,
In 1983, 67% of Britons identified as some kind of Christian. In 2015, it was 43%. Over
the same period, members of Non-Christian religions have more than quadrupled. In the
UK, conversion rate of nones from Christianity is astonishingly greater than the
conversion rate of Nones to Christianity with “every one person brought up with No
religion who has become a Christian, twenty-six people brought up as Christians now
identify as Nones.29
This appears to be the case in America as well. The conversion rates of “Nonverts” as Stephen
Bullivant calls them, are significantly greater than conversions from the None population to
Christianity in general and Evangelical expressions of faith in particular. A point Bullivant
confirms in stating, “for every person brought up in a non-religious household who becomes
religious, 26 people raised as Christians became non-religious.”30
So, it is not that Nones never had religion or were raised without religion. In fact, many
were raised in religiously affiliated homes, but they later chose to de-convert and some argue
convincingly that these deconverts are “unlikely to come back.”31 Interestingly, not only is the
population of Nonverts increasing, but there is also a corresponding increase in the retention rate
of the None population. Nones appear to stay Nones longer than deconverts raised in Evangelical
homes. Pew admits that the retention rate is still lower than other major world religions, with the
majority of Nones raised in unaffiliated households still identify as Nones. Additionally, the
retention rate is even greater among Millennials compared to all other religions listed on the

29

Stephen Bullivant. “The No Religion Population of Britain.” Recent data from the British Social
Attitudes Survey (2015) and the European Social Survey (2014) Catholic Research Forum Reports, 3.
30

Ibid.

31

Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch. Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving
Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back. Washington D.C.: Public Religion Research Institute
September 22, 2019.

8

survey.32 “Nearly one in five Americans switched from their childhood religious identity to
become unaffiliated as adults, and only three percent of Americans who were raised unaffiliated
are joining a religious tradition. This dynamic has resulted in a dramatic net gain—16 percentage
points— for the religiously unaffiliated.”33 This is “one important reason,” according to the
Public Religion Research Institute, “why the unaffiliated are experiencing rising retention rates is
because younger Americans raised in nonreligious homes are less apt to join a religious tradition
or denomination than young adults in previous eras."34 Furthermore, this phenomenon is growing
most immediately by conversion rather than biological growth due to religiously unaffiliated
individuals having fewer children than those who identify with a religion.35 In addition,
conversion processes are often a symptom, and a function of the public resurgence of religion.
As has been seen thus far, sociologists have been unable to agree upon a single,
significant cause for the rapid increase of Nones in America. Historically, attributing secularism
as the primary catalyst for the significant growth in the population of those identifying as
religiously unaffiliated has been a common argument among sociologists. This is why Berger, in
a 1968 interview in the New York Times, confidently predicted that, by “the twenty-first century,
religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a world-

32

Pew Forum. America’s Changing Religious Landscape. http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americaschanging-religious-landscape/. Accessed January 16, 2019.
33

Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re
Unlikely to Come Back,” Public Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, 4.
34

Ibid., 5.

35

See Michael Lipka and David McClendon, “Why people with no religion are projected to decline as a
share of the world’s population,” Pew Research Center, April 7, 2017 https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/04/07/why-people-with-no-religion-are-projected-to-decline-as-a-share-of-the-worlds-population/
(accessed January 20, 2019) “This relative decline is largely attributable to the fact that religious “nones” are, on
average, older and have fewer children than people who are affiliated with a religion.”

9

wide secular culture.”36 Nearly thirty years later, Berger redacted his proclaimed certainty as a
result of the global religious landscape he saw before him and stated, “the world today … is as
furiously religious as it ever was … the body of literature by historians and social scientists
loosely labelled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken.”37
It is the newness of this phenomenon that has posed a precarious question which has been
hard to answer with any significant amount of forceful significance, namely, what is causing
such a rapid increase of Americans choosing to not identify with any religion? One might
assume recent sexual scandal within the Catholic church would be a significant contributing
factor for the surge in religious unaffiliation but this only accounts for a relatively small number
of those.38 According to Public Religion Research Institute, the top two reasons that young adults
list for leaving the church is that “they stopped believing in the religion’s teachings (60 percent)”
and their families were “never that religious when they were growing up (32 percent).”39 In the
Public Religion Research Institute survey, which mirrored the most recent Pew research,40
among the reasons Americans identified as important motivations in leaving their childhood

36

Peter Berger, “A Bleak Outlook is Seen for Religion,” New York Times, 25 February 1968.
https://www.nytimes.com/1968/02/25/archives/a-bleak-outlook-is-seen-for-religion.html (Accessed January 2,
2019.)
37

Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat” The National Interest. .46 (Winter 1996): p3.

38

Worth noting here, the Catholic church is also experiencing a significant decline in those that identify as
Catholic. With “Catholics suffering the largest decline among major religious groups: a 10-percentage point loss
overall.” Where thirty one percent of Americans report a childhood Catholic affiliation thirteen percent of those
leave by switching to another religion or report no current religious affiliation. See Jones, Cox, Cooper, and
Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” Public
Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, for full report on retention rates of major religious categories in
America.
39

Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re
Unlikely to Come Back,” 6.
40

Becka Alper, “Why America’s Nones do not identify with religion,” Pew Research Center, August 8,
2018. Accessed January 29, 2019.

10

religion are: they stopped believing in the religion’s teachings, their family was never that
religious when they were growing up, and their experience of negative religious teachings about
or treatment of gay and lesbian people.41 The Nones’ experience of negative religious teachings
about the treatment of LGBTQ people is a relatively new phenomena. Interestingly, this latter
reason was cited as a much more important factor for disaffiliation than the clergy sexual abuse
scandal in the Catholic church.
Need and Purpose of this Study
This study is needed as there exists no investigation of the current rapid rise in religious
unaffiliation while comparing it to past major historical periods of American religion for the
focused purpose of identifying those mechanisms that sparked periods of resurgence of interest
in Evangelical-esque expressions of Christianity out of periods of significant religious
disinterest.
Greg Smith, Associate Director of the Pew Research Center, removes doubt concerning
the significance of a shifting tide in religious affiliation by certainly stating, “I think it goes
without saying these are pretty significant changes in the American religious landscape.”42 The
Nones phenomenon in the U.S. has gone from two percent of adult Americans in 1950 to twenty
one percent, 2014, according to Pew Research and some surveys put one in five adults as having
left the church and one in three Millennials have self-identify as unaffiliated. As alarms are
sounding for the Evangelical church due to the rapid increase of religious unaffiliation there is a

41

Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re
Unlikely to Come Back,” 6.
42

Daniel Burke, “Religious leaders respond to the rise of the ‘Nones’,” Religion News Service, October 10,
2012, https://religionnews.com/2012/10/10/religious-leaders-react-to-the-rise-of-the-nones/ (Accessed January 16,
2019).

11

glint of hope for the church in understanding “people stop being religious more quickly than
they start being wholly secular.”43 This means the total abandonment of religion is not imminent
and the Evangelical church still has time to respond, albeit, how much time is not clear since
religious decline has been at play throughout much of the 20th century; however, to be clear,
something is evolving in America's perception of religion generally and Evangelicalism
specifically and there are significant cultural consequences.
As households are becoming increasingly unaffiliated the youth of America are losing
their religion and identifying as Nones at a much faster rate than their elders.44 Every generation
is becoming more religiously unaffiliated with a majority of those who leave their childhood
faith do so before their eighteenth birthday.45 A staggering ninety percent of those who leave
their childhood faith do so before their 30th birthday putting these individuals squarely in the
Millennial demographic.46 Nearly half (forty six percent) of teens, on par with Millennials, say
“I need factual evidence to support my beliefs”47 The 2016 Cooperative Institutional Research
Program Freshman48 survey revealed the number of college freshmen with no religious
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affiliation more than tripled since 1986, up thirty one percent from ten percent.49 The most
recent survey thirty five percent of the incoming freshmen in the United States picked atheist,
agnostic or nothing in particular. The percentage of college graduates who identify with
Christianity has declined by nine percentage points since 2007 with twenty four percent of all
college graduates identifying as Nones.50 With atheists making up the fastest growing population
within the Nones; the number nearly doubling from 2007 to 2014.51 More than double the
population identified as Gen Z52 self-identify as atheist compared to 6% of the general US adult
population.53
Significance Of Study
The number of those that identify as Christian is quickly shrinking in the United States
with the religiously unaffiliated making up nearly a third of the population in the country.54 The
population of those who do not identify with any religious category being the primary or second
largest religion in seventy six percent of the 50 states in America, with the religiously
unaffiliated becoming the largest group in forty six percent of the nation’s states.55
49
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This is a monumental shift in the religious landscape of a country that has been
considered a “Christian” nation for nearly two and a half centuries and it is possible that this
national identity could cease to exist in the lifetime of those reading this project. Several in the
fields of sociology and religion are studying this religious de-evolution and the most recent
reports indicate a budding but dramatic increase in the number of individuals who are
comfortable with not identifying with any particular religion. The consequences of this massive
shift have yet to be fully explored in the social sciences and it is a huge shift which has not been
fully realized yet. Nonetheless, there are significant identifiable cultural consequences resulting
from a rapid decrease in religiosity in general and American Evangelical identification
specifically.
Beyond the immediate impact on religious institutions, religious affiliation has significant
individual and societal impact through the influence of politics, the economic impact of religious
establishments,56 and the relationship between religious affiliation, and mental health
consequences. PRRI’s Director of Research Dan Cox is quoted as saying, “The U.S. religious
landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation that is fundamentally reshaping American
politics and culture.”57 Religion is woven into the founding fabric of the American nation.
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Addressed in the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in Article 6, the nation and its leaders
cannot impose any particular form or preference of religion on the American people;58 the
government cannot interfere with anyone’s religion,59 nor can it require a religious test of any
sort as a prerequisite for holding public office. With Pasquale arguing, “‘Rational choice’ and
economic or market theories of religion stress the prevalence and benefits of religious belief and
affiliation,”60 the strong relationship between religion and a nation’s policy begins to become
evident.
Politics determines policy and as voters determine politicians, with “the role of political
authorities in supporting/discouraging religion is a significant factor in the flourishing of a
religion.”61 As such, religiously affiliated and unaffiliated voters significantly determine national
policy and the trajectory of a nation, religiously and politically. If this is true, the rise of the
Nones has political, policy, and cultural implications.62 With religious resurgence illustrated by
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the Moral Majority in the 1980’s shaping national policy and politics, so too do current surges in
religious unaffiliation have the potential to significantly influence public policy that has far
reaching consequences for those that hold traditional Evangelical beliefs. A great majority of
Americans hold the opinion that if more Americans were religious it would be positive for
American society;63 however, only a slim majority still believe religion can answer most of life’s
problems.64 As Chaves highlights,
Actively religious Americans are more politically and socially conservative than less
religious Americans. Active participants support more restrictions on legal abortion,
endorse more traditional gender roles, and vote Republican more often than less religious
people. These differences have existed at least since the 1970s, but some of them have
increased since then, creating a tighter link between religiosity and some kinds of
political and social conservatism.65
Writing for the Guardian, Jason Wilson speaks to the potentially dire implications of an
ever shrinking Christian majority in stating, “After accounting for eight out of 10 Americans in
1976, white Christians are now a minority...The political implications could be profound.”66
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These implications are compounded when one realizes the college educated, white, male is the
fastest growing demographic in the American None population.67 Add to this general profile of
the American None the political profile is Independent or Democrat68 and twice as likely to be
politically liberal (forty one percent) as they are to be conservative (twenty one percent).69
CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, Robert P. Jones recently wrote regarding
the declining trajectory of a diminishing white Christian America saying it is “remarkable how
fast” the trend is moving. In 2008, “white Christians were still 50% of the population, so that
there’s been an 11-point shift since Barack Obama’s election.”70 According to Jones, there is an
obvious reason for this shift, namely, “the disaffiliation of young people in particular from
Christian churches.”71 That is, especially among the young, there are proportionally fewer
Christians. If this trends continue, that means that there will be fewer and fewer Christians72 and
the political implications are revealed in a recent presidential election.
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According to the Pew Research Center, on election day, 2012 exit polls conducted by the
National Election Poll found that seventy nine percent of white Evangelical Protestants voted for
Romney over Obama.73 Conversely, the same exit poll found that, “that 70% of religious
“nones” voted for Obama over Romney.”74 Prior to the 2016 election, “more than one-quarter
(26%) of unaffiliated Americans report they were not registered to vote, a significantly higher
rate than among white Evangelical Protestants (10%).”75 With the a strong majority of Nones
strongly favoring Hillary Clinton (sixty two percent) over Donald Trump (twenty one percent),
the Nones were a significant, and perhaps underrated, voting coalition for Clinton compared to
Trump’s (thirty percent vs thirteen percent).76 This underutilized voting block will most likely
be a much more significant influence in the 2020 election. Compare this to those with
Evangelical beliefs, “among Evangelicals who voted, more than half of Evangelicals by belief
(58 percent) and self-identified Evangelicals (53 percent) cast their ballot for Trump,”77 and, “a
majority of non-Evangelical voters (53 percent) voted for Clinton, while 36 percent voted for
Trump.”78
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However, more than religious beliefs alone appear to influence political affiliation. It is
possible race and generational cohort significantly influences how those with Evangelical beliefs
vote. Lifeway Research contrasts the vast differences in how those who hold Evangelical beliefs
vote based on their race and generational cohort identification:
African-American voters with Evangelical beliefs overwhelmingly voted for Clinton (86
percent), while more than three-quarters of white voters with Evangelical beliefs voted
for Trump (77 percent). Around half of younger voters with Evangelical beliefs cast their
ballot for Clinton—47 percent of those 18 to 49. A majority of voters 65 and over who
have Evangelical beliefs voted for Trump (72 percent).79
As there are political implications of religious affiliation there are, conversely, influential
ramifications of unbelief regarding morality and beliefs concerning basic human rights. With
those considered to be more religiously conservative being “especially concerned about the
ungodliness and moral decay of U.S. society and its alleged abandonment of family values.”80
“The issue of abortion has been the most pivotal political issue mobilizing religious
constituencies to political action in the United States during the four decades since the Roe v.
Wade Supreme Court decision which legalized abortion in 1973.”81 Religious Nones are
significantly less likely to hold that belief in God is necessary for morality and good values, or
their own moral decision making.82 An interesting position given the views of Nones concerning
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LGBTQ equality stemming from arguments for basic human rights. Perhaps even more alarming
is the only slight majority (fifty nine percent) of white Protestants who hold that belief in God is
a precondition for moral behavior.83
There is also a growing body of research addressing the coadjutant relationship between
levels of religiosity and corresponding impacts on mental health. Religious beliefs and practices
are related to greater life satisfaction, positive affect and higher morale.84 Specifically, belief in
God, but not religious affiliation, has been associated with better psychiatric treatment
outcomes.85 Individuals with a positive and accepting image of God demonstrate fewer anxiety
and depressive symptoms.86 Similarly, belief in a benevolent God is associated with less social
anxiety, paranoia, obsession, and compulsion.87 Some argue that religious beliefs affect
individual and societal happiness.88 Of the thirty five studies in the past two decades that have
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investigating the relationship between Christian affiliation and levels of happiness there is a
more than sixty five percent positive correlation89 providing strong evidence that religious
affiliation positively affects the quality of one’s life. Additionally, the data seem to indicate that
those that are unaffiliated are nearly as happy as those that identify with a Christian religion. A
Canadian survey provided a very clear correlation between religiosity and happiness suggesting
spirituality forms the strongest predictor of happiness.90
While the majority of correlation studies regarding Christian affiliation and happiness
have been positive, studies investigating Muslim affiliation have been overwhelmingly
positive,91 but, this could be attributed to what Opfinger and Gundlach found that individuals that
were either highly or unremarkably religious reported higher levels of happiness. Whereas those
who were identified to be moderately religious were the ones self-reporting the lowest levels of
happiness.92 And self-reporting Muslims were “more religious and happier compared to believers
of other religions.”93
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Additionally, the relatively recent increase in acceptance of full-normalcy of
homosexuality has produced research that suggests sexual minority individuals who are affiliated
with a gay-affirming, Christian denominations experience less perceived discrimination and
overall lower levels of depression compared to their peers that identified as secular, and those
sexual-minorities who are affiliated with denominations that oppose homosexuality. This
research indicates religious affiliation for sexual minorities can be a risk factor or protective
factor regarding mental health in general and discrimination and depression in particular.94
Interestingly, committed atheists are found to enjoy the best mental health among the
Nones population similar to those possessing strong religious beliefs.95 In fact, “convinced
atheists may derive consolation from a certainty of belief in their own solidly-held worldview,
leading to similar mental health to the highly-religious.”96 The spiritual but not religious
population generally has greater numbers of depression and substance abuse. With one English
study concluding, “People who have a spiritual understanding of life in the absence of a religious
framework are vulnerable to mental disorder.”97
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Contrarily, Speed and Fowler argue for a cessation of overgeneralization regarding the
positive corollary relationship between religion and mental health and happiness. Focusing
exclusively on how church attendance affects mental health of the religiously unaffiliated, their
results suggest, “the religiously unaffiliated experienced attending church less positively than
Christians; when compared at the highest level of attendance, the religiously unaffiliated were
less healthy than Christians.”98 In only investigating categorical behavioral activities, Speed’s
and Fowler’s research highlights the fact that activities such as religious service attendance and
prayer/meditation do not significantly correlate to higher levels of life satisfaction, happiness, or
better states of mental health for the religiously unaffiliated. This ignores the positive effects
associated with belonging (socialization/identifying with) and beliefs.
When compared to lowest levels of attendance, there were no differences between
Christians and the unaffiliated in levels of self-rated health or overall satisfaction with life;
however, more frequent attendance increased self-rated health and satisfaction with life among
Christians whereas high levels of attendance had a subsequent negative effect on self-rated
health and satisfaction with life among the religiously unaffiliated. When attending church at the
higher frequency (once a week), those identifying as Christian experienced higher levels of selfrated health and satisfaction with life than those that identified as unaffiliated.99 This further
indicates religious affiliation influences one's quality of life, negatively or positively.
Nonetheless, this subsequently could negate the assumption that attracting the
unaffiliated to religious events and services is the answer to the current rise of the Nones since a
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large number of Nones report their last experience in a religious service, not including wedding
or funeral services, was largely positive.100 In fact, contrary to the “seeker” movement of the late
Twentieth Century, it is important to note that religious Nones are in fact not seeking to join a
religious organization. The overwhelming majority, 93%, report they are not actively seeking or
interested in joining a religious organization or church that would be right for them.101 Even
among those Nones to whom religion is still important in their lives very few are actively
interested in seeking to find a religious organization or church that is right for them.102
Interestingly, a higher level of certainty in one's belief system is associated with greater
psychological health.103 A claim that is also supported by Baylor’s 2011 Values and Beliefs
survey where it was shown that what individuals believe affects mental health more than
religious activity and affiliation (Behaving and Belonging). Though, those respondents that
attended religious services multiple times each week had the fewest number of mental health
issues,104 supporting the hypothesis illustrating a possible correlation that certainty of belief
increases religious affiliation via religious socialization (attendance).
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Research Problem and Thesis
Johnson provides a simplistic formula for calculating and predicting religious affiliation
locally and globally. By suggesting the measures of births minus deaths, converts minus
defectors, and immigrants minus emigrants, he relies heavily on the supposition that the causes
of current and future populations of religious and irreligious communities can be determined by
measuring empirical population data.105 In other words, he suggests changes over time in
religious affiliation can be measured by examining the empirical data sets just mentioned;
however, this does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the rapid increase in the number of
religiously unaffiliated among Americans 30 years old and younger as this population is having
fewer children than those generational cohorts before them.
Each successive birth cohort is less intensely religious than the one before, and there is
little sign of people becoming more intensely religious with age or over time.106 Brauer suggests
the reason for a lessening religiosity from one generational cohort to the next is, “not primarily
the result of the diminishing size of the moderately religious...Rather, the highly religious make
up increasingly small proportions of each subsequent cohort, while the proportion that is
moderately religious has actually increased substantially across cohorts.”107
Voas and Chaves also argue the rising numbers of religiously unaffiliated result from
younger generations replacing older, more traditionally religious ones; however, that is not the
entire story. The data suggest that Americans are becoming less religious across generations.
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Something more than cohort change is responsible for the overall trend leading others to return
the very important question,
Is religious decline inevitable and irreversible? If there is no expectation that the process
and the mechanisms underlying it will be disrupted, further religious decline is not only
theoretically possible but highly plausible. However, the existence of processes that
slowly weaken religious convictions does not preclude the possibility of strong
counteracting forces. Certainly, U.S. history provides many examples of religious
revivals and mobilization.108
So, for example, even if the conditions that enable religious decline remain (making
decline inevitable), religious revivals may effectively undo many decades of slow decline. In
contrast, Voas and Chaves provide a helpful metaphor comparing the current decline of religion
in America to a cooling bathtub. While one may continue to add hot water, and while the water
may get warmer, those efforts do not curb the cooling process.109 What is important for the
Evangelical Church in particular, if it is to have any hope of existing (minimally) or thriving
(ideally) in America, Brauer urges that unless “we understand the nature of the water heater and
the person turning on the faucet, we are left with significant unknowns about how long the bath
will remain comfortable.”110
With over sixty percent of Protestant churches in America experiencing either plateaued
or declining numbers, the ineffectiveness or outright inattention to evangelistic efforts is
magnified by the aggressive growth of the Nones population;111 therefore, this dissertation
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project seeks to answer one central question related to the current increase in the number of
Americans identifying as religiously unaffiliated: Are there identifiable religious resurgence
mechanisms in American religious history that address the current rise of the Nones and if
initiated would facilitate future religious resurgence?
Research Gap
Perhaps the most significant research currently underway regarding understanding
unbelief and religious unaffiliation is being conducted by the John Templeton Foundation. From
January 2017 to September 2019 a research team is completing a nearly $2.9 million grant
investigating the causes of unbelief and atheism around the world aiming to better understand the
phenomenon that is associated with the word un-belief whether that’s atheism, agnosticism, the
religious Nones; those individuals without religious identification. The project is less about what
these individuals believe in particular. Instead, the project is aimed at providing an analysis of
the current None population, globally.112 It is clear Nones are a heterogeneous group consisting
of nuances that have yet to be identified and researched. While some research exists that
provides broad sub-categories of religious identifiers and degrees of affiliation such as PRRI’s
Rejectionist, Apatheist, and Unattached believers to more general classifications of agnostic,
weak and strong atheists, etc. The lack of granular-level research into the nuances in causes of
belief, or lack thereof, is a primary impetus for the currently underway Templeton project on
Understanding Unbelief. The research will culminate in September 2019 for the 50th
anniversary of the Vatican’s 1969 conference, Culture of Unbelief.
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Prior to the current research project on Understanding Unbelief, The Templeton
Foundation initiated a yearlong study from October 2015 to December 2016 to conduct the
Scientific Study of Non-Religious Belief to map non-religious belief. This global research
project had as its aim to establish the study of ‘non-religion’ as a major sub-field in the
psychological and social sciences.” However, in investigating how belief and unbelief is
psychologically structured, the Scientific Study of Non-Religious Belief project has not provided
insight nor direction for what is needed for a future resurgence of religion.113
The recent focus on the rise of the Nones has led to coining new categories of religious
identification such as spiritual but not religious, committed atheists, disaffiliated, nonverts, etc.
providing a host of newly coined identifiers for a sociological phenomenon. But, most reporting
and texts regarding religious affiliation and the rise of the Nones discuss the current state of
affairs regarding the decline of religion in America in general and the rapid decline of mainline
and Evangelical Christianity in America specifically. Little-to-no space has been devoted to
comparing and contrasting the causes of the current surge of religious unaffiliation and
comparing those with potentially similar causes throughout the history of American Evangelical
expressions of Christianity for the expressed purpose of identifying common causes for a surge
in religious unaffiliation and the mechanisms that inaugurate a resurgence of belief in
Christianity among the American population. It is the lack of scholarly investigation regarding
the causes of previous periods of religious disinterest/unaffiliation and comparing those with the
current American religious situation that magnifies the need for this dissertation project.
The lack of academic treatments produces a specific set of research questions that can be
addressed and a treatment provided by weaving a hypothesis together from seeking the discovery
113
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of mechanisms that can facilitate future religious resurgence in America. The primary hypothesis
of this project suggests there are identifiable markers in the history of the American church
regarding primacy of prayer, sermon content, evangelistic focus, intentional discipleship, etc. and
surrounding culture regarding secularism, economy, politics, etc. that caused both periods of
disinterest in religion and precipitated surges in interest in Evangelical expressions of
Christianity. Have those identifiable mechanisms preceded the current rise of the Nones and
how present are those mechanisms of resurgence in the American Evangelical church today?
Statement of Limitations
Due to the relative recency of the Nones phenomenon there have been few academic
treatments which provides the most significant limitation of this project. The resulting lack of
substantial, academic treatment of the phenomenon requires this project to draw from,
incorporate, and supplement existing sources with news articles, surveys, polls, etc. to illustrate
the recent evolution of religious adherence while consulting historical works of the religious
history of the American people for the prospect of highlighting the potential cyclical nature of
American religiosity.
Moreover, this project does not investigate a comparison of the rapid religious decline of
the United Kingdom to what is occurring in the United States. As briefly discussed above, there
are several that suggest America is following a similar trajectory as that of the United Kingdom,
suggesting there could be the potential for significant predictions for the future religious
landscape of the US and insights regarding the causes and remedies for the current rapid decline
in those who identify as Christian.114
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Certainly there are socio-economic and psychological factors that significantly influence
the causes of unbelief; however, the scope and aim of this project prevents the implications of
these influences from being fully investigated apart from the brief discussion of socio-economic
theories influencing the rise of the Nones in the United States in Chapter 4.
Review Of Relevant Research
Robert Wuthnow’s The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since
World War II115 is first in a four-volume treatment by Princeton that addresses the relationship
between church and state. Though the work was published before there was a recognizable
increase in religious unaffiliation in America, the work still provides substantial insights
regarding the already-present shifts occurring in the religious landscape. This work consistently
confirms throughout that religion in America is persistent, and though it is being restructured to
be experienced in a more privatized instead of corporate context, it will not soon disappear.
Importantly, Restructuring addresses what Wuthnow calls the “education gap” between
religious conservatives and liberals that began to appear during the 60s “as a result of baby
boomers' experiences with higher education during the counterculture unrest; however, it also
traced the rising levels of education of Evangelicals and suggested that the ‘education gap’ might
be of limited duration.”116 Something Wuthnow further confirms from his research in Further
Evidence, specifically that the “educational differences between religious liberals and
conservatives appear to have diminished during the late 1980s.”117
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Wuthnow provides an update to his 1988 text in his Sociological Inquiry article118 where
he provides updated empirical evidence that further substantiates his primary arguments in
Restructuring American Religion. In his interest to “see whether the main arguments advanced in
Restructuring need to be modified or whether they are still supported by the evidence,”119 he
concludes that the primary arguments that religion was positioned “to be deeply influenced by
changes in its social environment” in a post-World War II America still hold true and are
supported by the dramatically changing political and social context.
The concept of religious socialization was not addressed in Restructuring but Wuthnow’s
updated research in Further Evidence purposefully investigated the statistical significance of the
familial influence on one’s religious affiliation and beliefs. Wuthnow’s analysis led him to
confidently conclude that “one important way in which religious orientations have become
institutionalized is family.”120
Part two of the Princeton Church-State series is provided by Robert T. Handy aptly titled
Undermined Establishment: Church-State Relations in America, 1880-1920121 describes this as
the period where the “informal” establishment of Protestantism began to markedly decline in the
American context. In purposefully employing the term “establishment” as that entity that
executes the leading role in determining and controlling the public agenda Handy is able to hint
at the force with which mainstream Protestantism was able to influence the American public
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agenda; the term as a nod to the force with which the State Church of England was able to shape
a nation.
Handy provides useful markers for possible causations of the decline of Protestantism
during this time, which can inform and guide the investigation of previous periods of American
religious history. Citing significant population growth, an increasing religious pluralism, the
growth of the Catholic Church, and the development of schisms within Protestantism as possible
fault lines within the religious landscape that would only continue to widen. Prior to the 60s and
the election of Kennedy, what Handy concludes was the final end to the Protestant establishment,
the majority of Protestant leaders had a favorable opinion of the state with the three Presidents
Handy discusses (McKinley, Roosevelt, Harrison) approving of Protestant activities and
beliefs.122
Mark Chaves, in his American Religion: Contemporary Trends,123 traces changes
occurring in religion in the United States between 1972 and 2008 primarily leveraging General
Social Survey data and National Congregations Study (NCS) data secondarily. Chaves suggests
the results do strike a balance between “the twin dangers of overstating and understating recent
changes.”124 He quickly acknowledges that the process of cultural change is very slow and as
such sociologists of religion and those that would study the American religious landscape are
best served by taking the “longer view” where more significant change(s) can be observed and
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identified. His primary argument for the rapid increase of Nones being a “backlash to the
religious right's rising visibility in the 1980s.”125 will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.
Chaves outlines his examination of religion (primarily Christianity) in American life in
several significant areas126 with the primary aim being to describe the American religious trends
in these areas over the past several decades with no purpose to explain these for the reader.
Largely, Chaves’ findings illustrate an American religious landscape that has fluctuated,
positively or negatively, very little since the earliest 1972 General Social Survey data, but his
conclusion points “to a straightforward general conclusion: American religiosity has been
declining for decades.”127 With every indicator of traditional religious belief is either stable or
declining, and most are declining. The trend is toward less religion.”128 Though the decline is
very slow;129 however, the decline has been so slow that it is necessary for the researcher to
examine larger periods of history and data to be able to perceive fluctuations in the ebb and flow
of American religiosity. Launching from this point, and what is of great relevance to this study is
leveraging the descriptive outlines Chaves provides from data as recent as 2008 and what has
happened since regarding the more rapid increase of those identifying as religiously unaffiliated.
Seeking to dismiss the secular vs religious dichotomy that has for so long existed, Baker
and Smith argue in their American Secularism: Cultural Contours of Nonreligious Belief
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Systems130 that there are several different types and shades of secularity and each has a nuanced
relationship with religion.131 By leveraging GSS data from 1972 to 2012 and 2007 Pew
Research data as a quantitative foundation, the text is able to establish the complexity of
American secularity by providing three useful dimensions of secularity (affiliation, belief, and
practices) that serve as delimiting scope for providing four categories of the non-religious
(atheists, agnostics, non-religious believers, and culturally religious). The incorporation of both
survey and interview data provides this treatment of the current state of American secularity a
more qualitative feel. Regarding potential causes for the current state of nonreligious belief in
America, Baker and Smith attribute this change in the American religious landscape to shifts in
the political meanings of religion in American culture; arguing that the rate of secularity has
increased since the 1970s due to changes in the family structure and due to the politics of
religion.
Locating Self As Researcher
An imperative step in the qualitative phenomenological approach to research is
bracketing out or identifying the researchers presuppositions and bias regarding the phenomenon
being research.132 To explicate the significance of identifying and acknowledging the
researcher’s bias, Wendy Sword outlines that “In a qualitative study, the researcher’s curiosity,
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relationships with participants, and conceptual lenses through which data are gathered and
interpreted have significant bearing on the research.” and “Reflection on the influence of self not
only creates personal awareness of how the research is shaped by one’s own biography but also
provides a context within which audiences can more fully understand the researcher’s
interpretation of text data.”133
Starbuck advocates that researchers “should both challenge their own thinking by
disrupting their preconceptions and try to demonstrate the validity of their knowledge by
observing natural experiments and by displacing situations from equilibria.”134
As this project examines the religiously unaffiliated, who largely are highly educated,
white, male, and votes Democrat,135 this researcher can similarly be considered as a highly
educated, white, male, albeit more conservative and voting Republican. Political affiliation is of
little interest to this author as the conviction exists that the Church is the medium of hope for
humanity rather than a robust support and relief system developed and provided by a national
governmental structure.
Concerning those who have disaffiliated from their childhood faith due to negative
experiences with the church, this author can also empathize. Being initially reared in a secular
home during early childhood then experiencing a familial conversion to a fundamentalist
expression of Christianity in the southern United States, this experience encouraged the author to
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be dedicated to the pursuit of Christian ministry in late 1999. These experiences have provided
this author with a valuable familiarity that will assist in the interpretation of the material being
presented in the research.
The theories that are generated regarding the mechanisms of resurgence will be allowed
to emerge, as naturally as possible, from the research. As Sword agrees, this familiarity not only
provides the researcher “a priori familiarity with relevant issues but also,” enhances the
researcher’s “ability to make sense of the data.”136
What has it been, precisely, that has prevented persistence in that childhood faith, and
perhaps more importantly for this study, what needs to happen with(in) the American church to
prevent further apostasy and initiate a period of resurgence of Evangelical American Christian
affiliation?
In looking to accomplish this qualitative endeavor, this author is seeking to collect and
interpret data, (both qualitative and quantitative), and evaluate prominent periods of American
Christianity for the aim of confirming or disproving that there are identifiable mechanisms in
significant periods of the history of American Christianity that have sparked resurgence of
Christian affiliation and commitment out of periods of languishing unbelief.
Research Approach
As it is detailed in the Research Gap section above, there are several substantial
published works and global research projects currently underway that are purposefully aimed at
illustrating the reason(s) why individuals (Americans specifically) are choosing to select “None
of the above” on national surveys. This project intends to investigate and analyze the ebb and
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flow of religious affiliation throughout significant periods of American religious history. Those
periods that could be considered to be characterized by significantly high and low levels of
Christian affiliation will be evaluated for the purpose of identifying mechanisms that may have
instigated periods of unaffiliation and sparked periods of religious resurgence. Comparing and
contrasting historical mechanisms for resurgence can assist in highlighting and outlining certain
cultural continuities that may help the Twenty-first Century church strategically implement these
mechanisms in their respective demographic and geographical contexts.
This necessitates a primarily phenomenological assessment. As such this project does
not focus extensively on answering the “why” of the recent surge in religious unaffiliation. The
aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust qualitative treatment of a recent American religious
phenomenon. To accomplish this aim, the research that follows will make use of data which are
drawn from several national surveys.137 Additionally, historical material supplied by surveys and
reports which provide the most recent quantitative statistics regarding American religious beliefs,
affiliation, etc. Works of history which outline the ebbs and flows of American religiosity will
also be highly utilized to identify those apparent periods of high and low religious affiliation,
interest, and belief.
Writing before the invention of the internet but reflecting the necessity of evolving
approaches to scholarship concerning the study of religion, Wuthnow states to accurately
“understand the active role of religion in the culture...requires the insights not only of
historians...but also of sociologists and anthropologists.”138 Thus, this project will rely heavily
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and draw upon historical studies, empirical data, and sociological publications that illustrate the
nuances of the current religious landscape in America.
The resulting analysis derived from this investigative approach provides the
comprehensive descriptions, which then provide the basis for a reflective structural analysis to
portray the essence of the American Christian affiliation as it has been experienced historically,
contrasted with how it is currently being experienced. This historical comparative analysis
provides the insights that will inform the conclusions and recommendations for the contemporary
American Christian church.
Research Method
The majority of research that has been conducted recently regarding religious affiliation
and the shifting landscape of American religiosity primarily employs quantitative methodologies.
Therefore, to assist in filling a gap in the current research, this study will consider and
incorporate quantitative conclusions in order to provide a more robust qualitative
phenomenological approach aimed at analyzing the narrative of American religion generally and
the recent surge in religious unaffiliation as it affects American Christianity particularly. As
detailed above, this narrative of the landscape of Christianity in America will be built from
investigation and analysis of quantitative survey data as well as works of history, sociology,
anthropology, and psychology.
Yin substantiates the value of a qualitative methodology allowing the method to more
effectively provide needed insights into particular phenomena:
By now, qualitative research has become an acceptable, if not mainstream, form of
research in many different academic and professional fields. As a result, the large number
of students and scholars who conduct qualitative studies may be part of different social
science disciplines (e.g., sociology, anthropology, political science, or psychology) or
different professions (e.g., education, management, nursing, urban planning, and program
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evaluation). In any of these fields, qualitative research represents an attractive and fruitful
way of doing research. 139
Since the investigation of possible mechanisms of religious affiliation involves analysis
of beliefs and experiences, a phenomenological approach ensures the aim of this project is met.
Smith provides a useful definition that illustrates the relevance of this approach by explaining
phenomenology as, “the study of structures of experience.... Literally, phenomenology is the

study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or
the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience.”140 The
phenomenological methodology is especially “powerful for understanding subjective experience,
gaining insights into people’s motivations and actions, and cutting through the clutter of takenfor-granted assumptions and conventional wisdom.”141 A “pure phenomenological research seeks
essentially to describe rather than explain, and to start from a perspective free from hypotheses or
preconceptions.”142 More specifically, “Phenomenology searches for the meaning or essence of
an experience rather than measurements or explanations.”143 Since qualitative phenomenology
searches for the meaning or essence of an experience rather than measurements or explanations,
leveraging this method will allow the research to focus more holistically on what is experienced
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as it relates to religious affiliation. This type of research necessarily approaches the
experience(s) holistically instead of limiting the focus to examining individual nuances.
To assist in safeguarding the integrity of the conclusions provided in this project, four
phenomenological method steps will be followed throughout the study. Bracketing, or
epoche’,144 “is important to phenomenological reduction, which is the process of isolating the
phenomenon being researched and separating it from what is already known about it.”145 All
judgments are to be suspended and the only thing to be considered is how people, cultures, etc.,
are experiencing the phenomenon in their individual or collective consciousness(es). Next, the
researcher is required to fully immerse themselves in the study of the phenomenon so the
meaning(s) of the phenomenon can be mined to achieve the third guiding principle of analysis
for the purpose of categorizing and defining common themes. The final step of describing, or
concluding, allows the researcher to assimilate his or her research findings into definitions of the
phenomenon that allow for an intuitive recommendation for a better way forward.
Lester proposes the inclusion of three sections, which will be incorporated below, for
substantially reporting findings in a phenomenological approach to aid in providing applicable
recommendations for responding to the continuing increase in religious unaffiliation and the
American Evangelical church incorporating and/or initiating the mechanisms of a new religious
resurgence. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 will rely on these three sections by following the proposed
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structure of providing a summary of the findings in the previous Chapter, e.g., Chapter 3 will
identify and summarize the findings or mechanisms ascertained from the historical survey
provided in Chapter 2. Then a discussion for the purpose of “relating the findings to previous
research or commentary, to personal experience or even to common-sense opinions, and
developing tentative theories.”146 will be provided. Finally, the implications or recommendations
will be established which are birthed from the previous two steps. This final section will allow
the author to identify significant implications and provide useful recommendations on a way
forward for the American Evangelical church in light of the current cultural/religious context.147
In each chapter, this project capitalizes on the benefits of qualitative research Yin outlines
regarding qualitative research methodology by first, studying the meaning of people’s lives
under real-world conditions. Second, representing the views and perspectives of the people in the
study. Third, covering the contextual conditions within which people live. Fourth, contributing
insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behavior.
Finally, striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source
alone.148
As with any research method, this approach is not without potential concern which this
heed and navigates. In discussing potential concerns with a phenomenological approach, Lester
compares a potential obstacle with a contrasting value in stating:
Phenomenological approaches are good at surfacing deep issues and making voices
heard. This is not always comfortable for clients or funders, particularly when the
research exposes taken for-granted assumptions or challenges a comfortable status quo.
On the other hand, many organisations value the insights which a phenomenological
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approach can bring in terms of cutting through taken-for-granted assumptions, prompting
action or challenging complacency.149
It is the latter, potential value, for which this current work aims. Specifically, Chapter 5
will be devoted to sewing together the mechanisms of religious resurgence identified in Chapter
3 with a comparison of the current dire religious landscape in order to challenge taken-forgranted assumptions with the hope of prompting action and challenging, with heartbreaking
immediacy, the current ineffectiveness of the American church. An additional characteristic of a
phenomenological methodology that may be perceived as a weakness is that it “differs from
other research in that it does not test a hypothesis, nor is there an expectation that the results
predictive or reproducible,” which calls into question the strength of the conclusions provided,
but the apparent value of this lack of expectation of finality as it relates to the topic leverages the
approach to serve as a launching point for further discussion, investigation, discussion, and
action for the American Evangelical church.
This method will be executed in the following manner throughout the following
dissertation. This work will consist of five chapters aimed at analyzing the current rapid increase
in religious unaffiliation among American Christians in general and American Evangelical
Christians specifically and comparing and contrasting it with other periods of religious flux
throughout American history.
To provide this analysis, Chapter 1 will serve as an intensive introduction to the project’s
topic and will consist of the project proposal components providing the thesis, review of relevant
literature, criteria, research approach and methods, limitations, and conclusion. Resultantly, the
absence of a thorough comparison of the current American religious landscape to other periods
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in the history of the American church where there may have been similar, if not greater, periods
of religious unaffiliation has created a ripe environment for this project to accomplish much in
the way of correcting a The end goal of this work is to initiate the discussion regarding the
mechanisms that have caused surges in unbelief historically and resurgence of religiosity
historically and how those mechanisms can be employed by the contemporary American
Evangelical church.
After 2000, data from the General Social Survey suggest that the prior trends of
converging beliefs between Nones and the affiliated began to “reverse or stagnate”150 History
indicates an individual’s relationship with religion evolves over time and does not necessarily
change in an instant.151 Therefore, and logically following from this introduction to and an
outline of the research problem, Chapter 2 will provide a survey of the history of American
religiosity for the purpose of highlighting in Chapter 3 those mechanisms that have caused the
intense pendulum swinging from ardent religious belief and apathetic religious indifference. It
has been stated that the lack of affiliation with organized religion may ultimately have led to a
loss of faith among the unaffiliated.152 Therefore it is assumed there are identifiable mechanisms
that have triggered religious affiliation, positively and negatively, and the historical examination
provided in Chapter 2 will feed the analysis conducted in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 will have as its goal to identify the historical causes of disaffiliation and causes
of resurgence in American Christianity for the purpose of extrapolating principles from these
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causes of resurgence uncovered in Chapter 2. The goal of Chapter 3 is to identify common
themes in the lived experience of American religious affiliation.
Following the discussion regarding historical religious affiliation in America, Chapter 4
turns to provide a thorough inquiry into the specific peculiarities of the current state of American
Christianity. There will be a qualifying of popular theories regarding the causes of the current
rise of the Nones to further remove chaff and specifically highlight those features that relate to
similar historical characteristics of the religiously unaffiliated.
Through providing a thorough investigation of the current American religious landscape,
Chapter 4 sets the stage for an identification of significant implications mined from Chapter 3
and provide useful recommendations on a way forward for the American Evangelical church in
light of the current cultural/religious context provided in Chapter 4.153
Chapter 5 is concerned with the possibilities of American Evangelical churches initiating
the historical mechanisms that have birthed periods of religious resurgence. How these
mechanisms were executed in the past and how they might be adapted and employed in the
current American religious context are the primary questions answered in the final chapter of this
project.
Criteria And Definition Of Terms
Unaffiliated vs None - Throughout this project the term “None” will be employed to indicate
those who self-identify as having no religious identification. After evaluating American
Religious Identification Survey data, Barry Kosmin, founding director of the Institute for the
Study of Secularism in Society and a professor at Trinity College, coined the term to serve as a
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less offensive identifier than what this population had for so long been known by, “the others.”154
The term Nones typically refers to those who do not affiliate with a religion on social surveys but
within the religious concept of Nones there are two primary categories. Within the population of
those that identify as having no religion exists those who have no religious identification and as a
result they choose “none” or “none of the above” on social surveys. These are referred to as nonaffiliates. The second subgroup are those who choose to not identify with a religion are doing so
to make a statement of sorts.
It is important to note within this definition of Nones that neither the term nor their
choice to not identify does not necessarily reflect on their religious beliefs, theistic views, etc. It
is imperative to avoid the assumption that Nones are unbelievers; simply agnostic or atheist.
Though there is a growing number of agnostics and atheists in the Nones category they still
comprise a significantly small number of the Nones population. As outlined below, Chapter 3
will provide an investigation into the similarities of historical periods of fluctuation in religious
affiliation.
Spiritual but not Religious - While Nones and those that have been identified as “spiritual but
not religious” are occasionally referred to as being synonymous, the two populations are similar
yet very distinct in that the Nones are identified as those individuals who have chosen “none of
the above” or “nothing in particular” in religious identification surveys. The spiritual but not
religious population consists of those individuals who, according to Pew Research, were asked
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separate questions concerning their self-perception of their being a religious person and whether
or not they considered themselves to be a spiritual person. The individuals who answered
affirmatively to both questions are identified as the spiritual but not religious, a population that
has dramatically grown to twenty seven percent of Americans.155
Some research hints at demarcations within the None population that can potentially be
used to categorize the whole. The phrase “spiritual but not religious” has been used to identify
varying population ranges within the None’s population. It will be beneficial to utilize the
insightful delineations provided by the most recent definitions of these sub-categories within the
Nones population provided by the Public Religion Research Institute where the survey found
very “little evidence of a separate mode of ‘spirituality’ distinct from ‘religiosity.’”156 The
Public Religion Research Institute indicates roughly forty percent of Nones consider themselves
very or moderately spiritual. Insightful and relevant for the purpose of this project is the finding
that those Nones categorized as Unattached Believers seventy one percent moderately
spiritual.157 Unless otherwise noted, throughout this study the generalization “spiritual but not
religious” will be used to indicate the sub-category of Nones who are defined as Unattached
Believers and hold similar beliefs as those who are affiliated but do not identify with a
religion.158
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To clearly illustrate the concepts of religiously unaffiliated and spiritual, but not religious
are not synonymous but not entirely divorced from one another, only thirty seven percent of
those identifying as spiritual but not religious are Nones.159
Disaffiliation, Deconversion/Nonversion and Never Affiliated - Deconverts and Nonverts160
are identified as those individuals who were raised in a household characterized by religious
affiliation or were religiously affiliated at one time and chose to no longer identify with that
religion. It be beneficial to delineate the unaffiliated into those who disaffiliated from a religious
background and those who were never affiliated in the first place. What seems to differentiate
these groups is not belief but rather a taste for certain religious practices. Unsurprisingly, those
raised in a religious home have a greater taste for continuing their religious practices even after
disaffiliation.161 As the term nonvert signifies those that were brought up in a religious tradition
but drifted away, similarly nonversion is synonymous with deconversion and disaffiliation which
describes the process of apostatizing from that religious tradition.162
Secularism and Secularization Theory - In its most basic form, the secularization thesis posits
“the idea that modernization tends to undermine religious belief and activity.”163 In arguing for
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the positive influence of modernization on individual’s converting to Christianity in the majority
world context, Rizvi and Hossain suggest, “theories point to the consequences of modernization
in initiating processes of religious conversion.” A thesis that is directly contrary to traditional
secularization theory, especially as it relates to religious affiliation in America, which
fundamentally proposes the process of modernization/secularization directly correlates to a
decline in religious affiliation; however, Voas and Chaves suggest,
the United States should not be considered a counterexample for two straightforward
empirical reasons. First, American religiosity has in fact been declining for decades, and
second, that decline has been produced by the same generational patterns that lie behind
religious decline elsewhere in the West where each successive cohort is less religious
than the preceding one.164
Therefore, the concept of secularism and secularization theory will assume the idea of
modernization of a society necessarily leads to a lessening value of religion in that society.
Church - Christianity is not dying, but it is experiencing a seismic shift in how it is expressed.
One major redefinition occurring is regarding where, or what, the church is. With churches
closing at record pace,165 American Christianity appears to be departing from traditional notions
of the church being intimately associated with a building, property, and the accompanying
overhead is now being perceived as an unnecessary anchor that has been and is preventing the
world from seeing the relevancy of the Christian faith.
There is great power in the grassroots nature of early Christendom when churches met
from house to house and in public spaces. It is when churches became established institutions
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that their effectiveness dwindled and confined within the four walls.166 Therefore for clarity, the
term “church” will be used to reflect the definition of church as defined by the Augsburg
Confession as the “assembly of all believers among whom the gospel is preached in its purity
and the holy sacraments167 are administered according to the gospel.” and as not referring to a
building, physical location of gathering, etc. unless otherwise noted.
Protestant - a demarcation indicating those churches and Christian believers identifying with the
rich heritage of the Sixteenth Century Protestant Reformation which holds “Protestantism is an
appeal to God in Christ, to Holy Scripture and to the primitive Church, against all degeneration
and apostasy.”168
Evangelical - With growing religious pluralism, denominational disaffiliation, and a decline in
those that identify as Evangelical a standard definition of what serves as demarcations of an
Evangelical expressions of Christianity can still be established on the grounds of a few integral
beliefs. It is imperative this term and the beliefs associated with it be clearly defined at the outset
of this project as it will serve as the lense through which suggestions for future resurgence will
be proposed. As such, throughout this project “Evangelical” is defined using the National
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) LifeWay Research Evangelical Beliefs Research Definition
based on respondent beliefs. To be considered Evangelical by the NAE LifeWay Research
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standard, individuals must respond as strongly agreeing with the following four questions. 1) The
Bible is the highest authority for what I believe. 2) It is very important for me personally to
encourage non-Christians to trust Jesus Christ as their Savior. 3) Jesus Christ’s death on the cross
is the only sacrifice that could remove the penalty of my sin. 4) Only those who trust Jesus Christ
alone as Savior receive God’s free gift of eternal salvation.169
Evangelical churches and those that identify as Evangelical are traditionally viewed as
significantly more conservative than those Christians that identify with mainline
denominations.170
Resurgence vs Revival - Though the two terms, resurgence and revival, are oftentimes used
synonymously, this project will employ the term resurgence to indicate an increase of religious
affiliation in a society that is not necessarily marked by the characteristic emotionalism
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associated with revivalism. And while revival can be identically synonymous with resurgence to
mean the renewal or restoration of vitality after a state of depression. The intentional use of
resurgence is important so as to not create confusion regarding any bias related to the topic of
revival, revivalism, or even fundamentalism.
To assist in delineating between the two similar terms, An increase or revival after a
period of little activity, popularity, or occurrence. Since Christianity in America is not dead,
resurgence is employed to illustrate revitalization not necessarily resuscitation or resurrection
from death. While revival is the act of or occurrence of reviving, resurgence is an instance of
something resurging. It is a renewal of vigor, force, and effectiveness.
Mainline Denomination - an inclusive term used to describe religious groups primarily with an
European background and having been present in the United States since its colonial history.
Once contributing to the American form of Christianity, they are now characterized as a
declining element with little influence on society or culture.
Chapter Summary
Lower levels of religious affiliation reveal a weakening of the heart of the Evangelical
position on evangelization and carrying out the Great Commission.171 The strength of the
religiously unaffiliated conversion and retention rates further highlights the increasing
ineffectiveness of Evangelical efforts to engage a culture that is becoming altogether
disinterested in organized religion, exclusive truth claims, and the faith of their forefathers
(parents).
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As Chaves concludes, “It is difficult to see how the trends I have described could amount
to good news for American religious institutions…” However, it is “good news for our
increasingly pluralistic society.” 172 Given the current decline of Evangelical influence and the
“bad news for religious institutions” one might conclude that efforts to reverse the rapid moving
away from and privatization of religious beliefs are simply hoping against hope. Nonetheless, the
confident expectation of this project is to confirm Rodney Stark’s and William Bainbridge’s
hopeful prediction from three decades ago: “The vision of a religionless future is but illusion.”173
The cultural context and what has transpired regarding religious affiliation and the strength of
Evangelicalism is undoubtedly very different from when Stark and Bainbridge offered their
conclusion. May what follows in each chapter of this project continue to confirm the accuracy of
their conclusion and illuminate a principled way for the Evangelical church, with precise
intentionality, dedicate time, energy, and resources to those activities, attitudes, and approaches
that generated religious resurgence in other significant periods of American religious history.
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CHAPTER 2 - SIGNIFICANT PERIODS OF BELIEF AND UNBELIEF IN AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY
Introduction
The national share of those that identify with a Protestant denomination has steadily
declined, year over year, since Gallup began polling denominational preferences of Americans in
1948. While those that identify with a form of Protestantism has continued to decline from 69%
in 1948 to 35% in 2018, the share of those that identify with no religion (Nones) has steadily
increased from 2% in 1948 to over 20% in 2017, with the sharpest increase developing during
2005 to 2017; an increase of over 10% during that time period.174 These two religious categories
show the sharpest decline (Protestants) and the most significant growth among all possible
religious categories listed in the Gallup survey. Additionally, significant are the 76% of all
survey respondents concluding that religion is losing its influence in America; an all-time high,
and an increase from 39% in 2001.175
This chapter will provide a summative survey of the major religious periods in American
history. While there is an intersect with the mutual influence between religion and politics, the
purpose of this chapter is not to provide an examination of that relationship nor for discussing the
how or why of the relationship. It is clear in every period of American history, the presence or
absence of Christian influence has had direct effect, positive and negative, on the trajectory of
American culture. This fact led historian William Sweet to assert, “The attempt to appraise
American culture apart from religion is a contradiction in itself, for culture has to do with the
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moral and religious as well as the intellectual life of a society.”176 Just as the increase in Nones
has a direct correlation to the diminishing share of the influence of Christianity upon current
American culture (and politics), it is clear, however, that religion in general and the Christian
faith specifically played an integral role in the early formation of the new American nation. “The
missionary and religious purposes are obvious”177 in many of the earliest state constitutions
which predate the signing of the Constitution of the United States on September 17, 1787. The
importance of religious freedom from an established church is couched in language that is
preferential to Protestant forms of Christianity in these statements from early state
constitutions:178
Table 2.1 Founding State Constitutional Statements Regarding Religion
State

Statement

Year

Connecticut

“It being the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the great
Creator and Preserver of the Universe... No person shall, by law, be
compelled to join or support, nor be classed with any association to any
congregation church or religious institution.”

1776

Delaware

“Every citizen who should be chosen a member of either house of the
1776
legislature... Should be required to subscribe to the following declaration:
– I do profess faith in God the father, and in the Lord Jesus Christ his
only son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God and blessed forever more...”

Georgia

“All the members of the legislature shall be of the protestant religion.”

1777

Maryland

“It is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to him, all persons professing the Christian religion are
equally entitled to protection in the religious liberty.”

1776

New
Hampshire

“That morality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles,
would give the best and greatest security to government, and would lay
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in the hearts of men the strongest obligation to do subjection...”
New Jersey

“That all persons professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect,
1776
and who should demean himself peaceably under the government, should
be capable of being elected into any office a profit or trust, or of being a
member of either branch of the legislature.”

New York

“This convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the
good people of the state, ordain, determine, and declare that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever hereafter be allowed within the
state to all mankind.”

1777

North
Carolina

“No person who denying the being of a God was the truth of the
protestant religion, or the divine authority of either the Old or New
Testaments... should be capable of holding any office or place of trust in
the civil government of the state.”

1776

Pennsylvani
a

“every member of the legislature shall subscribe to the following
declaration: I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the
universe the rewarder of the good, and the punisher of the wicked; and
acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is to be given
by inspiration.”

1776

Instead of explicating the seemingly inseparable relationship and influence between
American politics and religion (church and state), the aim in what follows is to build a
framework of the periods of American history that showed evidence of significant interest in
Christianity. The content of this chapter will serve as the foundation upon which chapter 3 will
build, and from which the principles regarding the rise and decline of interest in Evangelical
forms of Christianity can be extracted.
It is because religion has been woven into the fabric of the American nation that is what
allows it to be traced as a steady undercurrent that has ebbed and flowed with each cultural turn.
Guastad echoes the formative nature of religion evidenced from the very beginning of the nation
and more recently an experience of increasing cultural disrepute in stating, “Religion was a
powerful motive in exploration, a significant causal factor in much colonization, a partner in
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territorial expansion and national cohesion...a veritable whirlwind of energies and contrary forces
in the latter half of the twentieth century.”179
Colonial America
It was not yet a century after the Reformation, while the religious fervor produced therein
was still hot, that England had set its heart on launching a successful colony in the New
World.180 The London Company launched for the coast of Virginia at the beginning of 1607. It
was a voyage with a heartfelt objective of the “propagation of the Christian religion” in the New
World to those who “as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and
worship of God.”181
Though the Jamestown settlement attempted to transplant and establish the Church of
England into the infant colony, the progressive establishment of the King’s Church was as
fragmented as the general health of the population.182 The interest in religion was high but the
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lack of clergy that could effectively engage the large parishes along the James, York, and
Rappahannock rivers relegated the parish churches to “both literally and figuratively at the edge
rather than the center of community life in the seventeenth century.”183 The lacking number of
clergy paired with poor wages and living conditions resulted in many clergy leaving the
motherland for the New World as a means to escape “bad debts, unhappy marriages, unsavory
reputations.”184 The severity of the increase in disreputable clergy was not only noticed but the
ministerial debauchery caused the Virginia House of Burgess to decree in 1632:
Ministers shall not give themselves to excess in drinking, or riot, spending their time idly
by day or night playing dice, cards, or any other unlawful game; but they shall...occupy
themselves with some honest study or exercise, always doing the things which shall
appertain to honesty, and endeavor to profit the Church of God.185
It wasn’t long after John Hammond lamented that the new colony of Virginia could only
attract clergy who could “babble in a pulpit, roar in a tavern, exact from their parishioners, and
by their dissoluteness destroy rather than feed their flocks,”186 that Roger Green in 1662 offered
the idea of “Virginia Fellowships.”187 These fellowships would encourage the education of
upstanding men in exchange for spending at least seven years in the new colony to positively
affect the population. An idea that never fully caught on until England began sending literature
and clergy through the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Society for the
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Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, respectively.188 The result of targeted efforts to
educate qualified clergy and implant them in Virginia was a fruitful endeavor with the number of
Anglican parishes increasing from thirty by the mid-seventeenth century to more than one
hundred parishes by the mid-eighteenth century.189 The targeted efforts of educating worthy men
to propagate the gospel was achieving the desired results in the New World.
Although, at the time, Anglicanism was the state-protected religion there existed other
young churches that were at odds with the formal liturgy of the Anglican Church and these
churches were growing in influence due to their affinity for more Evangelical tendencies that
encouraged a personal and passionate faith. The seventeenth century Puritans and Quakers gave
way to the growing influence of Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists who expanded westward
and settled in the foothills of Virginia and prepared the way for the First Great Awakening.190
Presbyterians through the efforts of Samuel Davies led the efforts to spread
Evangelicalism and saw significant success in reaching the African American population.
Gaustad recounts a key to Davies’ success was that “Evangelical religion...made the gospel
appear more accessible, more comprehensible, more emotionally satisfying.”191 When John
Leland arrived in Virginia in 1776 he began work immediately in expanding the Baptist
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denomination, and to the Anglican’s horror, many churches were established quickly where
many women were assuming prominent leadership roles.192
It was the rise of the Presbyterians and Baptists that fueled the push for legislation for
religious freedom in the second half of the eighteenth century. The constant targeted persecution
of Presbyterian and Baptist ministers by the oppressive laws that favored Anglicanism that
resulted in the jailing of several men is what spurned James Madison’s political career in
promulgating religious freedom. According to Gaustad, “Madison was ready to make common
cause with them and other dissenters who found themselves arrested and jailed for no reason
other than the assertion of their religious opinions.”193
On the heels of Baptists and Presbyterians, Methodists made the transition from England
to the new nation and began to see equal success as a dissenting church. The movement birthed
in England by brothers John and Charles Wesley, began as an effort to engage the laity to spread
its message of improving personal piety and to reach that class of people who were “abandoning
the National Church in ever larger numbers.”194 Once Methodism gained a foothold in Virginia,
its Evangelical force led to its official break from the Church of England just a decade before the
dawn of the nineteenth century.
It was the gross, heavy-handed involvement of the English governmental system in the
religious structure of the land which led to the eventual emigration of many seeking religious
sanctuary in a new world. This led to the establishment and rapid growth of dissenting
denominations in the young colonies, which continued to seek ways to build credibility through
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establishing institutions of higher learning for the rigorous training in critical thinking and
religion and further distancing from any influence or support from the Church of England.
Education was viewed as integral for the establishment of an enduring nation and for the vitality
of a purer faith. The founding of institutions such as Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary
further established these young colonies as viable and reputable with increasing independence of
religious and educational influences from the Mother Country. The Anglican church that
remained faithful to the Church of England experienced a sharp decline in influence and it’s
evangelistic effectiveness waned as those dissenting denominations witnessed a continued rapid
growth throughout the establishment of each new colony.195
First Great Awakening196 1730-1745
Chronologically, the first Great Awakening occurred prior to and stimulated the growth
outlined in the preceding section, but it was the Great Awakening that not only ignited
denominational growth, but the religious fervor ignited therein also fed the political agenda that
contributed to the discussions which initiated the War for Independence from England.
As Sweet notes, the Great Awakening not only added to church membership197 and
increased the “practical influence” throughout the affected colonial regions, it “also sowed the
seed of dissention and controversy,”198 which facilitated the war. There were varying degrees of
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division that resulted in the Presbyterian church, divisions between the Regular and Separate
Baptists, there was the Dutch Reformed controversy and differences that spawned as a result of
the conflict between Arminian and Calvinistic ideas. Even within Calvinistic schools of thought
there were divisions between the Old Calvinists and the Edwardians. As a result of these internal
schisms, Sweet writes, “Congregationalism was in a turmoil for more than a half century,”199
following the Great Awakening.
Formal education was a natural outgrowth of the Great Awakening for Protestant
denominations since the three colleges (Harvard, William and Mary, Yale) that existed prior to
the movement did not reflect the dissenting denominations’ orthopraxy. It was during
Whitefield’s 1740 tour that he lamented that at both Harvard and Yale “their light is now become
darkness - darkness that may be felt; and is complained of by the most godly ministers.”200
Simply due to a lack of strength to support such an endeavor these denominations (Baptist,
Methodist, Presbyterians) were unable to establish colleges to train their ministers for the
furtherance of the gospel; however, the Great Awakening provided the capital necessary to begin
launching institutions of higher education for the formal training of individuals to be sent out as
teachers and preachers for the purpose of spreading “the revival into new communities.”201 These
denominations increased their strength by capitalizing on the fruits of the revived evangelistic
interest by focusing time and energy on educational endeavors. As Sweet highlights, “Nowhere
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did revivalism and education go more consistently hand in hand than among the New Side
Presbyterians.”202
Even more colleges were formed as a result of Whitefield’s influence in the latter years
of the Great Awakening. It was Benjamin Franklin’s interest in Whitefield that led to the
building of what became the College of Philadelphia and then later University of
Pennsylvania.203 Additionally, it was Whitefield that influenced the forming of Dartmouth
College and the College of New Jersey, both of which Sweet argues were “legitimate children of
the revival.”204 Whitefield devoted considerable time and energy into establishing colleges as he
saw them as the most effective vehicles for the promotion of the gospel. Another college that
formed by Baptists as a result of the revival was established in Rhode Island (College of Rhode
Island) in 1764,205 which is no surprise due to Roger Williams’ success in creating a religious
refuge out of the colony. Then, later Queen’s College formed in 1766 as a result of the growth
of the Dutch Reformed Church during the revival.
Formal education was not the only culturally transformative fruit born from the Great
Awakening. There was also a “new missionary impulse”206 that rebirthed missional interest to
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the Native Americans. This revival of evangelistic and missionary zeal was evidenced in the
New England Congregationalists and Presbyterians alike. Additionally, as a result of a growing
adoption of the doctrine of general atonement207 the missionary zeal spread to reaching the
African American population and the first anti-slavery inclinations grew out of Samuel Hopkins’
theology and preaching.208
After the American Revolution, Founding Father and second president of the United
States John Adams writes of the undeniable link between the growing religious fervor produced
in the Great Awakening and the commencement of the Revolution when stating, “The revolution
was effected before the War commenced. The Revolution was in the mind and hearts of the
people: and change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.”209 Historian Paul
Johnson adds further clarification how it was the religious enthusiasm smoldering from the Great
Awakening paired with political aims of independence from England that allowed both aims to
succeed:
It was the marriage between the rationalism of the American elites touched by the
Enlightenment with the spirit of the Great Awakening among the masses, which enabled
the popular enthusiasm thus aroused to be channeled into the political aims of the
Revolution...Neither force could have succeeded without the other. The Revolution could
not have taken place without this religious background.210
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Though the intensification of religiosity reached a crescendo in 1740 with Whitefield’s
tours and some denominations began to experience a plateauing of religious quickening, the
abiding nature of the Awakening “was still powerful in parts of the country at the breaking out of
the Revolutionary War.”211
American Revolution 1765-1783
So, it was the three-strand cord of Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, paired with
the political force of the American Revolution, that caused a concerted effort to severe ties that
had for more than a century identified the new nation with the Church of England; however,
preceding and in the mix of this, it was the Pilgrims, also known as Separatists, landing near
Cape Cod in September 1620 that highlights the fundamental religious interest for leaving
England and starting over in the New World that formed the foundation upon which the Baptists,
Methodists, and Presbyterians could thrive.
Initially, the Puritans retained a desire to remain a part of the Church of England. They
wanted to reflect a “purer part in a new England that would be able to demonstrate what a truly
revitalized Church of England ought to be.”212 The Pilgrims on the other hand, chose schism
from the Church of England and aimed to start anew in the New World. Nonetheless, both the
Pilgrims and Puritans provide evidence that for many, religion was a primary reason for leaving
England and of a deliberate effort to establish a pure church in the New World. Gaustad
articulates regarding the desire of these new religious efforts to provide an example that England
would hopefully witness and adopt:
They (the new citizens) came to prove that one could form a society so faithful, a church
so cleansed, that even old England itself would be transformed by witnessing what
211
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determined believers had managed to achieve many thousands of miles away. That was
the vision to be steadily pursued, without weakening or wavering, without transgressing
or backsliding, without forgetting that it is God who has made us and not we ourselves.
We are his people, bound together with him in a solemn covenant.213
It did not take long for the unmistakable differences between the Church of England and
the new Puritans to become evident in both beliefs and practice. Puritan John Cotton articulated
the primary complaints against the Church of England which provided the foundation for the
New England Way; complaints that paved the way for a redefinition of how the church would
exist in a purer form in the New World.214
The New England clergyman and advocate of religious freedom215, Roger Williams, in
being exiled from New England for his dissenting216 arguments against the New England Way,
founded the colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. This new colony “would be a
haven for all dissenters, for persons of all shades of religious opinion, or of no religious opinion
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at all.”217 It was Williams that helped found the earliest Baptist church in Providence.218
Quakers also found safety in Rhode Island which allowed them to increase their strength, along
with many other denominations219 with which Cotton Mathers found quite appalling. Mather
lamented that never before had there existed “such a variety of religions together on so small a
spot of ground where one might find Antinomians, Anabaptists, Antisabbatarians, Arminians,
Socinians, Quakers, Ranters - everything in the world but Roman Catholics and real
Christians.”220 Further evidence that the establishment of early American colonies, especially as
colonies expanded, were motivated by intense religious interests during a time where individuals
and communities devoted considerable effort in establishing and nurturing a pure Christian
church that was cleansed of the rigid and lifeless forms of the Church of England. There was an
intense desire, however varied, to establish a new nation that was from the very foundations built
to seek the “guidance of scriptures in regulating all aspects of the lives of their citizens, where
scripture was cited for many criminal statutes.”221
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It was in 1792 that the Methodists were reportedly numbered approximately forty
thousand. The denomination was growing at such a pace that Jedidiah Morse exclaimed “Their
numbers are so various in different places, at different times, that it would be a matter of no
small difficulty to find out their exact amount.”222
Johnson illuminates the growing personalization of the Christian faith for the believers in
the New World,
Hence Americans never belonged to the religious category who seek certainty of doctrine
and through clerical hierarchy...: most Americans... believe[d] that knowledge of God
comes direct to them through the study of Holy Writ. They read the Bible for themselves,
assiduously, daily.” Where “virtually every humble cabin in Massachusetts colony had its
own Bible. Adults read it alone, silently. It was also read aloud among families, as well as
in church, during Sunday morning service, which lasted from eight till twelve.223
Methodists had grown with particular force in Maryland due to their concerted missionary efforts
in reaching blacks and women, “utilizing both laity and clergy, employing devout women no less
than zealous men.”224 Former slave turned Methodist minister, Richard Allen testified to the
missionary effectiveness of the Methodists through their presentation of the gospel message for
the common people in recounting, “The Methodists were the first people that brought glad
tidings to the colored people. I feel thankful that ever I heard a Methodist preach...blacks were
beholden to the Methodists, under God, for the light for the Gospel we enjoy; for all other
denominations preached so high flown that we were not able to comprehend their doctrines.”225
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Allen goes on to provide further confirmation of the Methodists’ success in preaching the gospel
in a way that was accessible to everyone,
I was confident that there was no religious sect or denomination would suit the capacity
of the colored people as well as the Methodist; for the plain and simple gospel suits best
for any people; for the unlearned can understand, and the learned are sure to understand;
and the reason the Methodist is so successful in the awakening and conversion of the
colored people, the plain doctrine of having a good discipline.226
The Revolutionary Era eventually gave rise to a period of religious decline in America
due to distraction and disruption. The moderation of Christian zeal did not occur at the dawning
of the War in 1765, but had been cooling for the two decades after the climax of the Great
Awakening as Ahlstrom argues, “The long preoccupation of Americans with government and
politics, not to mention with the war itself, raised immense problems for the churches, bringing
on, among other things, a prolonged religious depression.”227 Ahlstrom highlights ways in which
the church was affected during the Revolutionary Era that resulted in a significant decrease in its
effectiveness and general depression of religious interest in America. Primarily, the church,
dissenters and high church alike, became distracted by the Revolutionary and Jeffersonian
political environment. The election of Jefferson brought with it the prominence of
Enlightenment philosophy and resulted in the primacy of framing theological issues in more
governmental ways which resulted in, as Ahlstrom calls it, “theological transformation.”228 This
new political ethos that promoted natural theology and more secularized ways of interpreting the
new American experience necessitated that the church respond accordingly with nearly every
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denomination feeling the need to redefine how it engaged the culture. Finally, the immediate
opportunity for churches to grow during this new and uncertain time was a reality, but how they
were to go about it in the context of increased religious freedom was the hard question not easily
answered.229
It is clear, the Revolutionary War affected the American church and initiated a period of
religious decline and a transition in religious-political focus. It was a critical period for each
denomination because of its preoccupation with politics. The church was so distressed during
this period that Ahlstrom suggests that by the end of this era membership had diminished
absolutely, “so that not more than one person in twenty or possibly one in ten seems to have been
affiliated; in many churches membership itself became increasingly nominal.”230 To compound
the problem of decreasing church membership and overall religious disinterest, there was a
correlating reduction in new ministers being trained and deployed into churches to help rekindle
the revival zeal that had long subsided. The population of current ministers also dwindled as a
result of the war as many either fled (their area or the country), became chaplains, some fought,
which resulted in leaving their congregations with no theological or pastoral oversight. No
denomination was left unaffected, but it was the Church of England in America that experienced
the most dramatic negative impact from the War. Ahlstrom suggests more than seventy
thousand Loyalists fled the country during and immediately following the War.231 While Noll
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notes that when the War first began, “all of the Methodists missionaries except Francis Asbury
returned to England.”232
Nonetheless, evidence of the persistent nature of the Christian religion can be seen in a
few denominations during the Revolutionary Era. For the Baptists revival zeal persisted
throughout the turmoil. When compared to the years before the War to less than a decade after,
the overall number of Baptist churches in the New England colonies increased significantly:
Table 2.2 Growth in Number of New England Churches233
Colony

1740

1790

Connecticut

3

55

Massachusetts

11

92

Maine

-

15

New
Hampshire

-

32

11

38

Vermont

-

34

TOTAL

25

266

Rhode Island

The New England colonies were not alone is witnessing significant growth among the
Baptists during the War. The southern states, still reaping harvests of a continued interest in
revivalism, produced much fruit. In 1790, Virginia had nearly as many Baptist churches (218) as
all of New England.”234
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The enduring nature of Christianity also became evident for the Methodists in the year
following the conclusion of the American Revolution.235 In 1784 John Wesley implemented the
Deed of Declaration, which cultivated an immediate interest in the renewal of the Methodist
denomination in America, which Wesley referred to in his diary as “the desolate sheep in
America.”236 The strategy to revitalize American Methodists hinged on the ordination of a large
number of ministers. Wesley logged his passion and belief in the strategy of ordaining and
sending ministers into these anemic congregations as the most effective way to breathe new life
into these people. This newly concerted effort to restore the Methodist church in America and
the continued multiplication of Baptist churches served as a precursor to the Second Great
Awakening.
Nearly every denomination, for the exception of the Anglican Church, experienced
growth in the fifty years leading up to the Second Great Awakening:
Table 2.3 Denominational Growth 1740-1790
Denominational Growth 1740-1790
Denomination

235

1740

1790

Methodist

0

712

Baptist

96

858

Presbyterian

160

725

Roman Catholic

27

65

Congregational

423

750

Anglican

246

170

Lutheran

95

249

Quaker

50

375

Dates for the Revolutionary War typically agreed upon by historians are Apr 19, 1775 – Sep 3, 1783.

236

John Wesley’s September 1, 1784 diary entry as quoted by Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the
American People, 371.

71

German
Reformed

51

236

Dutch Reformed

78

115

1256

4255

Total

2nd Great Awakening -1790-1840
As a result of the war and the rational deism that seemed to be gaining a foothold in the
recently victorious new nation, the church was desperate for renewed strength and vigor. It was
in 1790 that what has been called the “most influential revival of Christianity in the history of the
United States,”237 the Second Great Awakening was birthed. While it was the Revolutionary
Revival in New England that prepared the way for the Awakening,238 it was the western frontier
that seemed to provide the most kindling for the movement. Revival success in the frontier
would carry this renewed religious enthusiasm that produced significant advance for
Protestantism through the turn of and well into the new century until approximately 1840.239 It
was the weakening of the American church, particularly in the New England colonies, as a result
of the Revolutionary War created a fertile environment for the coming religious resurgence.240
Sweet emphasizes the draining effect the War had on the church when he confirms, "In postRevolutionary America religious and moral conditions of the country as a whole reached the
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lowest ebb tide in the entire history of the American people."241 Gaustad goes further to
substantiate the waning numerical strength of the post-Revolution church approaching the
dawning of the new century by highlighting, “While church adherence remained high at least
into the 1770s (with perhaps as much as 40 to 50 percent of the population attending church with
some regularity), formal church membership was sinking, and in the 1790s reached an all-time
low (somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the adult population).”242 It was “by 1780 the
percentage of adult colonists who adhered to a church was between 10–30%, not counting slaves
or Native Americans. North Carolina had the lowest percentage at about 4%, while New
Hampshire and South Carolina were tied for the highest, at about 16%.243
With many areas in the western frontier regions entirely vacant of churches immediately
following the War. Characteristic of the peculiar persistence of the Christian faith, the church
was able to rebound from the Revolutionary ebb it was experiencing. The momentum Baptists
and Methodists had been building in the years immediately prior to the beginning of the new
Awakening assisted in their ability to continue to scale in each new region they reached.
Whereas the aim of the First Great Awakening was to revive those already in the church,
the ambition of the new awakening was focusing its intentions on converting the unbeliever and
“bringing the gospel to all America and to the heathen lands abroad.”244 Though the movement
had its beginnings in the New England colonies it quickly spread to the frontier having great
241
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success in camp meetings. The most significant manifestation of the revival was in Cane Ridge,
Kentucky in 1801 where some argue became the birthplace of the Second Great Awakening in
the south.245 It was in Cane Ridge that the emotionalism that the Second Great Awakening has
become known for overshadows, in much of the scholarly literature, the evangelistic
underpinnings and success of the movement.
The Awakening was markedly egalitarian with many documented instances of children
and women preaching,246 which were both a break from traditional established roles within the
Church. Writing soon after the Cane Ridge revival, Richard McNemar highlights that the move
of God disregarded all social and denominational divisions in that there was no, “distinction as to
age, sex, color, or anything of a temporary nature: old and young, male and female, black and
white, had equal privilege to minister the light which they received, in whatever way the spirit
directed.”247 It was a revival accessible to everyone.
While there was no concerted effort to deliver a message that would have appealed more
to one audience than another, interestingly the large majority of converts during this Awakening
were women. Nancy Cott provides data regarding the disproportionate number of female
converts in that, “There were at least three female converts to every two male converts between
1798 and 1826, according to the Reverend Ebenezer Porter's estimate in 1832.”248 Cott also
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suggests that in addition to the likely conversion of women, it was those individuals under the
age of twenty five that converted at a greater rate and were often times the first to convert.249 It
could have been the rejection of traditional gender roles within revival meetings that served as a
distraction for men that prevented their conversion at the same rate as that of women. To this
point, Meyer argues that, “The emotional woman on display at the revival often proved to be a
stumbling block, an example of emotionalism run amok or the traditional susceptibility of the
female mind.”250 It is argued that the emotionalism of the revival caused men hesitation and thus
resulted in the conversion ratio of women to be greater but husbands also took concern with their
wives converting a point Susan Lindley illustrates, “Husbands, especially in the South,
sometimes disapproved of their wives' conversion, forcing women to choose between submission
to God or their spouses. Church membership and religious activity gave women peer support and
place for meaningful activity outside the home, providing many women with communal identity
and shared experiences.”251 Not only did women face potential criticism within the home, but
they also bore the primary responsibility of religious instruction within the home. A point Mary
Ryan confirms when explaining, “Women also took crucial roles in the conversion and religious
upbringing of children. During the period of revival, mothers were seen as the moral and
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spiritual foundation of the family and were thus tasked with instructing children in matters of
religion and ethics.”252
This was a responsibility the revival prepared them well for by meeting their spiritual,
social, and emotional needs. As Cott suggests,
Just as the doctrine of the revivals intersected at vital points with young women's needs,
the means used to propagate revivals suited young women's predilections. Prayer
meetings gave young women opportunity for public expressions of anxiety and offered
them sympathy and support perfectly attuned to the peer relationships they relied on at
work or at school away from home. These small group meetings also put effective
pressure on participants to become converts.253
Perhaps the central message being proclaimed, that of an evolving New England
Calvinistic message which was beginning to adopt the afore-viewed heretical Arminian doctrine
of man’s involvement in salvation provided the younger, mostly female audience a sense of
choice that they were now able to exercise in a manner that affected their identity formation and
eternal trajectory. The message in this revival was man should do all that the individual could in
the act of repenting of ones sins and placing faith in Christ’s finished work on the cross.
According to revivalist Increase Graves of Bridgeport, Vermont, individuals under the
conviction of the Holy Spirit were to strive "to do all they are able, just as much as if they could
save themselves by their own works, the sure destruction of those who forbear all exertions, and
of those also, who neglect to exert themselves in the right manner."254 There was a very clear
shift from the Calvinistic message of the complete sovereignty of God and the inability of the
252
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sinner to save themselves in the First Great Awakening, to the message of the Second Great
Awakening where every individual had been provided the ability to come to Christ through faith.
Noll notes that this shift “arose from a widespread desire for a theology of action that could
encourage and justify the expanding revivals of Christianity.”255
This theology for action allowed the Awakening that initiated the nineteenth century to
not only reinvigorated the Protestant churches spiritually, the movement also propelled the
church into politico-cultural influence and confirmed its ability to influence on a national level as
Ahlstrom confirms, “Protestant churches, with their message and methods tuned to the patriotic
aspirations of a young nation, reaching their high point of cultural influence” during this
resurgence.256 The Second Awakening resulted in a clear sense of purpose for social reform
generally, but evangelism both at home and abroad specifically and this dual desire led to the
establishment of several institutionalized organizations to transform and evangelize America.
Through the visionary leadership of Henry Beecher the following organizations were founded:
American Board for Foreign Missions, the American Bible Society, the Colonization Society for
liberated slaves, the American Sunday School Union257, the American Tract Society, the
American Education Society, the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, and the
American Home Missionary Society. Beyond Beecher’s influence, the Southern Baptist
Convention (which later became the largest Protestant denomination) was also established during
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this time,258 but, perhaps the most enduring legacies of the Second Great Awakening were the
elevation of missionary priority and the prominence of women’s religious and societal roles. It is
the evangelistic mobilization that affected not only the world generally with the launching of
global missions endeavors but the national evangelistic aim is what Noll calls, “the truly great
missionary story of the century.”259
The aim of the local church was the salvation of the individual and the establishment of
institutions both through which it would be able to affect transformation in the world.260 It was
this at-home evangelistic success that ensured the continued successful expansion of the
Methodist and Baptist churches in America. Noll admits “statistics can never tell the whole
story,” but the growth of the Methodist church can be evidenced in Francis Asbury’s evangelistic
efforts when he first came to America there were “four Methodist ministers caring for about 300
laypeople. When he (Asbury) died...there were 2,000 ministers and over 200,000 Methodists in
the States and several thousand more in Canada.”261 Similarly, the Baptists had continued to see
significant growth, and by “1812 there were close to 200,000 Baptists...with half of them in the
states of Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky.”262 By 1850, on the cusp of
the Third Great Awakening, Baptists numbered more than one million with approximately three
quarters of them being involved in missionary endeavors.263
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An additional, persistent result of the Second Great Awakening was the increase of
religious pluralism in America. This time saw a rise of sects and offshoots of various colors of
the Christian faith that have persisted with varying levels of influence and strength to the present
day. The Colonial through the American Civil War witnessed religious pluralism in an innocent
manner in that there existed a plurality of expressions of the Christian religion. There were sects,
native religions, and some expressions of religions practiced by immigrants. But, largely,
religious pluralism existed in the form of varying, but somewhat similar, Christian doctrines held
by different Christian denominations. The nineteenth century, however, specifically growing out
of the Second Great Awakening, witnessed the development of several sects and cults that later
developed into significantly influential religions in the American context. It was during the
Second Great Awakening that created an experimental environment that encouraged the
formation of several offshoots that have since grown in great prominence. Christian
restorationism, Seventh-Day Adventism264, Jehovah’s Witnesses265 and perhaps most significant,
the Mormons266 had their beginnings in the rich spiritual ground of the period.
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By the end of the Second Great Awakening the number of churches had expanded
exponentially throughout the colonies and states with Baptist, Methodists, and Presbyterian
churches drastically outnumbering other existent denominations:267
Table 2.4 Denominational Growth 1850
Denominational Growth 1850
State

Methodist

Baptist

Presby.

AL

577

579

162

AR

168

114

CT

185

DC

State

Methodist

Baptist

Presby.

MS

454

385

143

52

MO

250

300

125

114

299

NH

103

193

113

16

6

6

NJ

312

108

149

DE

106

12

26

NY

1231

781

671

FL

87

56

16

NC

784

615

151

GA

795

879

97

OH

1529

551

663

IL

405

282

206

PA

889

320

775

IN

778

428

282

RI

23

106

0

IO

71

20

38

SC

484

413

136

KY

530

803

224

TN

861

646

363

LA

125

77

18

TX

176

82

45

ME

199

326

7

VT

140

102

242

MD

497

45

56

VA

1025

649

240

MA.

262

266

528

WI

110

49

40

MI

119

66

72

Civil War (1861-1865) Through WWI (1914-1919)
Protestant churches benefited from the renewed spirit flowing from the most recent
awakenings. Carwardine summarizes Robert Baird’s 1856 data in providing evidence for the
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exponential growth evangelical denominations had experienced by the mid-nineteenth century.
The four largest denominations Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists had a
combined membership of approximately three million or nearly 13% of the total population of
the relatively young nation;268 however, as with the War for Independence, the Civil War also
extracted a significant toll on the momentum that had been built during the years immediately
preceding. Wilson argues regarding the influence of religion upon the war that though it was not
an immediate cause like in the Spanish Civil War, the influence was nonetheless present, albeit
developing over time in informing, “The flash points in the 1850s that became immediate causes
of war had little overtly to do with religion, but with fears about the future of northerners and
southerners under the Constitution.” adding, “Religion was a long-term cause of the war.”269 It
was becoming clear that the Civil War marked a “major shift in the public story of Christianity in
the United States.”270
Evangelical involvement in politics increased prior after the turn of the nineteenth
century. As the century was drawing to a close evangelical missionary endeavors, rather than
being limited to the expansion of the gospel only, were beginning to be viewed as vehicles for
the expansion of American ideals in the majority world. A year after his election to the
presidency, William McKinley illustrated the intimate, almost indiscernible, relationship
between the aims of Christian missions and the aim of American expansion in stating in relation
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to the Spanish-American war “there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to
educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace to do the
very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ died.”271 Where revivalists were
quoted as urging, “politics are a part of religion in such a country as this,”272 to the majority of
evangelical males being significantly involved in politics in some way.
Prior to the Civil War politicians drew heavily from evangelical practices exercised
during the great awakening and adopted mass revivalism tactics into their campaign strategies.
Donald Mathews highlights that politicians of this age who sought to influence on a large scale
and draw the most voters would “open party conventions with prayers, multiplied political
meetings and rotated speakers, their political songs even incorporated the language and tunes of
evangelical hymns, and, like revivalists, party activists sought to rally the faithful, draw in the
undecided, and reclaim the backsliders.”273 Campaigners leveraged God and the devil to
illustrate a world sharply divided “not between two sets of morally neutral policies, but between
two moral orders, between political salvation and the victory of the Devil.”274 The success
politicians were experiencing in assimilating the revivalistic strategies also assimilated Christian
rhetoric and piousness into the culture as can be seen in James Dixon’s account upon visiting
America. An English Methodist who visited the United States in 1848, Dixon wrote that
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"Christianity pervades the United States in vigorous action;" He did not mean however, "that
every individual is a pious Christian, but that the spirit of the evangelical system is in sufficient
power to give to religious opinion and sentiment the complete ascendant in society."275
The impending certainty of the War was evidenced by the schisms that split American
Protestantism in the 1830s and 1840s which were related to the role of slaveholders within the
churches. The church schisms unleashed angers, fears, and even violence, which further divided
the nation's religious people and set the tone for eventual political division.276 Some have even
suggested that the missionary enterprise itself was a great facade to hide the fractures within the
church. On this point Ahlstrom argues that, "crusades of diverse sorts were organized, in part, it
would seem, to heal or hide the disunity of the churches."277 It was the moral righteousness for
which Evangelical denominations were striving to influence on a national (even global) scale
through the vehicle of politics that Carwardine has expressed as a potentially unavoidable
consequence that made the Civil War inescapable:
We have no way of knowing if without the evangelical element there would have been a
war. What we can say is that the moral energies established by the Second Great
Awakening were powerful enough to splinter national denominations and national
parties; though conflicts of strictly material interest are often open to negotiation, they are
rarely so when associated with a conviction of moral righteousness.278
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Though the dawning years of the twentieth century have become known as the
Progressive Era, the effects of the Civil War and proceeding years led Noll to refer to the period
after the war and those years transitioning into the twentieth century as the “last years of
‘Protestant America”279 and Marty calls these transitional years the “complacent era”280 in the
Protestant experience in America, but the twilight years of the nineteenth century and the birth of
the twentieth century was not void of pockets of spiritual vitality. There was what has become
known as the “business man’s awakening”281 that lasted approximately a year from 1857-1858
that gave rise to noon day prayer meetings and urban evangelism. Additionally, Dwight L.
Moody’s ministry rose to prominence during the latter years of the nineteenth century where
Moody Bible Institute had its founding and Moody’s central message282 was an effective balance
between Finney’s revivalistic rigidity and Sunday’s theatrical style. Important here is the similar
rise in priority of missionary zeal that had accompanied past periods of resurgence of Christian
faith. An example to highlight this recurring focus on local and global evangelization as a result
of rekindled faith was Moody’s founding of the Student Volunteer Movement where he
encouraged young people to pursue “the evangelization of the world in their generation.”283
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By 1880 the national share of the most prominent Protestant denominations had increased
from 3 million or 13% of the population to approximately nine million which was then, 18% of
the American population.284 During the second half of the nineteenth century both Methodists
and Baptist saw aggressive growth. Methodists had grown from 1,250,000 to approximately
5,500,000 and Baptists increased their numbers from 750,000 to approximately 4,500,000 during
that period.285 The Protestant population appears low given the level of growth and increased
influence over the past decades but as Joseph P. Thompson notes, not all adherents would
officially identify as members:
In reading the statistics of the American churches, it should be borne in mind that the
term members by no means represents the total of worshippers in the several
congregations, or of nominal adherents to a confession, but only those who by their own
act have united with the church proper, the spiritual body, and who partake of the
sacraments.286
Nonetheless, and despite Protestants making up far less than half of the nation’s growing
population they firmly believed, as Handy argues, that “they formed the majority religious voice
in the culture.”287 It was during the dusk of the eighteenth century that the commonly assumed
view was that America was essentially a Christian nation but there was a growing dilemma with
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which the church had to bend in its separation from the state whose “constitutional provisions
explicitly forbade its government to institute religious tests for public office, establish religion,
or prohibit its free exercise.”288 Even the public education system was heralded as a sacred
venture as Robert Wood Lynn points out that Protestants viewed public schools as “symbolic of
both our national unity and God’s handiwork in history. As such it was a sacred cause, worthy of
religious devotion.”289 The educational system provided a solution that the denominational
divisions prevented Protestants from developing in previous years.
Another common theme whose significance can be seen echoing with greater frequency
in each period of resurgence is the involvement and participation of women. Similarly, in the
years after the Civil War and leading into the infant decades of the twentieth century, the
increase in missionary activity, both local and global,290 owes much to the presence and support
of women. Noll provides insight into the prominence of missionary involvement of women,
“single women in their own missionary societies and the lives of male missionaries made up 60
percent of the nation’s missionary force in the late nineteenth century. By the turn of the century,
forty-one women’s missionary societies supported over 1,200 missionaries.”291
Prior to this time, missionary efforts had been advanced by smaller pockets of
evangelistic concern and had successfully expanded the church into the new frontier; however, as
the church looked in the face a new century, missions gained national interest. “The number of
288
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American foreign missionaries, which stood at 934 in 1890, reached nearly 5,000 a decade later
and over 9,000 in 1915.”292
Early 20th Century
It was during this time that the nation’s population doubled293 and new advancements in
technology, the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and the new cultural and religious
nuances produced by increased immigration created a very different landscape with which
Protestantism had to learn to navigate. It was the dusk of the nineteenth and dawn of the
twentieth century that served as a “time when the earlier religious settlement was tested and
challenged.”294
The years after the Civil War provided a less turbulent environment than previous
decades had afforded the Protestants and the remaining years of the nineteenth century leading
into the early decades of the final century of the millennium saw a renewed increase of Christian
influence in the American culture. Gaustad provides insight into how these numbers continued
to grow “At the beginning of the twentieth century, about one-third of the nation’s population
could be found on the membership rolls of the churches and synagogues. By the middle of that
century, membership had increased to well over fifty percent.”295 It is significant to note that
during that same time frame the nation’s population doubled from approximately 76 million to
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over 150 million. Correspondingly, church membership mirrored this growth in both absolute
numbers and percentage of the entire population.296
Nonetheless, the fractures from division within the church still existed. As a result of the
Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy and the doctrinal divisions within the Baptist and
Presbyterian denominations, Fosdick highlights the diminished appeal of the church among the
educated of the day by lamenting “The educated people are looking for their religion outside the
churches.”297
Where could the solution be found? Fosdick proposes two necessary elements. The first
is a spirit of tolerance since “intolerance solves no problems.”298 The second element is “a clear
insight into the main issues of modern Christianity and a sense of penitent shame that the
Christian church should be quarreling over little matters when the world is dying of great
needs.”299
Ministers often bewail the fact that young people turn from religion to science for the
regulative ideas for their lives. But this is easily explicable. Science treat’s a young man’s
mind as though it were really important.” “A scientist says to a young man: ‘Here is the
universe challenging our investigation. Here are the truths we have seen so far. Come
study with us.’ See what we have already seen and then look further to see more. For
science is an intellectual adventure for the truth. Can you imagine any man who is
worthwhile turning from that call to the church, if the church seems to him to say, ‘Come
and we will feed you opinions from a spoon. No thinking is allowed here except such that
brings you to certain specified, predetermined conclusions. These prescribed opinions we
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will give you in advance of your thinking; no think, but only so as to reach these
results.300
As in the past, the dawning of a new century in America brought with it an entirely new
social and cultural context in which the church had to determine its place. Similarly, as in each
preceding cultural context, the church sought the moral reform of society and determined the
best way to achieve this end was, as Noll suggests that, “most Protestant reformers maintained
that they key to changing society lay in converting individuals, who would then reorder their
private lives.”301 This renewed gusto for moral reform again provide opportunity for women to
assume a leading role. One such reformation initiative was that of the Temperance movement
which paved the way for the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1919; however, and
although the Temperance movement along with the implementation of the new Amendment had
short lived positive results highlighting the government’s general inability to mandate moral
reform.302 This movement is mentioned here as evidence of the inability of a government to
successfully legislate morality, a tendency at which the First Amendment sought to prevent as
Philip Schaff explained, “the American nation is as religious and as Christian as any nation on
earth, and in some respects even more so, for the very reason that the profession and support of
religion are left entirely free.”303 This is a point that will be touched on again as the rise of the
religious right and the founding of the Moral Majority is discussed below.
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It was during this period that saw the rise of fundamentalism as a reaction against
growing theological liberalism, the naturalistic explanations germinating from Darwin’s Origin
of Species, and the biblical higher criticism encouraged by modernity’s threat against the
Christian faith. There were forces aimed at undermining the influence that Protestantism had so
long enjoyed, namely the liberalism and rationalism that some within the Protestant camp viewed
as the formidable enemy which had to be met head on in order to preserve the influence
Protestantism had enjoyed for two centuries. Fundamentalism was able to rally their influence by
aiming their aggression against the increasingly popular Social Gospel movement that was able
to use the same Bible Protestants had historically used but Darwinian ideology and higher
criticism created an impasse preventing consensus regarding the inerrancy of Scripture. The
Social Gospel was charged by conservative evangelicals of being a different gospel altogether in
that the salvation of sinful man was the primary aim of the true gospel not the salvation of
society against which Hugh Price Hughes argued, “The salvation of the individual soul was not
sufficient. Society must be saved as well as Christians.”304
James Hunter suggests it was “By 1910 the majority of Protestant ministers and
theologians had abandoned the conservative positions as indefensible.”305 It was against this
context that formulated the expressed aim of fundamentalists to produce a reestablishment of
fundamental Christian doctrines that had suffered from rationalism in recent years. The
movement has become known for its militant-like defense of these fundamentals which were
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outlined in a work edited by R.A. Torrey, The Fundamentals of the Faith, from which the
Fundamentalists get their name.306 It was this argument and fight for a return to the
fundamentals of the Christian religion that forbade any views contrary to those outlined in
Torrey’s work. As Martin notes they were the “Fundamentals of the Faith from which no
deviation could be tolerated.”307
The 1920s came to a close with the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy that surfaced
the split within American Protestantism. In attempting to regulate public school curriculum,
culminating in the Scopes Monkey Trial in July 1925, Fundamentalists led by William Jennings
Bryan who led the prosecution of a high school biology teacher that taught Darwinian evolution.
Though the Fundamentalist’s prosecution was successful, the movement suffered irreparable
damage to their reputation due to the media’s portrayal of Fundamentalists as anti-intellectual
stemming from their view of biblical literalism. As a result, Fundamentalists retreated from the
public scene and turned their attention inward and focused on building private institutions for
learning in attempts to serve as what American religious historian Randall Balmer describes as,
“a protective device to shield evangelical kids in particular from the corrupting influences in the
larger culture...giving way to Liberal Christians dominating national politics and denominational
institutions, until key court decisions -- Green v. Connally and Roe v. Wade which served to
galvanize them to re-engage in wider culture.”308
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Balmer provides an illustrative summary regarding the fundamentalists’ withdrawal from
the public and political scene after the Scopes Monkey Trial:
For about 50 years from the Scopes Trial in 1925 until, Jimmy Carter's campaign for the
presidency beginning in 1975, evangelicals are not involved in politics. Many of them are
not even registered to vote because politics is dirty and unseemly, and besides, Jesus is
coming back at any time to get us out of this mess, so why should we worry about the
temporal order? And that was a very, very real sentiment among America's evangelicals
for the middle decades of the 20th century.309
Though as militant and commonly divisive as history has shown Fundamentalism to be,
the movement endured with lessening force. Grant Whacker of Duke University Divinity School
writes of the lasting effects of fundamentalism that germinated throughout the twentieth century
in outlining, “Historic Fundamentalism, largely forged before World War I, helped to produce
the massive evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic revivals after World War II, as well as the
Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s.”
World War II to the Rise of the Religious Right
The individualistic theology that grew out of the Second Great Awakening and the
individualism310 in general that had been growing in acceptance through naturalistic and
humanistic philosophies continued to create shifting shades of religious affiliation throughout the
second half of the twentieth century. There was in the years after World War II what historian
Robert Wuthnow calls a “restructuring of American religion”311 where he notes Christianity
remained vigorous throughout the post-war decades. As Wuthnow notes the evangelistic force
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characteristic of Evangelicals previous to the War was becoming more difficult to discern in the
surrounding culture,
In area after area it was as if the war had shaken religious leaders from their previous
ways of thinking and forced on them a larger consciousness of the world which left them
in awe of forces shaping modern culture. Their call to repentance remained clear, but
increasingly it seemed to echo from the stratosphere rather than focusing on individual
hearts.312
However, until the rise of the Religious Right in the late 1970s the influence of
Christianity in the public and political arenas had abated, but not vanished entirely. It was during
these years that “the churches' larger role in society was, however, conceived of primarily as
influencing society by influencing individuals.”313 Nonetheless, though evangelicals were taking
a break from politics their churches benefited from renewed strength in the post-war prosperity.
After what he calls a decade long “lull” Wuthnow provides statistics that illustrate the post-war
church growth:
Southern Baptists added nearly 300,000 new members in the first four years after the
war...the Methodist church in 1948 showed that membership had increased faster in the
previous four years than at any time since 1925 and projected a need for nearly 3,000
additional clergy in the next five years. The Disciples of Christ announced their largest
annual gains in over 30 years.314
Yet it was not only the Protestants that were reaping the harvest of the rekindled religious
interest. Additionally, the Catholics were baptizing over one million infants each year and
launched their own building initiatives that resulted in 125 hospitals, over 1,000 new elementary
schools, and 3,000 new parishes. Additionally, Catholic seminaries saw a thirty percent increase
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in enrollment.315 Further, Church historian Martin Marty provides further evidence of a renewed
enjoyment of religion in America and suggests it was the relaxing of standards for membership
that contributed to growth. Nonetheless, the War was over, the economy was thriving, and the
church was again worth attending as the numbers show:
In 1920, 43 percent of the people were on the rolls; in 1930 47 percent; in 1940 this had
grown only to 49 percent but in 1950 57 percent were members, and by 1956 this had
grown to 62 percent. Eventually, the crest was reached at 63 percent or 64 percent, and
almost 50 percent of the American people claimed to have attended church in any
week.316
As the church was directing efforts at creating organizations and the preaching and
teaching ministries in local congregations to positively affect individuals with the gospel who
could then in turn positively affect society. This is the philosophy of ministry in which the young
Jerry Falwell was trained and which he echoed in his early preaching encouraging ministers to
preach the gospel only and to avoid becoming entangled in civil and political issues of the day.
Nonetheless, as the young Falwell matured in ministry and understanding of American culture
and began organizing efforts to catapult evangelicals onto the political scene for a fight to reestablish biblical morality in America once more.
In a 2005 interview with Jon Meacham, Jerry Falwell confessed the motive behind
changing his position in his early ministry from encouraging ministers to preach the gospel only
and not get involved in civil issues, to being one of the most prominent religious-political figures
of the twentieth century when stating, “It was only after the early '60s, with the court rulings
outlawing voluntary Bible reading and school prayer, and [then] Roe v. Wade, that I became
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convinced that my position was now wrong ... and I did an about-face and spent the last 30 years
forming the religious right."317
A seismic shift in the center of Evangelicalism occurred from the 1950s to the latter half
of the 1970s. In analyzing the content of the most popular Christian publication, Christianity
Today, David Wells provides an illustration of the Evangelicals’ moving away from their
traditional center to adopting the mores of the modernist culture through the shrinking space
given to expounding biblical truth,
In the editions of 1959, fully 39 percent of the space was given to exploring and
expounding biblical truth; by 1989, this had fallen to 8 percent. And whereas the news,
which in modern experience is virtually synonymous with the experience of diversity,
had filled only 20 percent of the pages in 1959, three decades later in 1989 it filled 40
percent.318
However, the lull was to be short lived as George Gallup in a 1976 issue of Newsweek
magazine called it the “year of the Evangelical.”319 Though Evangelicalism did experience
success through the public crusades of Billy Graham, as a whole it experienced relative minimal
cultural influence compared to previous generations, that is, until the 1970 Supreme Court case
of Green vs. Connally in which the Internal Revenue Service issued a statement that argued any
organization that engaged in racial discrimination or segregation was not a charitable institution
and should not be eligible for tax-exempt status. This case led to withdrawal of Bob Jones
University’s tax-exempt status and influenced the rise of the religious right and sparked the
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interest of Jerry Falwell, and eventually led to the growth of the Religious Right and the
founding of the Moral Majority (1979-1989).
Resurgence of Religious Education
It was from the years immediately following World War II through the rise of the
Religious Right that America experienced a surge in the interest in and establishment of an
emphasis on religious education. This renewed enthusiasm was motivated by the projected
population increases and the church’s corresponding desire to continue to influence society by
educating the individual in Christian values and a biblical worldview. Wuthnow explains how
the absence of religious instruction in higher education had resulted in a growing biblical
illiteracy during the twentieth century, “casual surveys by some of the larger denominations
revealed that students on secular campuses were already virtually illiterate as far as biblical
knowledge was concerned.”320 “The goal of religious education,” Wuthnow submits, “was to
halt the corrosive tendency,” of uneducated individuals to naturally gravitate toward evil.321
Through 1991, the percentage of Nones was stationary across time at about 7 percent of
the U.S. adult population. After 1991, there is a steady linear increase in the percentage of
respondents who are religiously unaffiliated, reaching nearly 22 percent by the last year of the
survey and showing no signs of slowing.322
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The Dying Protestant Mainline
Beginning in the years following World War II the declining importance of
denominationalism began being felt throughout the American religious landscape.323 Joseph
Bottum writes of the certainty of the demise of mainline denominations in America in stating
undeniably,
The death of the Mainline is the central historical fact of our time: the event that
distinguishes the past several decades from every other period in American history.
Almost every one of our current political and cultural oddities, our contradictions and
obscurities, derives from this fact: The Mainline…has lost the capacity to set, or even
significantly influence, the national vocabulary or the national self-understanding.324
The 1998 and 2002 GSS surveys report the Mainline Protestant denominations have the
oldest average age of any religious group in America at 52 years of age. With the aging
demographic of the mainline denominations coupled with the decrease in young adults who are
religiously affiliated the population is vanishing from which these churches have traditionally
attracted adherents. The shrinking membership is not the only alarm sounding for these
Mainline churches. Certainty of belief has also correspondingly decreased in recent years as
well. As Joseph Bottum explains,
Strength of belief is usually taken to indicate future stability: a measure of the likelihood
of a denomination’s members will pass their faith on to their children. When the Baylor
study (2005) asked about doubts of the existence of God, 100 percent of the members of
historically black Protestant churches reported no doubts, 86.5 percent of evangelical
Protestants had no doubts, and only 63.5 percent of Mainline Protestants had no doubts.
Regarding reading the Bible regularly, Evangelicals were at 42.1 percent but Mainline
was at only 16 percent.325
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Church historian, Walter Sundberg, provides additional insight into potential factors influencing
the demise of mainline denominations in America.
Mainline denominations lack impetus because they deliver a confused message based on
a strategy of accommodation. This strategy asserts that the Christian proclamation must
be made as compatible as possible with the intellectual presuppositions of contemporary
society. Churches must re-symbolize their historic faiths in light of prevailing cultural
imperatives taken from the natural and social sciences. Otherwise the Christian message
will fall on deaf ears. The primary means of accommodation are historical-critical
method in biblical scholarship, the politicization of theological concepts and
denominational activities for the purpose of social reform, the redefinition of Christian
anthropology using therapeutic categories derived from psychology, and the toleration of
religious diversity in ecclesial life.326
Comparing this intrinsic “confusion” of method and message to the Evangelical doctrinal
certainty provides a formidable theory for the slower decline of Evangelical adherents in
America. There is a slow, but sure decline in Evangelical churches where The Yearbook of
American and Canadian Churches reveals “growth fell from over 3 percent annually during the
1950s to about 1 percent through the 1980s to less than a half percent through 2005, at which
point Southern Baptist declines pushed the entire family into negative growth for the first
time.”327
Shrinking Southern Baptists
While Mainline denominations have been the focus of recent research with many
attributing the steady decline to liberal theologies and shifting positions regarding cultural issues
these hypotheses are no longer holding true as the only reasons for shrinking numbers. The
recent Annual Church Profile released by the Southern Baptist convention revealed and
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confirmed what pollsters and sociologists have been asserting for some time. Overall
membership numbers for the Convention which fell to below fifteen million for the first time
since 1989 and are at the lowest point since 1987.328 This drop in membership is a decrease of
nearly 200,000 from the previous count in 2017 which was the largest decline in the
denomination since 1881. Adding to the severity of shrinking numbers is the decline in the
number of baptisms which are lower than they have been in over fifty years when the
denomination baptized as many but was half the size as it is now.
The “conservative resurgence” birthed in a 1979 effort of conservatives, led by Adrian
Rogers, in the Southern Baptist Convention to take control of the Convention over the issue of
biblical authority and the direction of their seminaries. Conservatives argued liberal theology
had infiltrated the faculty ranks at these seminaries and was wrecking the conservative values of
the ministers in training. Michael Foust supports this allegation by providing a summary of a
1976 Ph.D. dissertation by a Southern Seminary student:
According to the thesis, 87 percent of first-year students had no doubts that Jesus was the
divine Son of God. By their final year, the number had fallen to 63 percent. In another
category, 85 percent of first-year students believed that belief in Christ was absolutely
necessary for salvation; by their final year, only 60 percent held to that view.329
In a successful movement, Adrian Rogers’ leadership was able to right the Southern
Baptist ship and as a result of a recovered conservative biblical heritage and the six seminaries,
publishing house, and missions boards all instituted new leadership and all faculty are now
required to affirm biblical inerrancy as a criteria to teach and lead.
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The Current State of Biblical Higher Education
The concerted emphasis on religious education renewed in the years following World
War II is now on the backside of its apex where institutions of Christian higher education have
experienced the sixth straight year of declining enrollment. This appears to be a direct correlation
to the corresponding decreased importance the role of religion is occupying in the lives of
college-aged individuals. With a few of the larger Christian institutions experiencing relative
success (though some are declining in various categories of enrollment) most smaller Christian
institutions are struggling to keep their doors open as a result of rising tuition, decreased donor
support, and the rapid expanse of online education. One example of a recent closure is Baptist
Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia. It was “the first free-standing seminary started as
an alternative to the six Southern Baptist Convention seminaries during a schism in the late 20th
century – is closing its doors at the end of the current academic year.”330 However, the school
was forced to close its doors much sooner than the end of the 2019-2020 academic year due to
financial pressure and low student enrollment.
Several other seminaries and theology schools with mainline denomination affiliations
have or are on the verge of closing their doors due to the same enrollment and financial pressures
experienced by Baptist Theological Seminary.331 The declining enrollment in biblical higher
education provides further evidence of the ebbing influence of Christianity in America and
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perhaps, secondarily reflects the characteristic lethargy of these institutions to adapt methods to
meet the needs of its people.
Secularization and Secular Theory
Secularization theories in general, which will be addressed in the next chapter have failed
to account for the peculiar persistence of evangelical forms of Christianity in America:
Virtually every discussion of secularization asserts that high level of religiosity in the
United States make it a decisive counterexample to the claim that modern societies are
prone to secularization. Focusing on trends rather than levels, the authors maintain that,
for two straightforward empirical reasons, the United States should no longer be
considered a counterexample. First, it has recently become clear that American religiosity
has been declining for decades. Second, this decline has been produced by the
generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive
cohort is less religious than the preceding one. America is not an exception. These
findings change the theoretical import of the United States for debates about
secularization.332
Interestingly, Schnabel and Bock argue that religion is not waning in America and any
claims that secularization is the catalyst for the recent spike in religious Nones are mistaken.
Their research suggests that intense religion defined as strong affiliation, very frequent practice,
literalism, and evangelicalism continues to experience vitality in the American context even
though it is abating in comparable countries such as the UK. This hypothesis leads them to
conclude that intense religion in America is as strong as ever but it is the population of
individuals who are only moderately religious that is shrinking and contributing to the increase
of those who do not identify with any specific religion.333 Rodney Stark of Baylor Institute for
Studies of Religion similarly found when looking at U.S. church attendance numbers going back
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to the earliest days of the nation, that the percentage of church-attending Americans relative to
overall population is more than four times greater today than it was in 1776.334
Sociologists Peter Berger had long been an evangelist for secularization theory as
evidenced in his publications from the 50s and 60s but in recent decades he has recanted his
previous position. The reason for his deconversion from his views is due to the persistence of
religion in the world in general and in America particularly. Berger defines secularization as the
thought that, “Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the
minds of individuals.”335 It is this assumption, he admits, “that has turned out to be wrong.” He
goes on to confirm his belief in the failure of secularization theory by concluding, “The world
today, with some exceptions... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so
than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely
labeled "secularization theory" is essentially mistaken.”336 Additionally, Schnabel and Bock
conclude that contrary to what is occurring in comparable countries, “religion in the United
States is persistent and exceptional in ways that do not fit the secularization thesis.”337
Chapter Summary
In an essay originally published in 1899, William Reed Huntington addressed the
temporal nature of the old vestiges (Bible reading and prayer in public schools, religious
mottoes on currency, etc.) that remained from a past, more intimate relationship between church
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and state by prophetically outlining what was sure to unfold in the coming century as the fissure
between the two bedfellows continued to widen to the chagrin of continued prevailing Protestant
desires for shaping the moral fabric of the nation:
These vestiges of Christianity, as we may call them, are printed on the sand. The tide has
only to crawl up a few inches further to wash them clean away. There is nothing in the
theory of the Republic that makes such usages an essential part of the national life. They
rest for the most part upon the precarious tradition of colonial days: or if on the statute
law, what is statute law but the creature of temporary majorities? The moment popular
opinion sets against them, all these relics of an established religion must go by the board.
They are not the natural fruit of our system; they are but reminders of an old order of
things that have passed away; fossils embedded in the rock on which the existing
structure stands. One by one they will probably be chipped out and set aside as
curiosities.338
Bottum argues the relationship between Protestantism and politics that has permeated American
culture has created a precarious situation for the contemporary church that finds itself struggling
for survival,
Many Americans are profoundly patriotic...and many Americans are profoundly critical
of their country. We are left...with a great problem in combining the two and that
problem was bequeathed to us by the death of Protestant America - by the collapse of the
churches that were once both the accommodating help and the criticizing prophet of the
American experiment.339
As the largest denominations are experiencing a dwindling enrollment there is,
nonetheless, a sign of continued and persistent spiritual vitality. There has been, in each period,
a steady increase in American commitment to send missionaries to the world. Though America
continues to send more missionaries the increase in the periods illustrated below trails
significantly behind the percentage of population increase in America. In other words, as the
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overall population continues to increase the percentage of missionaries sent does not match the
percentages in overall population growth:
Table 2.5 Number of Missionaries Compared to Population Growth 1900-2010
1900

1960

Rank

Country

#

Rank

Country

#

1

UK

6,530

1

USA

20,500

2

USA

5,591

2

UK

5,700

3

Germany

1,833

3

Canada

3,600

2000
Rank

Country

2010
#

Rank

Country

#

1

USA

64,084

1

USA

95,000

2

India

41,064

2

India

82,950

3

S Korea

12,279

3

S Korea

21,500

Regarding the frequency with which Americans pray, there is an intriguing discontinuity
in the GSS data between 2002 and 2004. Between 1983 and 2002, there is essentially no change
in the percentage of those saying that they pray several times per day, but the value jumps
dramatically from 24.6 percent in 2002 to 32.2 percent in the next GSS survey in 2004, and it
declines thereafter.340 The importance of this data is that the decline has continued since 2004.
President and CEO of the Southern Baptist Convention Executive Committee, Ronnie
Floyd ardently stated in response to the 2018 Annual Church Profile,
It is time to press reset spiritually and strategically in the Southern Baptist Convention.
Prioritizing and elevating the advancement of the good news of Jesus Christ into every
town, city and county in America, as well to every person across the world, must be
recaptured by every church. Urgency is not an option for any of us as Christ-followers.
People need Jesus and they need Jesus now. Our generation of Baptists must believe and
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determine now that we will do whatever it takes to present the Gospel of Jesus Christ to
every person in the world and to make disciples of all the nations.341
Similarly, current Southern Baptist Convention president J. D. Greear outlines what he believes
is needed to reverse diminishing influence of conservative American Evangelicals,
For the upcoming generation, our prayer should be to see an increase in evangelism,
church planting and revitalization, and ultimately an end to decades of decline. First
things must be first, not only in our declarations but especially in our demonstrations. I
pray that our annual meeting in Birmingham will spur all of us to that end.342
Perhaps Fosdick with many other Evangelical ministers of times past clearly articulated
the message that continues to give life to the church and thus to the world, “There is one thing
that does matter - more than anything in all the world - that men in their personal lives and in
their social relationships should know Jesus Christ.”343 It is to this end that Chapter 3 aims to
further investigate the periods of American history surveyed here in Chapter 2 to identify and
extract those fundamental mechanisms that sparked seasons of Evangelical resurgence.
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CHAPTER 3 - HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE IN
AMERICA
“History doesn't repeat itself but it often rhymes” Attributed to Mark Twain
Introduction
Several scholars have examined the peculiar resiliency of religion in the United States
and how that resiliency seems to provide a fatal blow to the general conclusion of secularization
theories.344 Others have argued on the contrary using the evidence of the rapid pace of religious
disaffiliation among younger cohorts345 while others continue this argument by leveraging
European data to suggest that the United States is on a similar secularizing trajectory as
experienced in the UK. Sociologists such as Simon Brauer and Robert Wuthnow suggest it
should be no surprise that religion is on the decline in America;346 however, none of these have
examined previous periods of American religious history for the purpose of identifying
comparable declines of religious affiliation and the religious or cultural mechanisms that sparked
religious resurgence.
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The intent of this chapter is to identify a familiar cycle regarding those mechanisms that
served as triggers for the ebb and flow in levels of Evangelical affiliation during those periods of
American religious history surveyed in Chapter 2. As such, this chapter seeks to uncover the
factors that have caused or inhibited religious affiliation. It is here proposed that there will be an
identifiable cycle consisting of an ebb or decline in intense religiosity, concerted prayer born out
of dissatisfaction with the current religious climate, a resurgence of religiosity that leads to a
renewed zeal for evangelism and missions resulting in church growth both locally and globally,
the establishment of organizations and/or the institutionalization of aspects of the resurgence,
Evangelical political involvement/influence, which results in a subsequent ebb in religiosity.
The conclusion suggested in this chapter is that Evangelical alliance with politics diminishes the
appeal, attractiveness, and effectiveness of the gospel specifically and church generally.
It is hypothesized at the beginning of this chapter that each time the Church experiences a
great period of resurgence it has tended to establish organizations aimed at institutionalizing the
primary facets of the resurgence in attempt to secure the moral reform of society. Then, the
Church abdicates its responsibility to preach the gospel to the individual for the conversion of the
individual so the individual can multiply that new life in society. This responsibility is abdicated
through the process of politicization. As a result of this abdication of responsibility, there is a
diminished importance of the local church and a corresponding diminishing of the authority and
reliability of Scripture to speak to the whole life of the individual. Finally, there is a diminished
confidence or certainty in religion in general and Evangelical expressions of Christianity
specifically.
This chapter also aims to go beyond Simon Brauer’s brief discussion regarding the
potential inevitability of religious decline in American and whether it is irreversible and if it is a
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self-reinforcing process.347 As discussed above, both Mainline and Evangelical churches are
experiencing declining numbers with, “mainline theologians and church officials rationalize
membership loss by ascribing it to the effects of modern secularization.”348 this generalized
hypothesis is found to be inaccurate when viewing overall levels of religiosity in America.349
There are some pockets that show growth,350 but to ascribe an increase in Nones and a decrease
in Mainline and Protestant numbers in America to secularization alone is a false conclusion.
Colonial America
Preceding the spread of Christianity to America was the more recent resurgence of a
vibrant Protestant faith in the Motherland during the seventeenth century. Without providing an
examination that is too broad in scope, the work of Richard Baxter provided much momentum
for the growth of Pietism and the Evangelical Awakening that occurred in Britain beginning in
1735. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the growth of Protestantism was his The Reformed
Pastor published in 1656 which provided pastors with practical advice exhorting them to “serve
with spiritual vitality.”351 In the work, Baxter admonishes pastors to be consumed with
evangelistic fervor and earnestly attend to the spiritual vitality of their families in stating, “You
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are not likely to see any general reformation (revival), till you procure family reformation.”352
These ends were to be birthed from a renewed discipline of cultivating a life of prayer as Baxter
states, “Your people will likely feel when you have been much with God,” and more certainly,
“Prayer must carry on our work as well as preaching: he preacheth not heartily to his people, that
prayeth not earnestly for them.”353
Philip Spener authored Pia Desideria (Pious Desires) which was to serve as a manual of
reform for the Lutheran church in the latter years of the seventeenth century. Drummonds
referred to Spener’s work as the “manifesto” which provided eight characteristics of the renewed
Lutheran movement important to note here: the new birth, religious enthusiasm, a joyous feeling
of communion with Christ, sanctification, biblicism, theological education, missionary
evangelism, and social concern.354 In his six measures necessary for the reform of the Lutheran
church, Spener’s first measure was a “greater commitment to the spread of the Word of God,”355
which assumes a great confidence in its authority and reliability. A conviction that will be seen
repeated in each future period of resurgence of American Evangelicalism.
The cultural environment before resurgence as McDow and Reid recount was rife with
“Philosophical rationalism and divergent theological views” that “created a spiritual vacuum
within Christianity that contributed significantly to spiritual declension. At the same time, strong
spiritual influences in Protestant churches were used of God to create spiritual hunger within the
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lives of many that served as a catalyst for revival.”356 It was against this context that men like
Baxter and Spener served as catalysts for the Evangelical Awakening in Britain in 1735, which
prepared the way for Whitefield and Wesley to ignite the spiritual blaze in the New World during
the First Great Awakening.
Immediately preceding the Evangelistic Awakening in Britain was the deplorable social
situation that provided a spiritual vacuum that W.H. Fitchett describes as “It would be easy to
multiply testimonies showing how exhausted of living religion, how black with every kind of
wickedness, was the England of that day.”357 The ministers mirrored, and perhaps facilitated, the
lifeless spirituality of the day due to being “more concerned with political unity than spiritual
fervency;”358 where “the Church of England was highly involved in secular politics and
culture.”359 A situation that necessitated determined devotion to revitalizing the anemic church.
John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefield each played their part in the forming Methodist
church but the movement was born from concerted effort in practicing a life of scholarship, holy
living, and cultivating a life of vibrant prayer.
It was in 1738, that the Wesley brothers along with others experienced, as a result of an
organized all night of prayer, what has been called the Methodist Pentecost. Wesley recounts
this event in his Journals,
About three in the morning, as we were continuing instant in prayer, the power of God
came mightily upon us, insomuch that many cried out for exceeding joy, and many fell to
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the ground. As soon as we recovered a little from the awe and amazement at the presence
of His majesty, we broke out with one voice, “We praise Thee, O God; we acknowledge
Thee to be the Lord!”360
After returning from America, George Whitefield wrote a parallel testimony of the
overwhelming nature regarding the intensity of this season of prayer,
Sometimes whole nights were spent in prayer. Often have we been filled as with new
wine. And often have we seen them overwhelmed with the divine presence and crying
out, ‘Will God indeed dwell with men upon earth? How dreadful is this place! This is
none other than the house of God and the gate of heaven!361
These accounts are provided here as further evidence that purposeful and intense prayer born
from a despair regarding the current state of affairs and a desperation for the presence of God
precedes waves of resurgence of Christianity. As a result of Whitefield’s intentional cultivation
of a life of prayer and diligence in preaching the gospel, after preaching his first sermon in 1739
to his death in 1791 there were nearly two hundred thousand Methodists around the world.362
First Great Awakening
The period immediately preceding the First Great Awakening was marked with …”What
concerned American Protestants, after the first planting of Massachusetts Bay, was the sterility not of colonial soil but of its spiritual life.”363 It was in this religiously sterile backdrop that men
like Increase Mather and John Cotton gave rise to the “jeremiad” sermons where they saw the
opportunity to leverage the fast day sermons issued on the state-ordained364 fast days to speak
360

John Wesley Journals, 3rd edition (Grand Rapids: Baker Pub Group; 3rd edition, 1979), 140.

361

John Gillies, Memoirs of the Life of the Reverend George Whitefield, (Farmington Hills, Gale Ecco
Publishing, 2018 edition), 34.
362

McDow and Reid, Firefall: How God has shaped history through revivals, 198.

363

Alan Heimert and Perry E. Miller, The Great Awakening, (New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company,

1967), xvii.
364

Fast days were voted on and approved by the Massachusetts General Court on January 19, 1637.

111

against the spiritual lethargy of the church. Though there were some such as these men who
were devoted to preaching with renewed vitality, as McDow and Reid notes, “the majority that
sought revival began to acknowledge by the turn of the eighteenth century that “only united,
earnest prayer could bring a divine outpouring...Rather than calling the people to change so that
God would pour out His Spirit, ministers began calling people to seek God’s face in prayer, in
order that He would lead the people into revival, which would in turn would initiate a moral
reformation.”365 The focus on God’s intervention and renewal of the individual as a catalyst for
moral reform in society is another fundamental principle that will be evidenced in later periods
of resurgence. When this principle is reversed spiritual vitality begins to ebb.
Dutch Reformed pastor Theodore Frelinghuysen witnessed some of the earliest
intimations of the Awakening when he acknowledged the apathy366 of his own congregation and
began focusing his efforts on evangelistic preaching and the necessity of the conversion of the
individual through faith alone for entrance into the eternal Kingdom as well as for church
membership.
Presbyterian William Tennant Sr. founded the Log College movement initially aimed at
providing a space for intense theological training to combat the dead orthodoxy rampant in those
Pennsylvania churches. His primary vision was to “instill in each student a passion for
evangelism, for a devotional life, and for the Word of God,” with the curriculum being “critical
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in the future development of leaders in the Awakening.”367 Williams’ son, Gilbert, continued
the movement of his father and published his sermon “The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry”
in 1740 which was distributed throughout the colonies as an indictment against many
Presbyterian ministers suggesting many were unregenerate and thus entirely unfit to preach the
gospel. This renewed focus or doubling down on orthodoxy, evangelism, necessity of personal
conversion experience, and commitment to the authority of Scripture resulted in an increase of
“New Side” ministers from twenty-two to seventy-two. Those who were against the approaches
that advanced the Awakening (Old Side) witnessed a corresponding decrease in their numbers.
Jonathan Edwards, considered the father of the Awakening in New England, also
demonstrated a frustration with the characteristic apathy of his congregants toward God and their
lack of zeal for piety. His life, like those other leaders in the Awakening, was “characterized by
fasting and prayer”368 and encouraged youth to follow suit and form small groups for the purpose
of prayer, which he considered the most important key for promoting a resurgence of faith. It
was during Edwards’ sermons on justification through faith alone that the Awakening revived his
congregation, which resulted in several hundred professing faith in Christ in only a few months’
time. It is worth noting here, The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Holy Spirit, which
Edwards published in 1741 provided five marks of a true revival, three of which provide further
evidence for a recurring theme in periods of resurgence. The first was a focus on pure doctrine
exegeted from an authoritative view of Scripture. The third mark suggested true revival caused
men to hold Holy Scriptures in greater regard. The fifth mark illustrated the recovery of the
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passion for evangelism.369 “The degree of their acceptance of these evangelistic ideals,” Maxson
notes, that was “the ultimate measure of the ultimate numerical strength” of the Great
Awakening churches.370
Post Awakening Expansion
That there was a resurgence of religious interest can be seen in the results produced
during this period. McDow and Reid summarize the general results of the movement by
explaining, “Multitudes professed to changed lives. Churches were established and strengthened.
Missions enterprises were birthed...Christian experience, when yoked with doctrinal fidelity, was
affirmed. Institutions were founded.”371 As an example of the number of churches established
between New England and the South, Baptist churches grew from forty nine to seven hundred
and twenty seven.372 More specifically, as outlined above, this movement was birth from
attention to intense prayer and pastors consistently speaking about the issues of the day and
challenging their people to study, understand, and discuss these matters as they related to living a
holy life in a world that was not their home.373
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It was Edwards that highlighted the broad scope of revival which tends nearly always to
extend almost infectiously into other regions, “The tidings of remarkable effects of the power
and grace of God in any place, tend greatly to awaken and engage the minds of persons, in other
places.”374 Hammond expounds further the cyclical nature of revival highlighting how they
begin in pockets and typically combust into a regional or even national reach,
The cyclical nature of these movements is imposed by the kind of activity that a revival
represents. An outburst affects communities and extends well beyond communities to
large areas and even at times to a whole country. Whether begun by a single charismatic
leader or simultaneously in several different places, a revival has a contagious effect
which spreads elsewhere. The same social forces that produce a revival in one place are
likely to be germinating in other places, and an initial outburst attracts the attention of
others who take up the call.375
Nonetheless, by 1750 the waves of religious affection had begun to wither. Edwards so
clearly articulated his heart, and echoed the fundamental activity that led so many to witness
such a widespread resurgence of a lively faith, namely intense, focused prayer for God’s
presence, “So it is God’s will...that the prayers of his saints shall be on great and principal means
of carrying on the designs of Christ’s kingdom in the world. When God has something very great
to accomplish for his church, it is his will that there should precede it the extraordinary prayer of
his people.”376 So, it was the concerted prayer of New England ministers that paved the way for
the Second Great Awakening.
The French and Indian War distracted attention away from the work that had been birthed
in the Great Awakening to such a degree that “after 1763 by the declining state of Anglo-
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American relations, the revivals lost priority as a general concern in New England.”377
Distraction coupled with internal division in the Church snuffed out the blaze of the Awakening
to nothing more than rote religiosity as Ahlstrom recounts of the resulting cooling of religious
fervor of the time,
For half a century ‘Old Calvinists’ and Edwardseans would contend for control of local
parishes, educational institutions, and other corporate enterprises of the churches. Such
contention had serious negative consequences, in that it drove many peace-loving souls
out of the churches and led many more to embrace milder forms of religion.378
By the end of the eighteenth-century higher criticism had served as a catalyst for growing
theological liberalism which had created a ripe cultural context for a renewal of Protestant
expressions of the faith born out of a desperation of the spiritless church.
American Revolution
The natural result of this distraction and disunity was that the Evangelicals "increasingly
confused civic virtue with piety and, finally, political enthusiasm with the joy of conversion ...
the very religious life of the colonies came to center on the crisis in public affairs."379 Where,
"religious revivalism, saving souls,” devolved into “a political activity, a way of producing a
reborn majority to remodel society according to God's will and with his help."380 GordonMcCutchan follows, “Should this ‘remodeling’ be opposed, revolution will be in the making.” A
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cycle that is witnessed after each major American Awakening and will be evidenced below
through the political crusades of the Religious Right.
The Revolutionary Era gave rise to a period of religious decline in America due to
distraction and disruption. Where “the churches reached a lower ebb of vitality during the two
decades after the end of hostilities than at any other time in the country’s religious history. In
many ways, the war itself began the process of decline.”381
Additionally, it was the war that created a roadblock for the recruitment of new ministers
and the retention of current clergy. Current clergy were distracted, some fled, some became
chaplains, while others chose to fight in the War. To compound the issue of clergy supply, the
faculty of the new colleges that had been established for the training of new ministers were
scattered and there was no longer attention given to maintaining a recruitment funnel for
producing new pastors. With fewer ministers devoted to rekindling the fire of revival, there was
a correlating decrease in religious interest and a prolonged period of religious attention
redirected to political questions. Where for Evangelicals, "independence thus became not only
political, but moral. Revolution, republicanism, and regeneration all blended in American
thinking."382 Ahlstrom explains this transformation of the relationship between religion and
patriotism,
It is ironic that a time of religious desuetude should also provide the circumstances for a
resurgence of churchly activity in America, but such is the case - made doubly ironic by
the fact that religious apathy contributed directly to the result. The great tradition of the
American churches, as it developed in the nineteenth century, depended upon - almost
consisted of - 1) the reality of religious freedom, 2) the relatively distinct separation of
church and state, 3) the growing acceptance of the idea of denominationalism 4) the rapid
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growth in favor of the voluntary principle in matters of patriotic piety, with its belief in
the divinely appointed mission of the American nation.383
He concludes for clarity “A colonial people almost congenitally exercised with religious
questions of all sorts - and possibly exhausted by or in reaction against the Great Awakening became preoccupied for forty years chiefly with the problems of politics.”384
Second Great Awakening
The French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars had a significant philosophical influence
on the religious zeal that resulted from the First Great Awakening before these wars. It was
Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason that criticized the Evangelical belief of revelation and the
authority of Scripture. This “new” thinking infiltrated the college campuses and eroded
confidence in traditional orthodox beliefs and resulted in a quelling of spirituality throughout the
campuses and began to be reflected in the morals of the citizens. Being the first college founded
in the new nation, William and Mary had succumbed to the skepticism transplanted from Europe
leading Bishop Meade to regretfully describe the situation where “Infidelity was rife in the state,
and the college of William and Mary was regarded as the hot-bed of French politics and religion.
I can truly say that then and for some years after in every educated young man in Virginia whom
I met I expected to find a skeptic, if not an avowed unbeliever.”385 Nonetheless, “revival often
begins at times and places where circumstances appear most bleak,”386 and it was so as revival
erupted on several college campuses as a result of student-led prayer meetings.
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The Reverend Ammi Robbins described the impact that an individual profession of faith
had in Norfolk, Connecticut in 1798,
Numbers who had as yet remained unmoved, when ... they beheld many of their intimate
companions a husband, a wife, a brother, a sister, a parent, a child, a near friend, a late
jovial companion, with sweet serenity, solemnly giving up themselves to the Lord ... they
were pierced through, as it were, with a dart. They often went home full of distress, and
could never find rest or ease until they had submitted to a sovereign God.387
Methodism after the 1784 Christmas Conference “expanded almost exclusively by
domestic evangelism” and it would “exceed in its rate of growth all other large Protestant
churches.”388 The new growth of the church can be traced to two fundamental aspects, according
to Ahlstrom, its message and its structure,389 and although ministers delighted in unexpected
conversions of lifelong infidels, they had to report that the best subjects for conversion were
young persons who had been reared in families of some piety.390
Mark Noll recounts the spread of revival through the Congregational churches of the
Northeast, “In the east concern for revival gripped several local Congregational ministers in
Connecticut during the early 1790s. By the turn of the century a considerable network of these
ministers was exchanging information on signs of religious vitality. Together they were praying
and preaching for the revival of church attenders and for the conversion of the indifferent.”391
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For example, Congregationalist minister and eighth president of Yale College, Timothy Dwight,
grandson of Jonathan Edwards, discovered several of his students were deists and to confront the
“infidelity,” he “labored by forthright argument to restore confidence in the Bible, and he began
a four-year cycle of sermons designed to communicate the essentials of the faith.”392 In 1802
revival swept the campus where a third of the 225 students were converted.
The western frontier was spiritually destitute which made it a prime missionary target for
zealous ministers. The living conditions were much harsher than the developed East and as a
result ministers were few, and most pioneered the new territory to secure land for their family.
Reflecting on the dire spirituality of the west Asbury lamented, “When I reflect that not one in a
hundred came here to get religion, but rather to get plenty of good land, I think it will be well if
some or many do not eventually lost their souls;”393 however, the spreading of the Awakening
quickly bore much fruit in this barren land as evidenced by a camp meeting at Cane Ridge in
August 1801 where an estimated twenty to twenty five thousand pioneers traveled to attend.394
As the movement continued it became apparent that not only were young people
converting at a higher rate than their elders, but it was women that were much more likely than
men to convert. Phoebe Palmer “insisted that God’s grace was poured out on women and men
alike and that all who tasted the heavenly gift had the obligation to pass it on.”395 Explaining the
important role women played in the spread of Christianity during this time, Nancy Cott explains,
It is important to recognize that economic development especially the decline in
household manufacture disrupted the daughter's usual place in the household before it
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disrupted the mother's. The predictability of the daughter's relation to and function in the
family faltered. The decline of household manufactures compelled many young women
to seek paid employment outside the family, to reproduce in cash their former domestic
usefulness.396
As a result of the renewed interest in the authority of Scripture and making disciples of
all nations the increase in missional fervor was a natural result of the Second Awakening
affecting both congregations and campuses alike. One example of the revived zeal for missions
was the missions work that began at Williams College after the revival. It then spilled over to the
student body of Andover Theological Seminary. In 1806 Samuel Mills and fellow classmates
took refuge from a thunderstorm in a barn and held a prayer meeting in which they each
committed to take the gospel to the world. As a result, they created the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Mills concentrated his efforts on taking the gospel to the
American frontier and as a result of his fruitful efforts the American Home Missionary Society
was formed in 1826 after his death.
As renewed concern for evangelism increased it reignited a zeal for missions during the
Second Great Awakening. President of Brown University, Francis Wayland, “What object ever
undertaken by man can compare with this same design of evangelizing the world? Patriotism
itself fades away before it.”397 Wayland goes on to confirm that it is only through the conversion
of individuals rather than the conversion or influence of society can a moral revolution be
realized when urging his audience to consider the means by which a moral revolution is to be
obtained by arguing, “It is, in a word, by the preaching of Jesus Christ and him crucified. It is by
going forth and telling the lost children of men, that God so loved the world, that he gave his
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only begotten son to die for them...This is the lever by which, we believe, the moral universe is
to be raised; this is the instrument by which a sinful world is to be regenerated.”398
By the late eighteenth century the continued revivalism that had been popularized in the
First Great Awakening had “swept Evangelicals into command of America’s Protestant
churches.”399 As a result of the pervasive expansion of Evangelicalism throughout the first half
of the century, by the end of the Revolutionary War, Evangelicals had secured a monopoly in the
American publishing industry and saturated the land with the distribution of tracts, books,
popular literature, and devotional material.
Leading up to the cusp of the Civil War, ”the revolutionary transition was to the
acceptance of an unordained and uneducated layman as an appropriate interpreter of the
tradition, spokesman for the church, and shepherd of souls.”400 Still, it was during the latter years
of the Second Awakening that Evangelicals focused their efforts on expanding their influence
through education. One significance of the educational aspirations of Evangelicals that assisted
in increasing influence and prominence throughout the mid-century was the establishment of
institutions of higher education; however, one of the most successful of these endeavors was
directed at reaching and educating children through what came to be known as the Sunday
School movement. Originally aimed as a mission to the poor and unconverted working-class,
each Sunday, nearly one-seventh of American children ages five to fifteen were benefiting from
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these two and a half hours of instruction each Sunday. In 1827 it was estimated that 350,000
children were being instructed in the approximately four hundred auxiliary societies.401
Nevertheless, even the original righteous ambitions of the Sunday School movement
would eventually be leveraged by Evangelicals for the hopeful zeal of reforming and securing a
Christian America. As Sweet summarizes, “The Sunday school, it was believed, could produce
moral character for democracy, build a Christian America, and provide America with a
constantly renewed soul.”402 The American Sunday School Union even formally adopted a
missional statement positioning it as a morally guiding force for the nation as being “eminently
adapted to promote the intellectual and moral culture of the nation, to perpetuate our republican
and religious institutions, and to reconcile eminent and national prosperity with moral purity and
future blessedness.”403
Further, at the same time as Evangelicals were devoting energy to reaching the world zeal
for missions was advanced in the form of local voluntary missionary societies. Regarding the
original ethos of missionary purity in the forming of voluntary societies, Sweet reveals, “the
fundamental premise of these associations...was that a nation could be conquered for Christ just
as readily by collective action as by political group.”404 These voluntary societies were growing
in popularity with approximately more than thirty percent of adults in New York City belonging
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to one of the church-related societies;405 however, the Constitution of the American Home
Missionary Society reveals the characteristic nineteenth century Evangelical fascination with
establishing a Christian America in confirming its dual patriotic-Christian ambition in affirming,
“We are doing the work of patriotism, no less than that of Christianity.”406 “There were those
who thought that individuals, redeemed and reformed, would automatically and irresistibly
transform the social order. Others believed that only through broad attack on social problems
could the Kingdom be forced.”407
Nonetheless, by the 1850s evangelicals began to ignore social issues and social stability
with the most prominent example being involvement with the Temperance movement. With the
movement enjoying the “greatest intensity and longevity of any reform movement in American
history and the evangelicals were zealous in promoting it. “Evangelicals justified their
temperance action as a religious and patriotic duty to build a sober and energetic republic of
good rather than a drunken and lazy republic of evil.”408 Furthermore, Evangelicalism’s
infiltration and influence of American culture is seen in Sweet’s summary of the results of
Finney’s theology, “Finney’s dyadic doctrine of human freedom and self-determination, in
which sin was something one did, not something one was, broke the back of Calvinism by 1830
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and proved the perfect theological scaffolding for the emergence and espousal of a free-labor,
free-market economy.”409
Gordon-McCutchan summarizes how periods of Evangelical awakening have
dramatically accelerated the rate of social change and have resulted, “ironically,” in the opposite
of what one might expect of a movement aimed at providing a “stabilizing social force” as he
proposes is the aim of such awakenings. He continues to argue, “Each of these awakenings
contributed, to the populace at large, ideological assumptions which quickly led to violent
revolution. Revivalistic religions which emerged to calm social anxiety rapidly became agencies
for social destruction.”410 In his research he examines four different periods of American
religious history and discovered a particular pattern where in times of social stress people
became likely converts to “enthusiastical” religions. Once converted, these enthusiasts then
engaged in revolutionary activity.”411
Civil War
It was by the middle of the nineteenth century that “a holiness emphasis asserted itself
among American Evangelicals that led to a reform-minded call for an alignment of personal
morality with social and political purity.”412 As mentioned above, those in the South carried
longest the view that social reform would come through the conversion of the individual who
would “indirectly elevate the moral well-being of society.”413 It was also during this same time
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that Evangelicals replaced the “theological doctrine of predestination with a political doctrine of
predestination,” which Sweet defines as “the evangelical empire was predestined and thus had a
natural right to expand to its geographical boundaries, which were across the continent, and to its
religious boundaries, which were across the globe.”414
The Civil War also created a monumental shift in traditionally held views concerning the
millennium. Postmillennialism was long held as the dominant view of most Protestants but as a
result of the Civil War, the de-emphasis on personal conversion, and the rise of biblical higher
criticism where biblical imagery was mythologized this gave way to premillennial notions which
resulted in the rise of the Social Gospel and the drive to establish the Kingdom on earth as it is in
heaven.
Leading up to the commencement of and during the Civil War Evangelicals found
themselves wrestling with how the morality of slavery should be defined, with many of the
earliest abolitionist leaders being Evangelical. Although, as Sweet concludes, “Evangelicalism
found the coils of the slavery controversy impossible to get out of. Its strategies proved
inadequate to eradicate America’s greatest evil and instead ended up rending divisions, splitting
denominations, enraging religious friends, and alienating social institutions and political
parties.”415 It was this inability of Evangelicalism to unify around such a momentous moral
cause during such an integrally opportunistic time in American history that led to an eventual
ebbing of Evangelical vitality during the twilight years of the nineteenth century.
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Though the Civil War further embedded Evangelicalism into the fabric of American
society, the rise of new religions, higher criticism, and Darwinian theories of evolution created
an ever-increasing indifferent environment and entirely novel ways of interpreting reality. This
was a new world to which Evangelicals were not accustomed and where “a scientific and
historical spirit worked to flatten the landscape of the spiritual life.”416 Leading into the dawning
of a new century Evangelicalism had successfully entwined itself into the DNA of the nation.
However, such a grafting in created a socio-religious environment that in most cases prevented
Evangelicals from assimilating many if not all new historical-critical influences. These
influences nuanced theology in subtle ways where God had been tamed from sovereign ruler of
the universe and wrathful against sinners with Jesus being the only way of salvation to now both
God and Jesus being a source of great comfort and unlimited blessing. Further the biblical text,
being demythologized, now served as a source of inspiration for a better life rather than
conviction.
Throughout the nineteenth century where the resurgence of Evangelicalism through
revivals and Awakenings transitioned into the Sunday School movement as the primary vehicle
for evangelistic efforts, it too fell into the cycle of being effective at producing converts,
successful in growing the church both numerically and in influence, served as a unifying agent,
was institutionalized in the American Sunday School Union, with the mission and effectiveness
eventually becoming diluted with affection for societal reform through political engagement.
Early Twentieth Century
In postulating a proposed cyclical nature of Evangelical history, Gordon-McCutchan
illustrates the twentieth century emergence of Fundamentalism with its inward focus to its
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evolution into the rise of the Religious Right and its insistence on Evangelical political crusade
as the primary means of (re)-establishing the Kingdom of God in America with millennial hopes
of preparing the way for the second coming of Christ,
...the breakdown of traditional institutions produces social chaos and anomie; an inwardly
directed religious form emerges to minimize the anxiety born of this social dislocation;
this inwardly directed form succeeds insofar as it makes people independent of
institutions or self-reliant; those still in the hierarchy of society (be they religious or
political figures) attack the newly emergent religion of inwardness, thereby politicizing
the thinking of its members; the religion of inwardness reacts by extending and making
ever clearer and more radical the theological principles on which its break with tradition
rests; it then begins insisting upon changes in the political or religious sphere to bring
them into coincidence with the teachings of the inner religion; next, it justifies these
changes in terms of millennial expectation; if it meets with opposition it will soon
identify those who oppose it with the forces of evil; it will then teach those who follow
the religion of inwardness that they have a religious duty to engage in political
revolution.417
The early Twentieth century was marked by Protestant attempts to reform society through
social organizations and political influence. The turn of attention from preaching the gospel for
converting the individual to a focused desire to renovate society born from the revivals in
antebellum America continued as a “potent force in American life...through the first World
War.”418 This eventually led to the rise of the Social Gospel movement. Born in the late
nineteenth century, the Social Gospel movement is defined by Noll as “The most prevalent
Protestant attempts to reform urban life were based on principles of private action and personal
responsibility. Many older churches developed programs of social outreach and support to
supplement more traditional services.”419 “The origins of the Social Gospel were both domestic
and foreign. The strong link in the American revival tradition between personal holiness and
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social reform contributed to the genesis of the movement…”420 Leaders of the Social Gospel
were trying to solve an American dilemma, namely how to adapt the Protestant tradition of an
earlier rural America to the changing demands of a newly industrial society.421
Protestants saw it as the “duty of the government to make it easy to do right and difficult
to do wrong.”422 There was perhaps no greater example of Protestant attempts to leverage
government to make it “easy to do right and difficult to do wrong” than the Temperance
movement. It was the Prohibition that “would establish the social conditions of morality under
which men are more likely to be moral than when living under an environment which is
conducive to immorality and wrong-doing.”423
World War II to Present
The mass evangelism success of Billy Graham is perhaps the most vibrant illustration of
the effectiveness of a confident belief in Evangelical doctrine and certainty in the power of the
gospel during the mid-twentieth century. Regarding the message of Billy Graham (like Moody
before him), he saw the first objective for the gospel to “change the hearts of women and men
then, one may proceed to transform the world.”424 With careful concern so as to not dilute the
fundamental aim and power of the gospel, Graham acknowledged that his understanding of the
power of the gospel to affect society through the individual evolved throughout the first decade
of his ministry,

420

Ibid., 305.

421

Ibid., 307.

422

Marty, Righteous Empire, 213.

423

Ibid., 213.

424

Gaustad, A Religious History of America, 291.

129

My belief in the social implications of the gospel has deepened and broadened. I am
convinced that faith without works is dead. I have never felt that the accusations against
me of having no social concern were valid. Often the message of the evangelist is so
personal that his statements on social matters are forgotten or left out when reports are
made. It is my conviction that even though evangelism is necessarily confined within
narrow limits the evangelist must not hedge on social issues. Yet I am more convinced
than ever before that we must change men before we can change society. The
international problems are only reflections of individual problems. Sin is sin, be it
personal or social, and the word repent is inseparably bound up with evangelism. Social
sins, after all, are merely a large-scale projection of individual sins and need to be
repented of by the offending segment of society.425
Graham conceded that mass evangelism, though an important form, was not the most
ideal form of evangelism as this responsibility was to be owned by the church. Graham echoed
the necessity of having an authoritative view of Scripture as a prerequisite for the effectiveness
of the church in the world. “The church has been effective only when it has spoken with
authority.” He said, “I am convinced that the reason some ministers are cracking up is that they
have no authority. I am thankful that there is a return to biblical preaching in America. The
Scriptures are beginning to return to their rightful place as the authority in the church.”426
The first aim of evangelism and resurgence then should be a converted membership.
Speaking to the criticisms that were often leveled against the mass evangelism crusades of
Graham, Elton Trueblood clarified that one of the largest mission fields in America at the time,
and most certainly currently, is the church roll. He argued,
If our only mission field is that of the 4 per cent who claim no affiliation, our
opportunities for religious advance are severely limited... Our main mission field today,
so far as America is concerned, is within the church membership it- self...[Our] task is to
try to reach the present membership of churches with a message of such vitality that all
experience conversion within the church, rather than a conversion to the church...In the
Billy Graham Crusade in New York there were certain skeptics who sometimes
complained that the figures were not dependable because, they said, many of the persons
425
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who made decisions for Christ were already church members. Therefore, they said, the
statistical reports were not accurate. What amazing misunderstanding this shows on the
part of the critic!427
While the generation influenced by Billy Graham’s shows higher levels of religious
affiliation, they did a poor job of passing on that intensity of Christian affections to their children
who, in turn, did even more poorly at passing on those affections to the next generation. With
each subsequent generation there is an increased diminishing of intensity of religious belief and
decrease in religious affiliation. According to the American Family Survey, of those who
matured during the successful years of Graham’s crusades, those currently older than 65, only
twenty one percent self-identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular, which is a five
percent increase from 2015.428
The Conservative Resurgence and the Rise of the Right
Examining the past presidential elections since 1980 it becomes increasingly clear to
absolute certainty that Evangelicals continued to align with and crusade for Republican
initiatives. Gordon-McCutchan suggests that Evangelicalism has always tended to be “a religion
of social control predicated upon inner- direction,” and this fascination with social control is
what has given it “a pronounced tendency toward political revolution.”429 But this is not how
periods of resurgence began, nonetheless this is what each devolved into, which resulted in a
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recession of religiosity. He goes on to rightly caution, “Hence preaching social control by means
of Evangelical piety is a very dangerous business.”430
During previous periods of Evangelical resurgence, “the sort of revivalism preached
corresponded with the social situation of the hearers.”431 Where the social anxiety was most
intensely experienced the awakenings spread quickest. This can be seen with the Second Great
Awakening spreading quickest in the frontier where it can be assumed anxiety generated from
the economic instability and uncertainty of personal health were prevalent through to the rise of
the Religious Right as Supreme Court decisions invalidated long-held traditional Evangelical
mores in the public spheres which created inner and external social and religious angst. This
angst nurtured a ripe environment for Evangelicals to rally a new revolution. Unfortunately, and
again, efforts were misguided at seeking reformation political action.
Chief Executive Officer of the Public Religion Research Institute, Robert P. Jones
outlines it was the waves of Evangelical resurgence throughout the eighteenth century that
formed the political underpinnings and identity of the new nation. He continues to summarize
the political contest during the latter half of the twentieth century that facilitated the alliance,
especially in the South, between politics and the Evangelical church,
In the south, the explosion of evangelical churches coincided with a wave of racial
reaction in the wake of the civil rights movement. After being a Democratic stronghold,
the South became solidly Republican beginning in the early 1970s. The Republican
“southern strategy” used race as a wedge issue to attract white votes in the wake of the
civil rights movement, but it also proffered a socially conservative message that gelled
with the values of the emerging Religious Right.432
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In the late 20th century, there was another resurgence in religious interest that fueled new
successes of conservative politics. Building the momentum that reached its apex with the rise of
the religious right and conservative resurgence it was “Preachers like Billy Graham and Jimmy
Swaggart – in spectacular revival meetings and increasingly on television – attracted millions of
white converts to churches which emphasized literalist interpretations of the Bible, strict moral
teachings and apocalyptic expectations;”433 however, scandal also rocked the Evangelical
confidence in the late 1980s with several televangelists being found out for mishandling
finances, prostitution, and infidelity. This had significant reverberations throughout the
American culture as confidence in the trustworthiness of religious leaders plummeted. Tom
Smith, Director of the National Opinion Research Center, provides a summary of the Gallup
Social Survey data regarding the impact of the televangelists scandal,
the percent with a ‘great deal’ of confidence in the leaders of ‘organized religion’ fell
from 30% in early 1987 before the Bakker scandal to 21% in 1988 after the Bakker
disclosures and during the Swaggart expose (and those with ‘hardly any’ confidence rose
from 19% to 32%). Also, showing a clear scandal effect was the general measures on
religious influence. The percent saying that the influence of religion was increasing fell
from 48% in 1985 and 1986 to 36% in 1987 and 33% in 1988...church membership
dipped from 69% in 1986 and 1987 to 65% in 1988 and the percent praying daily fell
from 58% in 1985 to 53% in 1989.434
Even so, confidence in religion and the church remained as the majority among other
categories polled by Gallup even after the televangelist scandals broke. It wasn’t until 2002
Catholic sex abuse scandal that the confidence Americans placed in religion and the church
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dropped sharply below fifty percent for the first time.435 General Social Survey data from
showed a majority of Americans (sixty nine percent) believed that the influence of religion was
increasing in America. By 1990 confidence had dropped to thirty three percent.436 The General
Social Survey religious preference trendline from 1972 held relatively flat until 1991. As seen in
the chart below, the number of those selecting “No religion” begins to sharply increase after
1991.437

Figure 3.1 - Religious Preference Timeline
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Religious affiliation reached a fourteen-year low in 1991 matching the 1977 low of six
percent however it was during 1991 that a continual drastic climb has occurred in the number of
those who have chosen “no religion” in the General Social Survey. Similarly, there was a
corresponding increase in those that chose “Other” as their religion from less than two percent in
1991 and more than doubling to three and a half percent by 2018.438 Interestingly, the number of
Americans that identify as being Evangelical has held relatively flat since 1991 according to
Gallup survey data. At forty one percent of Americans identifying as Evangelical in 1991,
reaching a low of thirty six percent in 2015 it was hovering at forty one percent in 2018.439
Similar to what has been witnessed in past resurgences of Christianity in periods of
American history examined here, current levels of intensity of religiosity remain consistent
among those aged 25 and younger, however has Schnabel and Bock point out, the number of
those in this age category who have disaffiliated has drastically increased in recent decades:
We also considered patterns among young people on this and other measures and found
similar patterns of persistent intensity. Looking just at people aged 25 and under—a
relatively small proportion of the sample for which we would expect some year-to-year
fluctuation—26 percent were strongly affiliated in 1974, 22 percent in 1988, and 25
percent in 2016. Whereas strong affiliation remained consistent, no affiliation among
those 25 and under almost tripled from 13 percent in 1974 to 35 percent in 2016. The
percentages for strong affiliation are lower overall for this group than those for all
Americans—which suggests that people may age into strong affiliation, as we are
effectively controlling for cohort by looking at the same age group over time—but are
similarly consistent.440
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Hout and Fischer conclude that the growth of religious non-affiliation, particularly among
younger cohorts of Americans, represents a movement away from the organized religious bodies
that Americans associated with conservative politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s.441 More
specifically, Schnabel and Bock conclude that the general increase of religious disaffiliation in
America was initially sparked as a backlash against the rise of the Religious Right.442 Which
served as a “reminder...that the relationship between the sacred and the secular have been a
frequently contentious issue in American politics.”443
The Diminishing of American Evangelicalism
Jeffrey Jones of Gallup illustrates the accelerated decrease in membership numbers in
America’s churches within the past two decades, "U.S. church membership was 70% or higher
from 1937 through 1976, falling modestly to an average of 68% in the 1970s through the 1990s.
The past 20 years have seen an acceleration in the drop-off , with a 20-percentage-point decline
since 1999 and more than half of that change occurring since the start of the last decade."444
Declining denominationalism has expanded beyond the collapse of Mainline
denominations to now seriously affect the largest denomination in America. The significance of
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this decline is seen in Wuthnow’s explanation of the meaning denominationalism once had in
forming and determining the religious identity for Americans. He argues,
over the past half-century, denominationalism has declined seriously as the primary mode
of identification in American religion. Indications of this decline include increased
interfaith and interdenominational switching, heightened tolerance across faiths and
denominational boundaries, ecumenical cooperation, and a deemphasis in many
denominations on distinctive teachings and specific membership requirements.445
This decline in denominational loyalty and its subsequent negative effects on religious affiliation
was acknowledged by Sherkat at the turn of the twenty first century where he predicted this
increased permeability of denominationalism would result in a decline in religious loyalty
“particularly in younger cohorts.”446 This is precisely what has occurred at a very rapid rate in
the twenty first century, especially in the last decade.447
According to Sundberg, many Mainline theologians and leaders attempt to “rationalize
membership loss by ascribing it to the effects of modern secularization.” He goes on to affirm
that, “They assert that the decline of the church is inevitable because we live in a ‘post-Christian’
era in which fewer people are attracted to organized religion. The trouble with this mainline
scenario is that it does not fit the facts of religious life in America.”448 The culprit for the decline
of religious affiliation generally and Evangelical affiliation specifically is not the secularization
of culture (though that is occurring, naturally) but it is the secularization of the church as
illustrated by the overall decline in spiritual vitality in these Evangelical congregations.
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Clarifying Kelley’s central thesis in Why Conservative Churches are Growing, Sundberg
asserts, “This strategy asserts that the Christian proclamation must be made as compatible as
possible with the intellectual presuppositions of contemporary society.”449 Sundberg continues
to provide a succinct summary of the primary means by which Mainline churches capitulate to
culture in accommodating their message, “The primary means of accommodation are historicalcritical method in biblical scholarship, the politicization of theological concepts and
denominational activities for the purpose of social reform, the redefinition of Christian
anthropology using therapeutic categories derived from psychology, and the toleration of
religious diversity in ecclesial life.”450 Although Kelley was writing in the latter part of the
Twentieth century and Sundberg was echoing these charges against Mainline congregations at
the turn of the Twenty-First century it has become increasingly definite that more and more
Evangelical churches have made their message “as compatible as possible with the intellectual
presuppositions of contemporary society,” where now only ten percent of those who consider
themselves “born again” hold a biblical worldview.451 This has consequently initiated a resultant
decline in membership and affiliation in Evangelical denominations.
Writing in 2001, Darren Sherkat provided data analysis that concluded, “denominational
loyalty is only declining among Liberal Protestants, Episcopalians, and in Catholicism.”452 Data
from the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches reveal a deceleration of growth for
Mainline churches going back as far as 1955. Growth fell from over three percent annually
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during the 1950s to about one percent through the 1980s to less than a half percent through 2005,
at which point Southern Baptist declines pushed the entire family into negative growth for the
first time.453
Perhaps the most prominent bastion of Evangelicalism in America is represented by the
Southern Baptist Convention who in 1967 surpassed the United Methodists in size. The
denomination has prevailed as the largest, growing denomination in America until recently.
Unfortunately, with no accurate way of measuring conversions one is left with relying on data
recording the number of baptisms for a given period for measuring congregational effectiveness.
The data is showing more interest as recorded by increased attendance to religious services, but
commitment is decreasing as illustrated by the decline in recorded baptisms where they have
declined for eight of the last ten years with. For 2017, congregations reported baptizing 254,122
individuals which was nearly a twenty seven percent decrease from 2007. This provides the ratio
of one baptism for every fifty-nine church members. These alarming indicators of a deceleration
of growth led Mohler to admit this, “statistical crisis related to baptisms raises huge theological
questions.”454
Albeit, the denomination is still adding numbers and saw just over a six percent increase
in churches between 1997 and 2007;455 however, increasing the number of churches is not
translating into evangelistic effectiveness as missions activity declined from 2016 to 2017.
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Southern Baptist churches reported 4,376 church-type missions in 2017, which is a decrease of
nearly three percent from 2016.456Additionally, individual membership in Southern Baptist
congregations fell for the eleventh consecutive year, to below fifteen million. Since 2006,
Southern Baptist Convention congregations have lost about 1.3 million members.457
Mohler provides two insights as potential reasons for the steadily declining numbers in
the largest Evangelical denomination in America. First, those in the Southern Baptist Convention
are not as concerned about reaching the lost as they once were. Second, the methods of
evangelism that were once successful at reaching the lost and increasing membership numbers
are no longer effective in the current culture.458 Mohler concedes that for the largest
denomination in America, it is time “to acknowledge the hard fact that rates of identification
with and membership in evangelical congregations is likely to fall even further.”
Although, even with the high child mortality rate in Colonial America, the church was
still growing, a fact contrary to assumptions by the Southern Baptist Convention and other
theories regarding low birth rates. Mohler argues that it is the falling birth rates that has
contributed to the corresponding decline in SBC’s numbers,
Throughout recent centuries, the vast majority of church members have been the children
of church members. It is no accident that falling birth rates are reflected, in short order, in
baptism statistics. There is no question that children raised within Christian homes by
Christian parents are most likely to make their own profession of faith and continue
church participation into adulthood. There is also no question that when Christian parents
have fewer children, they produce fewer future converts to Christianity. The fall in the
birth rate has been precipitous and the trend lines parallel baptism statistics in the SBC.459
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The decreased fertility rates in America are a natural consequence of increased wealth
and availability of healthcare, which resultantly lowers child mortality rates. Max Roser
explains, “When more infants survive fertility goes down and the temporary population growth
comes to an end.”460 While reaching children of current members is the “top priority” for
Southern Baptists, Mohler concedes that they are “also about to find out if we can reach young
people to whom we did not give birth. That is more challenging.”461
With the rise of the outwardly (politically) focused Religious Right and the parallel
inward focused Evangelical Conservative Resurgence aimed at reestablishing the authority of
Scripture during the late 70s and throughout the 80s there was a revived sense of certainty of
belief among Evangelicals. 462 Reminiscent of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the
early twentieth century, albeit not as militant, the conservative resurgence in the Southern Baptist
Convention did not so much create a resurgence in affiliation or interest in Evangelicalism as it
aimed to purify and realign the denomination especially regarding the authority and inerrancy of
Scripture.
In surveys between 1984 and 1992, in polling to determine national distribution of
religious conservatives, liberals, and moderates, it was found that Americans began to exhibit a
greater degree of certainty regarding their religious identity. During the heyday of the Moral
Majority and as the Conservative Resurgence was accomplishing its aim of reestablishing the
authority of Scripture in the Southern Baptist Convention and its seminaries, those that indicated
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they did not know if they were conservative, liberal, or moderate fell from sixteen percent in
1984 to seven percent in 1989. There was a corresponding increase in those that identified as
conservative, increasing from nine percent in 1984 to sixteen percent in 1989; however, certainty
of belief has continued to decline with each subsequent generation.
Sherkat speaks to the effects of these dissolving religious convictions and how the lack of
clear or strict463 denominational distinctiveness creating clearly definable costs and benefits
facilitates a denominational permeability. He concludes from General Social Survey data
evaluated from 1973 to 1998 that “(1) religious groups with distinctive theologies, liturgies, or
rituals will have higher rates of retention; (2) denominations with little distance from secular
society will have lower rates of retention and will lose members through switching; and (3)
denominations that are similar to a high number of other religious organizations will have lower
rates of retention.’464 The relatively recent increase in churches with non-denominational names
or denominationally unaffiliated also experience the same vague definability that eases attrition
for their intended audiences. General Social Survey data shows, “the nondenominational “other
Protestant” category posts the lowest overall retention rate among religious affiliations, while the
diverse “other religions” category charts a relatively high loyalty percentage.”465 Whereas,
perhaps not surprising, the retention rates of the unaffiliated are increasing with each subsequent
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generational cohort. Further, retention rates even among the strictest denominations that have
clear distinctives are on the wane in America. Chaves and Voas provide empirical evidence that
religious affiliation, belief, and practice in the United States have in fact been declining for
decades and because this decline has been produced by the same generational patterns
underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: “Each successive cohort is less religious than
the preceding one.”466 Importantly, this decline in the intensity of religiosity in America is
occurring among the moderately (fuzzy middle) religious as well as intensely religious.
General Social Survey data from 2000 to 2010 reveal the membership decline was nearly
the same for Evangelical congregations as for Mainline.467 Roozen goes on to report that
interestingly, “the biggest decline among any age group within these families is among older
evangelicals. Among that group, the number expressing confidence in organized religion fell
from forty three percent to twenty seven.”468 Roozen went on to illustrate in the “Decade of
Change” report, that “spiritual vitality”469 of American congregations also dropped significantly
among Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic denominations but the decline was most dramatic
again for those Evangelical congregations dropping from forty nine percent in 2005 to thirty one
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percent in 2010. The lower vitality was mirrored in the FACT survey by a decrease in
congregational emphasis on prayer groups, spiritual retreats and scripture or theology studies.
While it is clear the spiritual vitality of American congregations has significantly
decreased over the last decade, there is a demand for more rigorous and relevant teaching from
Scripture is reflected in the desires of the majority of parishioners. A recent Barna survey
revealed that more than sixty seven percent of spiritually active believers confirmed their desire
for their church to provide more instruction describing what the Bible teaches about current
social and political issues.470 When congregational leaders intentionally built supportive
communities, and engaged their people in faith practices (within and outside the congregation),
they strengthened vitality. When leaders or the congregation at large focused on anything else,
vitality diminished.471
Further, polling data reveal that younger generations are disaffiliating at a much faster
rate than previous generational cohorts. With the decreased birth rate in America coupled with
the lack of confidence in religious teaching, the importance of religious socialization through the
family unit becomes magnified as indispensably necessary.472 Indeed, the structures of society,
perhaps unknown to converts themselves, play a key role in determining religious choice.473
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However, Simon Brauer acknowledges that though unique cultural nuances may contribute to the
decline of religious interest and affiliation what sustains that decline is not necessarily unique
and can be addressed. He explains that,
Despite varied histories and cultures, countries might undergo the same process of
religious decline if it is instigated by certain conditions common to contemporary life and
maintained by basic processes of familial and societal socialization of new members. In
other words, what starts religious decline is relatively new while what maintains it is not.
One possibility is that forces that had previously engaged religious convictions have
weakened, leading to a slow decline toward modest religiosity (Smith
2017:198).conditions, albeit at different times and under different circumstances, that
weaken the ability of society and families to socialize youth into religious
traditions...Religious counter-movements, such as the religious right in the United States
or anti-Soviet Catholic nationalism in Poland, might combat or offset some of that
change. But so long as it remains harder to socialize new members into religious
traditions than before, each subsequent generation will slowly make society less religious
overall.474
Regarding the factors that appear to be causing religious non-affiliation and disaffiliation
in the West, Brauer discusses the influencing force of religious change as a non-directional
process versus religious change as a self‐reinforcing process.475 In short, "with each generation,
irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth among religious nones more so than
disaffiliation."476 Hammond echoes this as it relates contrarily to resurgence in arguing that, “just
as the revival is social, so is its dying out: fading enthusiasm can also be contagious.”477
Religious communities not only inform members' preferences and considerations of options, but
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also sanction members' behaviors.478 Youth researchers Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch suggest
that it is a “common sense notion that parents and their own religious practices are among the
strongest influences on the religious behavior of adolescents.”479
Importance of Familial Religious Socialization
The ability of parents to effectively communicate and transmit their own religious beliefs
to their children for sustained growth (even survival) of that religion magnifies the importance
of religious socialization that allows Wuthnow to confidently assert, “Put simply: One important
way in which religious orientations have become institutionalized is family.”480 Thus the integral
necessity of family can be seen as the lynchpin for securing future Evangelical resurgence in
America. As Richard Baxter contended, “You are not likely to see any general reformation
(resurgence), till you procure family reformation.”481
Generally, the overall importance of religion in one's family of origin and the parents'
specific religious activities reinforce religious conservatism that can be typically correlated with
Evangelicalism. According to Wuthnow, the specific activity that had the strongest effect on
reinforcing religious conservatism was reading the Bible at home and being sent to Sunday
school having the weakest effect.482 This leads Wuthnow to confidently conclude, it is religious
socialization in the family unit that “plays a role in maintaining religious conservatism: People
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whose parents regarded religion as important and who engaged in family devotional practices
such as reading the Bible together are more likely to attend religious services regularly and
identify themselves as conservative.483 This finding suggests that some of the shift toward
religious conservatism among baby boomers (noted earlier) may be a return to the religious
practices of respondents' childhoods.484
Unfortunately, however, the generational picture is bleak in America. With over a third of
young Protestant teens do not think that church usually makes them think about important things.
Schwadel and Smith’s research suggests, “On the whole, teens whose parents are affiliated with
conservative denominations are somewhat more likely than most other Protestant teens to report
that church usually makes them think about important things.485
While it is the youngest generation in which a resurgence of Evangelical influence would
most likely occur, it is precisely this generation (Millennial) that is most likely to continue the
abdication of traditional Evangelical worldview as Barna laments,
The United States is in the early stages of biblical abandonment and the consequent
cultural decline. Increasing numbers of people are comfortable with faith as long as it
provides the benefits they seek and is neither demanding nor constraining. This shift
began tentatively more than four decades ago and has been gathering momentum ever
since. Millennials, the generation whose choice will ultimately determine the nature of
Christianity and the Church in America for several decades, appear poised to
wholeheartedly support the shift away from biblical Christianity and toward new belief
patterns.486
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Presiding Bishop and Primate of the Episcopal Church of the United States, Katharine
Jefferts Schori explains her parents’ reasoning for conversion from Catholicism to Episcopalian
“I think my parents were looking for a place where wrestling with questions was encouraged
rather than discouraged.”487 This testimony reminds the Church of the necessity to preach and
teach with a confident certainty which results naturally in a clarity of how Scripture continues to
speak into the lives of each generation. Steve Bruce explains the benefit of parents transmitting a
confident Evangelical faith to their children that assists its ability to thrive compared to an
ambiguous faith,
The socialization of young children necessarily involves bowdlerizing and simplifying.
The virtue of conservative Protestantism is that it survives such treatment better. Children
can understand and believe in a God with the white beard who actually did make the
world in six days and who dictated the Bible to faithful stenographers. Apart from
anything else, conservative Protestantism has the advantage that its treatment of the
Bible, as containing true stories of miraculous occurrences, makes for appealing
presentation to children. Because conservative Protestantism is realistic and dogmatic,
what is left after it has been reduced to the level of the comic book is still consistent with
the mature product. When it suffers the same translation, liberalism appears either empty
or uncertain and ambiguous.488
In discussing the ambiguity that has led to the decline of the Protestant Mainline
denominations that has prevented the passing on of the faith to the next generation, Sundberg
affirms the situation is no better for those Evangelicals that have not engaged in rigorous
religious activity by concluding, “Lapsed evangelicals are no more successful in passing faith on
to their children than Christians raised in mainline churches.”489 Barna suggests the abiding lack
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of planning and inadequate investment in the next generation will continue to add to the unstable
futures of American churches. Where now three out of five religiously active parents say that
they are primarily responsible (fifty nine percent) and more than one-third says that it’s mostly
them, with the help of church leaders (thirty six percent).490491
Additionally, Wuthnow’s data suggest that religious conservatism is also reinforced by
congregational interaction, that is involvement in the local church, but not by special-purpose
groups operating outside the local congregation.492 He argues, “One reason why religious
conservatives are, in fact, conservatives rather than moderates is simply that they participate in
congregations that provide affirming plausibility structures for conservative beliefs.”493
However, the conversion occurs most frequently through pre-established relationships with
family being the most obvious and perhaps accessible, social networks (sacred and secular) also
serve as a catalytic agent in the conversion process, to or from religion. Since it is “through
repeated consumption of specific religious products, individuals come to prefer them to
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alternatives”494 the necessity of familial involvement in purposeful religious socialization of their
children becomes even more integral for any hope of a resurgence of Evangelicalism in America.
Chapter Summary
As a result of the examination presented in this chapter, a few conclusions must be
proposed. First, religious alignment with political authority tends to diminish religious influence.
Second, the primacy of prayer and preaching has served in each period as the impetus that
sparked Evangelical resurgence. Third, the importance of the family unit in transmitting the
Christian faith to the next generation was viewed as a primary responsibility of parents, and
fourth, as the authority of Scripture is diminished there is a corresponding ebbing of intense
religiosity. When the Evangelical message has evolved from the conversion of the individual so
the individual can influence the greater culture, to interests in transforming the greater culture to
affect the morality of individuals there is a declension in the effectiveness of Evangelicalism in
the culture. This loss of evangelistic effectiveness, an Evangelical distinctive, is an influential
catalyst for the rise of the Nones, especially among the traditionally Evangelical-affiliated, which
Sherkat echoed nearly two decades ago,
In the latter half of the twentieth century, liberal and moderate denominations became
increasingly secular and this lack of distinctiveness from secular society pushed out
members who desired more otherworldly religious compensators. Further, niche overlap
with secular alternatives has meant that decreased loyalty also contributed to increasing
rates of defection from organized religion — to both nonaffiliation and the nebulous
“other Protestant” designation.495
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In nearly every period of American religious history periods that experienced intense
religious resurgence in America provide evidence that religious alignment with political
authority tends to diminish religious influence over time. The dangers of religion aligning with
government and politics can be evidenced in other countries as well. For example, the 1876
Spanish Constitution had established near complete religious freedom, and the influence of the
Catholic church among the masses had been in decline in the early twentieth century because of
its alliance with the oligarchy.496 Historian William Sweet provides further insight into how this
relationship tends to weaken the fundamental aim of the religion,
When religion attempts to interfere in the affairs of the civil state, it weakens and
undermines the state’s legitimate power - the state becomes the tool of the church and
does not function in its own right. Persecution by the state because of religion, in the
attempt to secure religious uniformity, confuses the civil and the religious, denies the
principles of Christianity and civility.497
Further, as Sweet quips, Evangelicals have a persistent tendency of “constantly sticking
their noses into the public arena.”498 Whereas the political agenda in the nineteenth century was
fashioned around religious issues and leveraged tactics taken from the revivalist tradition the
current political agenda in America is fabricated around constitutional and civil issues that
leverage an equation of civil rights with inalienable morality.
The men and women that sparked and served in advancing these periods of resurgence
were burdened with an intense dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs both inside the
church and culturally. They had been serious students of Scripture and had given themselves to .
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Although they were burdened with the current state of affairs of society, they did not aim to
convert society. As they were students of Scripture, they were also students of the times, which
allowed them to craft their methodologies accordingly for the conversion of the individual who
lived in those churches and cultures, and although many revivals are known for their
emotionalism, the key players used in these greater resurgences tended to avoid the emotionalism
and were able to promote a sense of ecumenicity that allowed the movement(s) to transcend
traditional and previously limiting denominational, demographic, and geographical boundaries.
Indeed, there has been a vast growth of the non-religious in the United States in the past
decade. One potential factor is just when a certain critical mass is obtained being unaffiliated
becomes a legitimized identity that is no longer taboo and has become socially normalized.
Although the decline in Evangelical affiliation has accelerated in recent years, hope is not lost for
a resurgence in the near future as Brauer believes, “Even if the conditions that enable religious
decline remain (making decline inevitable), religious revivals may effectively undo decades of
slow decline.”499 Adding, “until we understand the nature of the water heater and the person
turning on the faucet, we are left with significant unknowns about how long the bath will remain
comfortable.”
As with the importance of religious socialization in familial structures for the transmitting
of religious values and increasing probability of affiliation, the principle holds true for political
affiliation as well. Wuthnow confirms the political socialization power of congregations by
arguing, “One reason why religious conservatives are, in fact, conservatives rather than
moderates is simply that they participate in congregations that provide affirming plausibility
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structures.”500 The current religious climate highlight these affirming plausibility structures
making it easier, or perhaps more comfortable, for many who would have in previous
generations to self-identify as a None. On the contrary, congregations that
Individuals do not choose their religious identities as an act of rebellion but more so,
perhaps, in a vacuum void previously occupied by religious belief that was certain, most
importantly to this study, orthodox Evangelical belief in the authority of Scripture and
“Religious orientations are not arbitrary labels that people choose when confronted with a Gallup
pollster, but are identities that correspond loosely with stances on the Bible and on contested
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer.”501 Rizvi and Hossain confirm that
“the single best predictor of church participation turned out to be belief - orthodox Christian
belief, and especially the teaching that a person can be saved only through Jesus Christ.”502
Further, the life of the mind was never ignored and concerted effort was typically always
devoted to creating or substantiating institutions, schools, etc. that provided academic
opportunity to sharpen the intellect for a more ardent delivery of the gospel and theology. Elton
Trueblood articulated during the pinnacle of Billy Graham’s evangelistic success that “No vital
Christianity is possible unless at least three aspects of it are developed. These are the inner life of
devotion, the outer life of service, and the intellectual life of rationality.”503 Evidence of these
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three aspects of vital Christianity can be traced in each major period of Evangelical resurgence in
American religious history.
The decline in the spiritual vitality, religious interest and affiliation continues as the new
century begins to mature. As Roozen illustrated in the 2010 FACTS survey, “Despite bursts of
innovation, pockets of vitality, and interesting forays into greater civic participation, American
congregations enter the second decade a bit less healthy than they were at the turn of the
century.”504 This process of declination appears to be increasing in momentum as each year
passes. Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the current state of spirituality in America,
specifically as it relates to Evangelical affiliation among each generation. An investigation of
current beliefs and possible motivations for disaffiliation for each generational cohort will be
provided for identification of any existing common themes. The purpose of discovering any
identifiable catalyst(s) for the accelerated growth of the Nones population in America to possibly
confirm future Evangelical resurgence is possible.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY
Introduction
Writing in the latter half of the twentieth century, American historian Theodore Roszak
explained that the Christian faith in America had become, “socially irrelevant, even if privately
engaging.”505 While Protestant forms of Christianity have dominated the American culture for
more than two centuries, according to some researchers it should be no surprise that there has
been a significant shift away from religion as experienced in America during the last two
decades.506
In a 2016 interview at the Reason Rally,507 Executive Director of the Secular Coalition
Larry Decker proclaimed with confidence the rapidly increasing influence of the religious Nones
in America,
I’m religiously unaffiliated. I think that what we’re seeing is that the - None of the
Above community, and the religiously unaffiliated community in this country is growing,
larger than any religious demographic. And to me, that says that we’re winning, you
know. And it’s not a fight against religion, per se. But it’s a fight for the equality for all
people in this country to have freedom of religion, and freedom from religion. I
personally think that we’re going to turn this into a very strong voting bloc, particularly
when we’re connecting with people around values that the secular community shares -
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the values of freedom, equality, inclusion, and knowledge. And, and you know - they’re
not just for the secular community. They’re American values.508
Political scientist, Ryan Burge provides further insight into the historically ascending
religious trendline as revealed in General Social Survey509 data that the increase is occurring
among all generational cohorts where, “A person under the age of 40 is four times more likely to
say that they have no religious affiliation today than in 1972. However, the jump in those over 40
is six times as likely.”510 As there has been an increase in those that have self-identified as
Evangelical in both age groups described by Burge, the expansion of Evangelicals has been
negligible compared to the increase in those who have no religious affiliation. The increase in
those identifying as Evangelical has increased from seventeen percent to twenty one percent
among those under 40 and seventeen percent to eighteen percent for those over 40 years of age
from 1972 to 2018; however, the increase in those identifying with no religion has increased
from eight percent to thirty two percent among those under 40 and three percent to seventeen
percent for those over 40 years of age in the same amount of time.511 This accelerated population
increase now gives religious Nones (twenty three percent) a slightly greater share of the
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American population as Evangelicals (twenty two and a half percent) and Catholics.512 The
population of Nones has now surpassed Evangelicals in size from the Pew Research Center
Religious Landscape survey conducted in 2014 where over twenty five percent of the population
identified as Evangelical and only twenty two percent identified as None.513
The American Family Survey reports the highest number of Nones at thirty five percent
of Americans and the number is even more staggering among the Millennial cohort at forty four
percent with the Generation X cohort nearly as large at forty three percent.514 The data are
providing a clear illustration of Decker’s declaration that the Nones are beginning to “win” in
redefining the American religious landscape at the detriment of Evangelicalism. In examining
only a one year span, Brauer is able to illustrate the stability of the moderately religious
population515, but the decline of the highly religious and corresponding growth of those that do
not consider themselves to be religious.516
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Table 4.1 Stability of the Moderately Religious
Category

2016

2017

Highly Religious

38

37

Moderately
Religious

30

30

Not Religious

32

33

The number of Americans who identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular is
now thirty five percent. For Millennials and Generation X, the most common “religion” is no
religion at all. The Nones claim forty four percent of the 18–29 age group, and nearly that (forty
three percent) among those who are 30–44.517 The fact that high levels of religiosity are
declining even among those that have traditionally been viewed as the most religiously
conservative, i.e. Evangelicals, and those that are not identifying with religion are becoming
more confident in identifying as such creates a precarious situation for the American church and
perhaps a religio-cultural situation that can be celebrated by secularists generally and Nones
particularly.
In short, the confidence Americans currently place in religion and the church is at an alltime low since Gallup began polling this survey question in 1973 after the Watergate scandal.
Breaking below fifty percent for the first time in 2002 after the Catholic sex scandal news broke,
the confidence has continued to plummet to an dismal thirty six percent, lower even than the
presidency and United States Supreme Court.518 One potential factor contributing to the waning
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confidence in religion provided by a recent Pew Forum study reveals Nones believe religious
organizations are too concerned with money and power, rules and politics.519 Those that have
grown up in the church are leaving in droves; even those that have served as prominent speaking
and worship leaders of global ministries are publicly renouncing their Christian faith.520
Underlying Reasons for Religious Departure
Religious switching, according to Pew Research, accounted for an estimated twenty three
percent increase in growth of the religiously unaffiliated population in America.521 However, for
those that grew up attending Protestant church(es) during their adolescent years and later left the
church, an overwhelming majority indicated they disaffiliated due to “life changes,” typically
college or moving away from home, that create resulting in enough distance from the church to
show that it was not that integral for their spiritual well-being. Sixty six percent of college-age
adults ages 18-22 stop attending church according to the most recent LifeWay “student dropout
survey.” The survey respondents were provided with fifty-five options as for indicating the
reason they stopped attending church. According to the survey, the results could be grouped into
four primary categories:
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Table 4.2 Reasons Young Adults are Dropping out of Church522
Life Changes: that prevented them from
attending

96%

Church/Pastor Related

73%

Religious, Ethical, or Political Beliefs

70%

Youth/Student Ministry

63%

Interestingly, among those aged 18-22 that attended church regularly during high school
and continued to do so, though a diminishing group, chose to remain connected to the church
because they viewed church as a vital part of their relationship with God.523 Further, those that
did drop out of church after graduating from high school, but later returned to the church
primarily did so as a result of parents or family members encouraging them to attend (thirty
seven percent).524 Of those that dropped out after graduating high school, only thirty one percent
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returned to the church to attend services at least twice a month.525 So, the large majority, nearly
seventy percent, that leave church will never return.526
Importantly, those that are leaving are not leaving because of life stage effects.527 In other
words, the rapid rise of Nones among Millennials is not simply a result of “that’s what people do
in during that stage of life.” Rather, those that are choosing no religion appear to be doing so as a
result of generational differences in preferences. It is true that for decades coming-of-age young
adults tend to disappear from church during their young adult years, typically in large numbers
but many of them have usually found their way back to their childhood faith. This is no longer
the case with each subsequent generational cohort. The most recent Gallup data reveals, “The
lower rate of church membership among religious millennials appears to be more a product of
generational differences than of life-stage effects. In 1998-2000, sixty eight percent of
Generation X respondents were church members when they were roughly the same age as today's
millennials.”528
Similar to Decker’s proclamation above, the majority (sixty two percent) survey
respondents in America believing the global share of religiously unaffiliated will continue to
increase in the coming decades, Pew research seems to indicate the contrary. Pew Research
Center is able to project that the global unaffiliated population will decline in the decades ahead
due to the older religiously unaffiliated population in Asia being replaced by a younger, more
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religious cohort.529 It is interesting, however, that it is Americans who assume the population of
Nones will continue to increase; perhaps a reflection of their own experience with the rapid
increase of the religiously unaffiliated in recent years. Further, young adults, currently the
fastest growing cohort of Nones, believe the religiously unaffiliated will be the largest religious
category by the year 2050.530
Since it is becoming increasingly clear that the population of Nones in America has
dramatically increased among all cohorts in the past two decades and the increase shows no sign
of slowing, Christianity is growing in the global context and slowing in the American context,
and membership and beliefs of traditional Evangelicalism in America as represented by the
Southern Baptist Convention is declining, the aim of this chapter is three fold. First, there will be
a general examination of the geography and demography of American Nones. This section will
speak to the context and any contributions geography provides in determining the religious
beliefs, or lack thereof, of American Nones. Additionally, there will be an examination of the
religious beliefs and characteristics of four generational cohorts (Baby Boomers, Generation X,
Millennials, and Generation Z) for the purpose of revealing in each cohort potential cause(s) that
serve as catalyst(s) for the rapid increase in religious unaffiliation with each successive grouping.
Second, a general qualifying of popular theories that have been presented as primary stimulants
for the abandoning of Evangelical Christianity and the increase of religious switching, which has
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resulted in an ever-increasing population of Americans who choose to refuse to identify with any
religion. Finally, an examination of the Evangelical Church in America, specifically data from
the Southern Baptist Convention, as it relates to the loss of Evangelicalism’s foothold in
American culture and how the failure of the Baby Boomers and Generation X in the American
Evangelical Church to religiously socialize (evangelize) the subsequent generation has served as
the primary catalyst for the rise of Nones and the decreasing membership in American
Evangelicalism in general and Southern Baptist Churches specifically.
Southern Baptist Convention membership data will be leveraged due to the Southern
Baptist Convention serving as the largest evangelical denomination in America for several
decades. It is assumed that Southern Baptist Convention data provides a more reliable
representative sample of American Evangelicalism for this study.531 This chapter will utilize
historical data from the Southern Baptist Convention to serve as a comparison between the
religious views and characteristics of the religiously unaffiliated and the beliefs and
characteristics of the largest Evangelical denomination in America.
Geography of Belief
Geography can play a role in how one chooses to religiously affiliate. Regarding the
influence of geography, Keysar suggests, “The geographic clustering of American non-
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identifiers, non-members and non-believers in the West fits its classification as the “none zone”
in the Religion by Region series.”532 Further, and contrary to previous FACT surveys that
showed that newer rural developments produced the most religious growth, the most recent
survey conducted in 2010533 indicated that those congregations located near or in cities,
regardless of geographical region, now experience the most growth; however, as far as the most
spiritually fertile national geographic region, the South, from Maryland to Texas, continues to
produce the most growth.534 Nonetheless, even the South is not immune to the declining
inclination to share ones faith where from 2005 to 2015 those considered born-again residing in
the South witnessed a twenty eight point decrease in those that share their faith with others.535
Further, the South also is experiencing an exponential increase in the number of Nones.536 David
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Roozen, Director of Hartford Seminary’s Hartford Institute for Religion Research outlines how it
is more than location that now determines the likelihood of influence for a congregation,
Location, Location, Location used to be the kind way that researchers described the
extent to which the growth or decline of American congregations was captive to the
demographic changes going on in their immediate neighborhoods...in today’s world,
growth and decline are primarily dependent upon a congregation’s internal culture,
program and leadership, and therefore a congregation’s own ability to change and
adapt.537
Though there are pockets containing higher rates of the religiously unaffiliated, largely
the numbers are increasing in every geographical region in America even in the South which has
typically been perceived as a geographical bastion of religious conservatism.
Demography of Belief
Attempting to generalize the religiously unaffiliated in America falls outside the scope of
this project. Julia Duin’s research concludes that “men and singles are the largest demographic
among the unchurched.” Although, “unchurched” does not necessarily correlate to religiously
unaffiliated. Duin goes on to provide data showing an emerging classifiable group, working
moms, which is about to join those two demographics of men and singles.538 Additionally, there
are other facts such as sexual orientation that can increase the likelihood of identifying as a
None. Students whose sexual orientation is Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, or Other were more
than twice as likely to be Atheist, Agnostic, or None, compared to heterosexual students (57
percent versus 27 percent).539 Further, research from the Public Religion Research Institute
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reveals that among those who left their childhood religion, women are twice as likely as men to
say negative religious teachings about or treatment of gay and lesbian individuals was a major
reason they chose to leave their religion (forty percent vs. twenty percent, respectively). Women
are also about twice as likely as men to cite the clergy sexual-abuse scandal as an important
reason they left their childhood faith (twenty six percent vs. thirteen percent, respectively).540
Moving beyond gender and identity demography, Voas and Chaves suggest it is
generational replacement that has contributed significantly to the religious decline as they say it
“is largely the result of more-religious older generations being replaced by less-religious younger
generations.”541 However, the rate of growth of the Nones population is compounded by the fact
that each generation is doing less and less to religiously socialize or disciple the next where now
in America, "with each generation, irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth
among religious Nones more so than disaffiliation."542 Therefore, It is necessary to provide a
survey of the four most prominent generational cohorts in America. Generation Z, Millennials,
Generation X, and the Baby Boomer generation, which comprise the majority of the American
population and are of age to make influential decisions, many are of age to have families, and
contribute to society.
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Generation Z
Although the General Social Survey only provides data on those over eighteen years of
age America’s youngest cohort, Generation Z, typically classified as those born after 1996543,
will be briefly discussed here since valuable insight can still be ascertained regarding the
religious preferences of America’s youngest cohort. An overwhelming forty percent of young
adults aged eighteen to twenty two are religiously unaffiliated and only a little over fourteen
percent identify as Evangelical which fell to third behind Catholicism (sixteen percent).544
Further, and perhaps most alarmingly, Generation Z has deprioritized family placing personal
achievement, even hobbies and pastimes, above their value of family heritage as influencing
their sense of self. Falling to fourth, tying with the prioritization of religion, among the youngest
generation, the influence of family was the top priority among all other preceding generations.
Similarly, and perhaps the catalyst for this is the family’s decreasing prioritization of religion
with each subsequent generation.545
Perhaps one of the most alarming symptoms of decreasing levels of religiosity among the
youngest cohort is the drastic increase in mental health issues experienced by this generation. In
explaining that, “as a proxy of the social aspects of religion, attendance is one of the primary
reasons for better health and well-being among the religious,”546 Fenelon and Denielsen speak to
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the positive mental health benefits of regular religious service attendance illustrates the
correlation between drastically lower rates of religious service attendance among the youngest
generations and the dramatic rise in mental health issues.
Evidence of this correlation is shown among members of Generation Z who are the least
likely to report "excellent or very good" mental health. Generation Z is significantly more likely
to report their mental health as fair or poor, with twenty seven percent saying this is the case.
Millennials (fifteen percent) and Gen Xers (thirteen percent) have similar numbers reporting fair
or poor mental health, while fewer than one in ten Boomers (seven percent) and older adults
(five percent) consider their mental health fair or poor.547 When it comes to specific mental
health issues, adult Gen Zs are more likely than other generations to report they have been
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (eighteen percent) and more likely than all other generations
to report they have been diagnosed with depression (twenty three percent). While those in
Generation X (fifteen percent), Millennials (fourteen percent) and Boomers (twelve percent) are
diagnosed. Recent research confirms what college mental health professionals and
administrators have noticed over the past few decades: there is a mental health crisis taking place
on college campuses.548 Growing numbers of students arrive on campus with histories of
significant mental health challenges, and higher proportions of college students report taking
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psychiatric medications than ever before.549 As those in Generation Z show the lowest levels of
religious service attendance they are reporting the highest number of mental health issues.
Millennials
There are varying opinions regarding a definitive date range for Millennials. This study
employs the parameters used by Pew Research Center where Pew Research Center decided in
2018 to use 1996 as the last birth year for Millennials for their future work. Anyone born
between 1981 and 1996 (ages 23 to 38 in 2019) is considered a Millennial, and anyone born from
1997 onward is part of a new generation. Gallup provides data showing that the None
population is more than one in three Millennials with thirty three percent reporting no religious
affiliation in 2019.550 Some researchers have referred to Millennials as being “spiritually
confused” largely as a result of “the guidance (or lack thereof) provided by religiously
unaffiliated Baby Boomer parents on religion and spirituality.”551 For this cohort, church
membership is becoming much less important than previous generations with “just forty two
percent of millennials are members of churches.”552 With only twenty two percent of Millennials
holding that none of the primary, traditionally held religious texts qualify as a sacred text 553 it is
clear that the belief in the inerrancy of Scripture is in sharp decline.
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It was the parenting style of the Baby Boomer cohort provided a developmental
environment that provided children more freedom of choice. Explaining this new parental
encouragement of choice, Bibby, Russell, and Rolheiser show that “pluralism, equality,
diversity, and individual freedom were values woven into the parenting practices of many Baby
Boomers who, unlike their own parents, were less inclined to expose and involve their children
in religious traditions and faiths.”554 Consequently, “many Millennials received passive guidance
from parents, who actively chose to allow their children to independently explore religion and
spirituality.”555 This accurately mirrors Thiessen’s and Wilkins-LaFlamme’s research that
concludes the four primary factors serving as the most significant catalysts for the two youngest
generations in choosing to not identify with a religion being 1) Parents give choices to children
(whether to attend religious services), 2) Intellectual Disagreements (Unanswered questions,
compatibility of faith/science, etc.), 3) Social Influences, and 4) Life Transitions.556 The primary
influencing agent became parents imparting autonomy at an early age which showed to be
detrimental to the child’s spiritual development and the vitality of the church as “this emphasis
on autonomy and choice gives young people, for example, the option of not attending church.557

554

For parallels present in Canadian Millennials see, Bibby, R. W., Russell, S., & Rolheiser, R., The
emerging millennials: How Canada’s newest generation is responding to change and choice, (Lethbridge: Project
Canada Books, 2009).
555

Bahan, “The Spirituality of Atheist and “No Religion” Individuals in the Millennial Generation:
Developing New Research Approaches for a New Form of Spirituality,” 67.
556

Thiessen and Wilkins-Laflamme, “Becoming a Religious None: Irreligious Socialization and
Disaffiliation,” 74-77.
557

David Voas, ‘Explaining Change over Time in Religious Involvement’, in Religion and Youth, eds.
Sylvia Collins-Mayo and Pink Dandelion (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 29.

170

This created a cultural context where, “religious affiliation is now a matter of private choice”558
confirming that these identified causes reaffirm the critical role parents play in passing on
religious faith leading Ed Stetzer to state forthrightly,
There is no easy way to say it, but it must be said. Parents and churches are not passing
on a robust Christian faith and an accompanying commitment to the church. We can take
some solace in the fact that many do eventually return. But Christian parents and
churches need to ask the hard question, “What is it about our faith commitment that does
not find root in the lives of our children?559
The “roots” as Stetzer suggests, are what is missing in the lives of the youngest cohorts
and which is allowing them to spiritually drift as they mature. To this, Smith and Snell posit,
“Little evidence supports the idea that emerging adults who decline in regular external religious
practice nonetheless retain over time high levels of internal religious faith.”560 Leading them to
conclude that the case is “quite the contrary.”561 McConnell argues, that thirty five percent of
those that leave the church eventually find their way back to the church. However, this reveals
that the overwhelming majority, approximately sixty five percent or more, will not return.562
This data magnifies Mohler’s emphasis on the necessity of parents intentionally discipling their
children while they are young by concluding, “There is no question that children raised within
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Christian homes by Christian parents are most likely to make their own profession of faith and
continue church participation into adulthood,”563
Hope is not lost on the Millennials, however. Social scientist, Robert Putnam provides a
glint of confident hope that these will be the individuals who will lead the way in a positive
cultural revolution that is not so individualistic but more civil and interdependent upon one
another. And, it is religion, he says, that is the best vehicle for this generation to create a
resurgence Putnam states, “I actually think it’s possible that the millennials will lead a renewal of
civil society. There’s a decent chance we’re on the verge of a major change in American
society...And religion, he said, could very well be a part of that.” 564
Generation X
Pew defines Generation X as those born between 1965 and 1980.565 A comparison of the
1990 and 2008 American Religious Identification Surveys566 indicated that “Generation X
became more secular and also less Christian (eighty five percent in 1990 v. seventy five percent
in 2008) as it aged and grew in size.”567 Importantly, the number of Nones grew among
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Generation X during the same time period from eleven to sixteen percent.568 In general,
Generation X experienced significant growth due to immigration, increasing its overall
population from twenty nine million to thirty four million between 1990 and 2008.569 This
growth from immigration was primarily due to immigration from Latin America, a point worth
noting as the significance is seen in the strikingly low number of first and second generation
immigrants in the Southern Baptist Convention.570 Regarding immigration, according to 2007
and 2014 Pew survey data the overwhelming majority of the religiously unaffiliated population
is third generation or greater immigrant. With this population holding relatively steady in the
seven-year period at eighty percent in 2007 vs seventy five percent in 2014.571
The data make it clear that Generation X experienced a significant secularizing effect and
it is necessary to determine whether this was a result of more individuals from this cohort
pursuing higher education with fifty seven percent having completed some college or completed
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a bachelor’s degree or higher.572 In addressing the assumed secularizing effect of higher
education, Kosmin explains that the assumption does not hold true for Generation X; “Secular
members of Generation X are just as likely as religious members of Generation X to have a
college education. Moreover, members of Generation X with a college degree are no more likely
to identify as Nones than those without college degrees. Thus, education was not a factor in
secularization among Generation X in 1990 or 2008.”573
Brooke Hempell, senior vice president of research for Barna remarked,
What stood out most to us was how stark the shift was between the Boomer and Gen-Xer
generations...We expected Millennials to be most influenced by other worldviews, but the
most dramatic increase in support for these ideals occurs with the generation before them.
It’s no surprise, then, that the impact we see today in our social fabric is so pervasive,
given that these ideas have been taking root for two generations.574
So, it was not necessarily those in Generation X that were secularized through the process of
pursuing higher education but rather they were conditioned by the generation before them; their
parents. Confirming the hypothesis that preceding generation(s) socialization had a great effect
on the religiosity of the succeeding generation is confirmed by Kosmin and Navarro-River’s
analysis,
Identification with religion declined among Generation X as they aged, particularly
among men, which suggests that the secularization of Americans is not just about young
people from the Millennial Generation abandoning religion because it has become too
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politicized. It is an on-going and wider process that involves other generations in
American society, particularly Generation X.575
Similarly, to general fertility estimates of the religiously affiliated, those in Generation X
“who self-identified with the Christian traditions have more children and are more likely to be
married than are Nones or Other Religions.”576 Nonetheless, the current trend of lower fertility
and marriage rates can find its origin among those in Generation X.577 Following the trends of
the generations that came before them, it could have been assumed that Generation X would
have married, had children, and identified with religion as they aged but this has not been the
case. Those in Generation X that are now having children are raising those children in less
religious environments than preceding generations which will most assuredly serve as a
continued catalyst for the declining American Evangelicalism in general and the rapid increase
of Nones specifically.
Those in Generation X experienced a new cultural development that began in the home
initiated by their parents of the Baby Boomer Generation. Generation X children were afforded
more autonomy of choice and as they aged, they began making decisions like no generation
before them. Speaking to the surprise of the effects the home environment had on this
generation Kosmin stated, “Many in this generation of Americans have abandoned their religious
roots and political affiliations in adulthood. Historically and sociologically, that’s an unexpected
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development.”578 These changes, “religious, social, and political,” report Kosmin and NavarroRiver, are often first evident and most pronounced among the youngest cohort of American
adults, comparing responses between 1990 and 2008 is useful for highlighting social change.”579
Baby Boomers
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “By 2029, when all of the Baby Boomers will be
65 years and over, more than 20 percent of the total U.S. population will be over the age of
65.”580 Interestingly, even at its eventual largest number, the entire population or Baby Boomers
is smaller than the current population of Nones, which is continuing to increase year over year;
however, according to the Census Bureau, “By 2056, the population 65 years and over is
projected to become larger than the population under 18 years.”581 This means the Millennial
and Gen Z cohorts have and will continue to have significant generational influence due to their
large population size.
While surveys indicate a seismic shift away from identifying with religion among the
Millennial generation, these same data suggest that it was the Baby Boomer generation where the
slide began.
Generally, cohorts experience an increase in religiosity later in life. A reason for this
increased attention to religious thought and activity is proposed by Lars Tornstam as
578
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“gerotranscendence” which suggests older individuals “experience a shift in meta-perspective
from a midlife materialistic and rational vision, to a more cosmic and transcendent one,
accompanied by an increase in life satisfaction.”582
Baby boomers are particularly disconnected from religion. Americans born in the later
1940s and in the 1950s—the heart of the baby boom generation—are particularly
unlikely to hold literal views of the Bible. The across-cohort decline in attendance begins
among baby boom cohorts. Additionally, the probability of weekly prayer is lowest
among baby boom cohorts. In their analysis of religious disaffiliation, Hout and Fischer
propose a 1960s legacy effect583 that leads to religious decline. The above results suggest
that the 1960s legacy effect may be specific to those who matured in and around the
1960s, rather than enduring across later cohorts.584
Wuthnow is able to provide a succinct definition of what religious socialization aims to
accomplish in stating, “the effects of religious socialization is that more frequent religious
activity as a child leads to more frequent religious activity as an adult, which, in turn, is
associated with religious conservatism.”585 But this has not been the case among the Baby
Boomer generation.
The religiosity of Boomers has been found to be relatively stable compared to previous
generations where levels of religiosity increased in the twilight years of one's life. The study by
Silverstein and Bengston found that the majority (56%) of Boomers reported steady levels of
religiosity over the past decade, only twenty one percent indicated an increase in religiosity with
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sixty four percent reporting a belief in God with high level of certainty.586 Of those that
reported an increase in spirituality, they indicated a concern for the religious development of
their children or grandchildren as a primary catalyst for the increased interest.587
Additionally, Sherkat found that traditional socialization agents, such as parents and
school, were most responsible for the religious beliefs and involvement of Baby-Boomers.588
Similar to each subsequent generation, Boomers are no more likely to return to religion or attend
church later in life. Generally, the majority of Boomers report stable levels of religiosity later in
life. “This may be the last generation to have had such widespread exposure to religion in
childhood and to have been active religious consumers in their earlier lives—providing another
example of how baby-boomers are a transitional cohort, even now in their later years.”589
Why Different Generations choose None (Barriers to Faith)
Silverstein and Bengston predictive model of religious change among Baby Boomers
specifies a direct relationship between early religious involvement and religious change. To this
they explain,
Examining the indirect effects of childhood religious attendance, we see that greater
religious exposure early in life heightened the risk that religiosity increased over the tenyear period by strengthening cognitive and behavioral religiosity. Similarly, greater early
exposure lowered the risk of declining religiosity by strengthening both types of
religiosity...Those with greater early exposure were more likely to experience religious
decline, implying continued moderation of religious commitment in the transition to later
life590
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In analyzing age, period, and cohort effects on religion, Schwadel provides insights that
suggest “the youngest cohorts are more inclined towards biblical literalism than are the
immediately post-World War II cohorts.”591 He continues that, “While biblical literalism
declines somewhat across periods, there appears to be a moderate resurgence in biblical
literalism among the youngest birth cohorts.”592 Recent survey research indicates sixty one
percent of those that identify as Christian agree with ideas rooted in New Spirituality, with fifty
four percent resonating with postmodernist views, another thirty six percent accepting ideas
associated with Marxism, and twenty nine percent believing ideas based on secularism.593 This
further confirms that not only are more individuals choosing to not identify with a religion, those
that do choose to identify as Christian are experiencing a dilution in the content of their beliefs.
According to Cooperative Congressional Election Study594 data the average age of
American Nones is just over forty-three years old, squarely in the Generational X cohort. This is
much younger than the average age of nearly fifty-two years of Protestants but still old enough to

591

Philip Schwadel, “Age, period, and cohort effects on religious activities and beliefs,” Social Science
Research 40 (2011), 190.
592

Ibid., 187.

593

Barna Research Group, “Competing Worldviews Influence Today’s Christians,” May 9, 2017.
https://www.barna.com/research/competing-worldviews-influence-todays-christians/
594

The Cooperative Congressional Election Study is a national stratified sample survey administered
to over 50,000 individuals. YouGov defines the survey cycles around around election cycles in the following
way, “The survey consists of two waves in election years. In the pre-election wave, respondents answer twothirds of the questionnaire. This segment of the survey asks about general political attitudes, various
demographic factors, assessment of roll call voting choices, political information, and vote intentions. The preelection wave is in the field from late September to late October. In the post-election wave, respondents answer
the other third of the questionnaire, mostly consisting of items related to the election that just occurred. The
post-election wave is administered in November. In non-election years, the survey consists of a single wave
conducted in the fall.” See, https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/

179

have children in one of the integral generations discussed above for reversing the trend;595
however, as Brauer acknowledges, each cohort could behave differently than their predecessors.
Where there exist conditions and factors (cultural, economic, etc.) that serve as a catalyst for
changes in levels in religiosity, for example, but once those “mechanisms” are set in motion,
Brauer argues, “it is more plausible that mechanisms might start or enable a process that takes on
its own trajectory.”596 As a result making assumptions regarding how a particular rising cohort
will act is difficult.
Qualifying Theories Regarding the Increase In Nones
James White proposes three primary catalysts for the rise of the Nones, 1) Secularization
(Christianity is losing its place as the dominant worldview), 2) Privatization (spiritual things are
increasingly placed in the private arena), and 3) Pluralization (Individuals are confronted with
increased ideologies and faith options - which he attributes to increased immigration).597
Secularization and secularization theory needs to be briefly addressed and dismissed as the
primary catalyst for the rapid growth of Nones in America. Secularization is generally viewed
through the lens of what Swatos and Christiano term the ‘‘decline in religion thesis.”598 The
central thesis of secularization suggests that as a society modernizes there will be a resulting, or
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corresponding, decrease in religious belief and participation.599 This secularization perspective
predicts that religious participation and belief decline as societies modernize.
Secularization surely does act as a “solvent” as Stephen Dawson alleged;600 however, this
project assumes the thorough conclusion of Simon Brauer who suggests that his evaluation of
Voas’ data revealed that secularization is certainly at play in America, but the findings that there
is a decrease in those who could be considered intensely religious and a corresponding increase
in those who are not religious show that,
These findings strengthen the plausibility that a general process of religious decline was
at play during much of the 20th century in the United States and Europe. Certainly, these
findings fit within secularization theory, and could be used to argue that it was abandoned
prematurely. But this would neither be easy nor necessary. It would require a clear
specification of what secularization means and what subtheories within the breadth of
secularization theory should be retained.601
Though secularization of American culture is not the primary justification for the
growing lack of religious affiliation, there are several other commonly proposed reasons that
might provide insight into this phenomenon. Interview data from Thiesen and WilkinsLaFlamme confirm that “the dynamics within religious institutions are not cited as the main
reasons in an individual’s choice to disaffiliate,” nonetheless, “once the decision is made these
dynamics can at times reinforce it.”602 Across the sociological research, there are several reasons
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suggested as serving as stimulants in creating a cultural environment that has made it more
acceptable to identify as a None and to disaffiliate from the religion of their family. With at least
one in four internet users using the internet to search for and obtain religious or spiritual
information,603 Nick Fish, president of American Atheists suggests one contributing factor is that
the ever-accessible internet has fueled both question asking and access to answers without the
need to test the validity of the sources.604 With over half of what Pew calls “Religion Surfers”
seeking information regarding other religions but the overwhelming majority (seventy four
percent) are very active in their current faith and attend a religious service at least once per
week.605 This suggests that the internet is not significantly contributing to the rise of Nones.
LGBTQ Equality
A third of Nones polled by the Public Religion Research Institute religion stated it was
their “experience of negative religious teachings about or treatment of gay and lesbian people”
that influenced them to leave them to leave their childhood religion.606 While there has been an
overall increase in American Christians who accept homosexuality as normal and believe it
should be accepted,607 and an increase in Evangelical Protestants that believe the same, there has
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been a drastic increase in the number of Southern Baptists who believe homosexuality should be
accepted as normal as well. While there was a seven percent increase for the entire Southern
Baptist Convention between 2007 and 2014, the increase from thirty five percent in 2007 to fifty
three percent in 2014 among those 18-29 years of age is the most significant increase among all
cohorts and a sharper increase in the number Nones that believe homosexuality should be
accepted.608 Similarly, Southern Baptists aged 18-29 are nearly twice as likely to favor same sex
marriage than the previous cohort and their parent’s cohort.609 This data reveals the youngest
cohorts in the Southern Baptist Convention are getting much closer to mirroring the beliefs of
Nones.610
Although a third of Nones claim the church’s position and teaching regarding
homosexuality as being an influence for their unaffiliation, it is not a significant enough of a
motive for the continued growth of Nones especially given the increasing number of Evangelical
Christians who have become accepting of homosexuality.
Politics
Hout and Fischer examined three possible explanations for the rise of the Nones (those
who report no religious affiliation, regardless of their belief or behavior). Their three
explanations are secularization, demographics, and politics. They reject the secularization thesis
for reasons mentioned above, particularly the persistence of religious belief in America. They
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additionally reject demographic influence since these cannot account for such a rapid increase in
religious unaffiliation. This leads them to conclude politics was the primary factor. The growing
detachment from organized religion in their view is associated with a backlash against the
political powers of the religious right.”611
According to Pew, the second most common reason given by Nones for their lack of
affiliation is the position(s) taken by churches on political issues.612 Currently, Americans have
more confidence in the presidency than in religion or the church.613 A peculiar reality given
Burge’s analysis that the presidency of Trump may be influencing the declining numbers in
American Evangelicalism.614
Schwartz writing on the politicization of Evangelicalism stated that “...the overarching
narrative of postwar (Vietnam) Evangelicalism is growing politicization.”615 A point that Baker
and Smith take up and explain that in responding to,
cultural shifts in morality, sexuality, and gender, the religious right politicized these
issues and aligned themselves with the Republican Party. Political reaction against
secularism, paradoxically, increased the numbers of the nonreligious, especially among
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the nonreligious believers. The secular left has since become a voting bloc that agrees on
issues of abortion, same-sex relations, and marriage.616
Some data does confirm the politicization of religion in general and Evangelicalism in
particular is a compelling catalyst for the growth of the Nones.617 Even though Evangelical’s
traditional alliance with American politics throughout American history is viewed unfavorably
by many, political affiliation is an identifier not a cause of unaffiliation.618 As such, the political
involvement of Evangelicals and the alignment of traditionally biblical aims with political
agendas has blurred the ability to distinguish the two. This could be remedied by intentional
intellectual training through both the institutions of higher education and the family unit.
Socio-Economic Theories
Socio-economic theories have also been provided by some like van Ingen and Moor. The
central thesis in these theories is purports that, “People living in insecure conditions are expected
to have a heightened need for religiosity that comforts and reassures them.”619 However, this
does not seem to hold true for the American context overall. The most recent economic recession
occurred in 2008 and there was no notable increase in religiosity or religious affiliation. In fact,
the opposite occurred. Both the number of religious Nones continued to increase and the number
of Evangelicals, Southern Baptists specifically, continued to decrease.
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Exclusive Truth Claims
Furthermore, one might think in a pluralistic, postmodern culture620 that the exclusive
truth claims central to Evangelical Christianity could be a deterrent to some individuals, but data
suggest this is not the case. Though exclusive claims to truth can be viewed unfavorably by
some, it is not enough of a significant factor for those who choose to disaffiliate. However, the
further away one moves from the religion they disaffiliated with the more exclusivity became a
factor for choosing not to return later in life, after having children, for example.621

Higher Education
Evangelicals have long been characterized as anti-intellectual and diligent in insulating
believers from the influences of secularism that were thought to be rampant at institutions of
higher education. Where high school graduates who were Christian that chose to attend a secular
university would have their faith assaulted.622 Church historian, Mark Noll highlighted the irony
of the idea of an intellectual Evangelicalism in quipping, the scandal of the Evangelical mind is
that there is not much of an Evangelical mind at all.623
The lacking Evangelical intellectual ethos existed throughout most of the twentieth
century which led Richard Hofstadter to identify the “evangelical spirit” as one of the prime
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sources of American anti-intellectualism. Where a humble ignorance has been a far more noble
human quality than a cultivated mind.624 In essence, a dumbing of the Christian mind has
occurred to the detriment of the Evangelical church and is dissolving institutions of biblical
higher education at an alarming rate providing an ever-decreasing number625 of available
(credible) colleges and universities that still integrate a biblical worldview across the curriculum.
So what of the Nones and their perception and levels of educational attainment? The
most recent data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study suggest that the “nothing in
particular” category have lower levels of formal educational attainment,626 but those individuals
that do choose to pursue higher education are more likely to be or become religiously
unaffiliated. Those that disaffiliated from religion have higher levels of educational attainment.
According to General Social Survey data from 1972 to 2012 over sixty percent had completed at
least some college compared to the over fifty percent of those who have never affiliated with
religion having only attained a high school education or less.627
However, by examining data from the Youth Parent Socialization Panel Study, Darnell
and Sherkat were able to surface evidence suggesting that “fundamentalist beliefs and
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conservative Protestant affiliation both have significant and substantial negative influences on
educational attainment above and beyond social background factors.”628 Where the more
religiously conservative the individual the less likely that individual would pursue higher levels
of education.629 Additionally, and specifically, those that hold the conservative belief of the
inerrancy of Scripture appear to also correlate to lower levels of education attainment and
performance.
Biblical inerrancy not only has a significant negative direct effect on educational
attainment, but inerrancy also influences two key aspects of the educational attainment
process: (1) Believers in the inerrancy of scripture are significantly less likely than other
respondents to enroll in college-preparatory courses, and (2) such beliefs have a modest
negative estimated effect on grade-point average in high school.630
One Pew study on the most and least educated religious groups in America shows
Mainline denominations among the most educated and those that identify with the Southern
Baptist Convention ranking twenty-third out of thirty religious groups polled. Only nineteen
percent of Southern Baptist reported having a four-year degree (eight percentage points below
the general U.S. public) and forty six percent having a high school diploma or less.631 This
echoes Darnell’s and Sherkat’s affirmation regarding the negative consequences fundamentalisttype beliefs have on educational attainment by concluding their “results have revealed that
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fundamentalist orientations significantly retard educational attainment.”632 They continue
regarding the negative correlation between familial religious and denominational affiliation
arguing, “Parents' religious orientations and denominations also influence youths' educational
choices. Youths are less likely to take college preparatory courses if parents subscribe to
fundamentalism.”633 Van Ingen and Moor argue from their research that “not only individuallevel but also congregational level educational attainment has a negative effect on biblical
literalism. This mean that the erosion of religiosity is self-reinforcing (even the lower educated
are affected, because they are surrounded by more highly educated individuals).”634 Similarly
Darnell and Sherkat conclude that higher education levels have tended to correlate with a
decreased view of inerrancy of Scripture which in turn prevents views of the authority and
reliability of Scripture to be passed on to their children. They continue, “In contrast, parents from
the South and rural areas are more likely to believe that the Bible is the inerrant word of God.”635
Education and Religious Affiliation
Allan Downey compiled data from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program that
illustrated “the fraction of “Nones” is higher at universities, thirty six percent, than at four-year
colleges, twenty six percent, mostly because more colleges than universities are religiously
affiliated.”636 Nonetheless, the number of freshman Nones at four-year colleges has tripled in the
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past thirty years. Not surprisingly, religious colleges are more religious, with only 17 percent
Nones.637
Higher education and rigorous learning is not counter-productive to religion in general or
Christianity specifically. In examining examples from the global context, Tong provides a
counter argument that illustrates Singapore’s science-oriented education system and associated
‘intellectualization’ of the population has actually facilitated a growing number of conversions to
Christianity. Moving away from traditional Chinese ritual practices towards the more ‘rational’
Bible teachings of Christianity reflects a shift ‘from an unthinking and passive acceptance of
religion’ to a religion that is believed to be more ‘systematic, logical, and relevant.’638
So, what is the most influential factor contributing to the rapid increase in the number of
Americans who are choosing to disaffiliate from religion in general and Evangelical Christianity
in particular? When Pew data confirms that the primary reason Nones choose not to affiliate with
religion is the questioning of religious teaching639 it is becoming clear that Evangelical families
have failed in religiously socializing the next generation. Or, in other words, each generation has
become less intentional in discipling their children which has resulted in a decreased certainty
regarding doctrine and truth claims.
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Religious Socialization
According to the 2014 Religious Landscape study the overwhelming majority of Nones
are not parents. With seventy four percent of the religiously unaffiliated having no children this
is an increase of seven percent from 2007.640 On the other hand, the majority of Southern
Baptists are married with only a small minority that have never been married, interestingly
corresponding with the total number of 18-29 year old members.641 For those in the church that
do have children, they are relying on others for spiritual development. Unfortunately, and to the
detriment of American Evangelicalism, Barna argues, “A large majority of churched believers
rely upon their church, rather than their family, to train their children to become spiritually
mature.”642 In examining instances where children actually developed into mature believers
Barna found that there had been a symbiotic (not parasitic or consumeristic) relationship between
parents and the church that facilitated the spiritual maturation of youth,
In situations where children became mature Christians we usually found a symbiotic
partnership between their parents and their church,...The church encouraged parents to
prioritize the spiritual development of their children and worked hard to equip them for
that challenge. Parents, for their part, raised their children in the context of a faith-based
community that provided security, belonging, spiritual and moral education, and
accountability. Neither the parents nor the church could have done it alone.643
Barna was writing in 2003. Lamentably, since his empirical exhortation to the church to
focus on discipling the next generation Nones have increased by more than one hundred percent
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from approximately fourteen percent in 2000 to over twenty eight percent currently.644
Correspondingly, membership in the Southern Baptist Convention churches has decreased by
nearly 1.4 million from 2003 to 2018 and baptisms have continued to decrease year over year
even though there are more Southern Baptist Churches than ever.645 Thom Rainer, President and
CEO of LifeWay, expressed regret at the ineffectiveness of the Southern Baptist Convention
strategy in hoping new churches would equal more return on evangelistic effort, stating, “It’s
heartbreaking to be baptizing fewer people for Christ, even though Southern Baptists have nearly
2,900 more churches than we had a decade ago.”646 This decrease in baptisms is not a subtle leak
as the more than one hundred twenty thousand fewer baptisms in 2018 than in 2003 clearly
depicts a rupture in evangelistic effectiveness. The youngest two generations only comprise
approximately thirteen percent of Southern Baptist membership647 and approximately seventy
percent of them leave the church after graduating high school and do not return.
The stability of the family unit is also important to the success of the religious
socialization process. The research of Glass, Sutton, and Fitzgerald found a recurring link
between parental divorce, geographic mobility, and changes in religious participation that
precipitate religious switching and disaffiliation. They suggest this is particularly true for
“Conservative Protestant youth who, overall, come from a more stable religious category.
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Disaffiliation from religion, in particular, is characterized by changes in family structure and
functioning, such as parental divorce and decreased religious participation, as well as lower
involvement in church youth programs.”648 They go on to conclude that, “that religious
switching is related to changes in social ties and opportunities, which often precede the actual
switch.” In other words, the more stable the family environment the more likely it will be that the
parents’ faith is successfully transmitted to the child(ren), given the parents are having
intentional conversations regarding faith matters.649
Brauer clearly illustrates what is occurring in the American religious landscape, “If the
pools of parents and peers become less religious, they might instigate further decline in the
following cohorts and generations. Finally, national religiosity moderates the effectiveness of
parental religiosity, such that initial declines within a religious country might instigate further
declines across cohorts.”650 Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme continue the case that each
generation will continue to become more and more unaffiliated by arguing, “While disaffiliation
has (to this point) been an important catalyst for a growing unaffiliated segment, with each
generation irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth among religious nones more
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so than disaffiliation.”651 The problem of declining affiliation and Evangelical belief and
participation in each generational cohort is a direct result of parental deprioritization of
intentional child discipleship and investing in maturing critical thinking abilities. The situation is
not necessarily a retention problem for Evangelicals but more so a problem with parents’
intentionality in transmitting Christian faith and values as Mark explains,
a fall in young people’s religiosity may be an indication of a problem in transmission
rather than a lack of retention. Young people, as a result, may be less religious than the
older generation, not because of a value shift in the importance they place on religion, but
on the value and importance that their parents and family have placed on passing it on.652
This process is what has been at play in the American religious landscape generally and
within American Evangelicalism, the Southern Baptist Convention, specifically and there
appears to be no signs of the declines slowing unless churches begin intentionally and
strategically investing in parents and children.
Denominational Examination
Amidst claims of current forms of Christianity being intellectually anemic,653 has the
American church in fact become unable, through neglect and distraction, to effectively
communicate how the robust tenets of the faith once for all delivered to the saints challenges
individuals regarding how to create a better world by establishing the Kingdom of heaven here
on earth as it is in heaven? Perhaps the present is available for the taking.
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In providing a robust examination of the religious beliefs of the youngest generation,
Generation Z, David Kinnaman provides a clear diagnosis of the waning influence of
Evangelical Christianity in America stating, “The dropout problem is, at its core, a faithdevelopment problem; to use religious language, it’s a disciple making problem. The church is
not adequately preparing the next generation to follow Christ faithfully in a rapidly changing
culture.”654
A recent Pew survey asked religious Nones to indicate why they have chosen to
disaffiliate from religion and the most common answer given by the majority of those who
identified as Atheists, Agnostics, and Nothing in Particular was the questioning of religious
teaching as the primary reason for choosing to not affiliate with a particular religion.655 This is
striking when an overwhelming majority of all Nones (seventy eight percent) were raised in a
religion but later chose to disaffiliate from their childhood faith. Of these that were reared in
religious homes that later chose to identify as None, about half indicated they no longer believe
in the religious teachings of their childhood religion.656
Not only are millennials less likely than older Americans to identify with a religion, but
millennials who are religious are significantly less likely to belong to a church. Fifty-seven
percent of religious millennials belong to a church, compared with sixty five percent or more in
older generations.”657 Church membership and the resulting doctrinal and discipleship influence
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of the church is decreasing with each successive generational cohort to where it has become
woefully evident in the decreasing numbers of those in America that identify as Evangelical.
Church Leadership
Perhaps a telling reason for the rapid decline in church membership in many
denominations is the traditional “come and see” mentality where church leaders think making the
church more relevant to a new generation will attract attendees and result in a growth in
affiliation and/or conversion. Bishop Stacy Sauls, COO of the Episcopal Church reveals this
lingering ineffective strategy in offering his remedy for the rapid rise of the Nones by suggesting,
“I think one of things we're learning is that we have to give people of any age a reason to come
these days. We can't assume they're going to come just because their parents did.”658 This “come
and see” strategy has been assimilated by Evangelical church leadership as well with everdiminishing returns.659
The importance of examining church leadership as it relates to the increase of the
religiously unaffiliated is twofold. First, a primary reason that those in younger generations are
giving for disaffiliating from church is echoed by historian Christian Smith, who suggests “The
main reason the young people say they left the church was unanswered doubts and questions.
That they had questions, they had doubts; they brought them to the church leaders and they
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couldn’t get answers.”660 Even secularist are acknowledging the hunger for truth and certainty
characteristic of the younger generations. Robyn Blumner, executive director of the Richard
Dawkins Foundation for Reason & Science, sees the change as a generational trend driven by
millennials. "We are seeing the rise of a generation of Americans who are hungry for facts and
curious about the world."661
The diminishing membership numbers in the Southern Baptist Convention could be a
result of the statement regarding the ineffectiveness of leadership, "Workers don't quit
companies; they quit managers." In a Gallup study regarding church leadership and declining
service attendance it was found that those who attend religious services more frequently are more
likely to rate their pastor as outstanding compared to those who attend less frequently. The
study’s author Frank Newport admitted the “correlational data do raise the possibility that those
who are staying away from church may be doing so precisely because they are less engaged by
their church leaders than are those who attend more frequently.”662 Moreover, additional data
reveals that those that do attend church at least semi-frequently, at least once per month, do so to
hear sermons that teach more about Scripture or help connect religion with life (seventy six
percent and seventy five percent, respectively).663
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Second, is the fact that Evangelical clergy are aging and with the decreasing membership
numbers there will be fewer and fewer who will rise to fill the rapidly vacating shoes of church
leadership. According to the 2010 FACT survey, Generally, the younger the leader, the more
likely a congregation has grown. Leaders 35 to 39 years old are most likely to be in growing
congregations. The problem for the Evangelical church is only fifteen percent of pastors are
under forty years of age.664
Barna data suggest that “adult church leaders usually have serious involvement in church
life and training when they are young.” This means those that are currently serving in leadership
roles within Evangelical churches experienced significant involvement in church activities as
children, prior to the age of thirteen. Barna goes on to suggest this provides the inference that
“the individuals who will become the church’s leaders two decades from now are probably active
in church programs today.” Therefore, if families with children younger than thirteen years of
age are attending church less and those in the youngest two generations are leaving the church
more quickly than previous cohorts it is clear that the Evangelical church is not only facing an
emergency of declining membership but also an impending leadership crisis.
Decreasing Membership
American unchurched population has increased from thirty five percent in 2005 to over
forty six percent in 2015. It is interesting to note that sixty two percent of the unchurched selfidentify as Christian but most alarming is the twenty one percent of the unchurched population
being born-again based on their personal theology.665 This highlights the diminished importance
and influence of the local church in American life.
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Evangelicals who identify as being born-again have traditionally been a persistent body
among the American population typically holding at between twenty two percent and twenty five
percent. Burge highlights the historical stability of the Evangelical population and the recent
overtaking of the majority by the corresponding upswing in the number of Nones,
The fact that Evangelicals’ share of the population remains relatively stable over the last
decade is striking given the continued rise of the nones. Evangelicals have been able to
replace losses as fast as they are occurring, at least for now. Recent survey evidence has
found that nearly 95 percent of born-again Christians stayed that way from 2010 to 2014,
compared to just 85 percent of those who said that they were Protestant but not bornagain...though they’re currently 7.5 percentage points lower than their highest share of
the US population: 29.9 percent in 1993, just as the nones began their upswing.666
It is not only the membership numbers that has been in decline among American Evangelicals.
The traditional beliefs that characterize Evangelicalism has also been ebbing among those that
still self-identify as Evangelical.

Decreasing Evangelical Belief
As mentioned above, the Southern Baptist Convention membership data will be
leveraged as it has been the largest evangelical denomination in America for several decades. It
is assumed this denominational data provides more accurate insights into the beliefs and
behaviors of American Evangelicalism for this study. Beneficially, since its formation in 1865,
the Southern Baptist Convention has released an Annual Report containing data detailing the
performance of the congregations in the Convention. This report provides the necessary
empirical data that reveals the crisis for Evangelicalism in America.
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“While some young adults who leave church are rejecting their childhood faith, most are
choosing to keep many of the beliefs they had, but with a smaller dose of church,” said
Executive Director of LifeWay Research Scott McConnell.667 Though there are those that retain
some of the beliefs from their childhood faith studies are finding that the Christian faith that the
youngest generations looks very little like the robust understanding of doctrine of generations
previous to the Boomers. David Kinnaman, in explaining data collected on those among the
youngest generations who have left the church explained that those who identified with
Christianity and regularly shared their faith did not possess a thoroughly Christian worldview
themselves. He explained, “We found that the faith that they were trying to spread was, in fact,
more akin to moralistic therapeutic deism than to historic Christianity. Few of these youth
evangelists could identify a single portion of the Bible as the basis of their faith in Christ.”668
Fueling this dilution of belief is the shrinking number of those that hold the Bible to be
reliable and authoritative. When Southern Baptists were asked if Scripture should be taken
literally the data reveal a significant decrease from 2007-2014 in those likely to take Scripture
literally (fifty one percent vs forty one percent). There has been a corresponding increase during
the same timeframe in those aged 18-29 years old that claim Scripture is “not the Word of God”
(five percent vs fifteen percent). Significantly, young adults aged 18-29 are much less likely (17%) to take Scripture literally than their preceding cohort, those aged 30-49. Nonetheless, each
cohort is less likely than preceding cohorts to take Scripture literally.669
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Consequently, there has been an overall decrease in the certainty of belief among
Southern Baptists and the decrease has been increasing with each generational cohort. For
example, there has been an eight percent decrease (ninety one percent from eighty three percent)
in absolute certainty in the existence of God among the 18-29-year-old cohort from 2007 to
2014. This cohort is less likely than all other cohorts to belief in God with absolute certainty (8%). Where an absolute certain belief in God has held relatively steady with preceding cohorts at
or over ninety percent. Additionally, the importance of religion became less important with each
subsequent cohort, and much less important for those aged 18-29 than all other cohorts (-9%).
Interestingly, as the belief in heaven has experienced relatively no change from 2007 to 2014
(eighty nine percent vs ninety percent) and has remained steady across cohorts, there has been a
decrease in those that believe in hell among the 18-29 year cohort (ninety percent vs eighty three
percent) during the same period. While only twelve percent of the 18-29-year-old cohort that are
members of Southern Baptist Churches do not believe in hell, this is double the preceding (30-49
year old) cohort which is at six percent.670
Reasons for Decreasing Membership Numbers
The data is clear that the beliefs of each cohort are becoming less and less Evangelical
mirroring Jones’ conclusion that each cohort will continue to become more secular leading to
continued membership decline in America, “Given that church membership, and religiosity in
general, is greater among older adults, the emergence of an increasingly secular generation to
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replace far more religious older generations suggests the decline in U.S. church membership
overall will continue.”671
Weekly Attendance in Southern Baptist churches has been declining steadily among all
generational cohorts. Most significantly, those aged 18-29 became less likely to attend at least
once a week from ‘07-’14 (fifty five percent vs forty nine percent). This cohort is also less likely
to attend than previous cohorts. Nonetheless, the drop in overall attendance to weekly church
services is not only characteristic of the youngest generation. Attendance has been steadily
declining with each successive cohort with each cohort less likely to attend weekly than
preceding cohort.672
Fortunately, it is not only Evangelicals that are unable to retain adherents. Agnostics and
Nones are drastically more likely to defect from their religion to a Protestant religion than the
other way around (forty to forty eight percent of Nones and Agnostics vs only ten percent of
Protestants). Burge confirms, “Americans who identify as agnostic or “nothing in particular”
are four times more likely to change their religious affiliation than Protestants or Catholics.”673
Over the four year period of the CCES survey data collection of the forty percent of Nones that
changed their religion nearly twenty percent of them returned to the church and of those thirteen
percent changed their religious preference to a Protestant religion.674 Though there are a number
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of Nones returning to church over time, the rate at which they return is dwarfed by those that
choose to remain unaffiliated. Nonetheless, the fact that many Nones do return to church
provides confident hope that something can be done about this American phenomenon.
However, to provide a vivid illustration of the significant influence Nones can wield in the
American culture, Burge provides the comparison, “Fully 1 in 20 Americans joined this group in
the last 10 years. That’s the functional equivalent of every Southern Baptist in the United States
becoming ‘nothing in particular.’”675
In attempting to identify a cause for the shrinking Southern Baptist Convention, Mohler
has suggested that a significant culprit behind the declining membership numbers in the Southern
Baptist Convention is the decreased fertility rates in America.676 This, prima facie, appears to
serve as a reasonable explanation given that if fewer adults are having children, then there will
be fewer children to join the church as they mature. Though this is not the case among Christians
who still have among the highest fertility rates in the nation and have children at a higher level
than the replacement rate, second only to Muslims.677 This fact magnifies the failure of
Evangelical parents in effectively training their children in “the way they should go.”678
Nonetheless, an examination of the national fertility rates compared to fertility rates of the
religiously affiliated in general and the fertility rates of those women who identify as Christian
suggests falling fertility rates is not significantly affecting Christianity as much as it should be
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negatively affecting the religiously unaffiliated populations. Important, there is the research by
Hout, Greeley, and Wilde’s whose findings illustrate that variable fertility rates can dramatically
impact societal-level religious change.679

Figure 4.1 U.S. Fertility Rates as measured by the CDC680
The group declining fertility rates “should” affect more drastically than Christians is the
religiously unaffiliated. The birth rate for this religious grouping is approximately 1.6 children
per unaffiliated woman globally and 1.7 children per American unaffiliated woman compared to
2.6 children per Christian woman globally and 2.2 children per woman in the United States.681
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Figure 4.2 Total Fertility Rates - Religiously Affiliated vs. Unaffiliated, 2015-2020682
Additionally, Pew data suggest Christian mothers will continue to have children at a
higher rate than the national average where they are projecting “Christian...mothers are expected
to give birth to increasing numbers of babies through 2060.” However, again, the decreased birth
rate should more significantly affect the religiously unaffiliated category most since, “the total
number of births is projected to decline steadily between 2015 and 2060 for all other major
religious groups.” Albeit, the negative impact on natural categorical growth on the religious
Nones only holds true if religious switching holds steady, which is not the case with those that
were raised in Evangelical homes who have now become religiously unaffiliated.683
Additionally, with the characteristic ebb and flow in levels of spirituality throughout life
stages, studies have shown that individuals typically experience a peak in religiosity once they
become parents.684 In fact, religiously affiliated women in general have more children than
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religiously unaffiliated women.685 This means the population of Nones is growing, not by
biological growth but by religious switching, changing from their childhood religion to no
religion at all; a failure of the church to facilitate the transmission of the faith from the parents to
the child(ren).
Evolving Views of Higher Education and Anemic Biblical Higher Education
If Evangelicalism can be synonymous, in most instances, with political conservatism686
then the importance of higher education is on the wane among Evangelicals.687 While about half
of Americans, both conservative and liberal, say college education is having a positive effect in
America, recent survey data show that the number of conservatives who view higher education
positively has plummeted to become the dominant perspective. In 2009, fifty three percent of
conservatives favorably viewed higher education versus thirty five percent who viewed it as
having a negative impact in the United States. As of 2019, those numbers have traded places
with fifty nine percent of conservatives now perceiving colleges as having a negative effect in
America.688
Pair this shift in perceived value of a college degree with replaced importance on
receiving the necessary training to secure a career that provides financial security (cite) then it is
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easy to see why institutions of biblical higher education are in a dire predicament. The majority
of Americans and Evangelicals choose a college or university based on the likelihood of earning
a degree that will provide the best odds of obtaining a career that creates a life characterized by
financial security. Since most Americans (eighty five percent) and importantly most Evangelicals
(sixty five percent) do not think Bible colleges adequately prepare students for careers outside of
ministry.689 The perception is not much better for Christian universities especially regarding
prospective parents’ perspectives. Christian parents mirror their prospective student’(s) desire
for job preparation and financial security as the top priority in choosing a college or university.
Southern Baptists and Education Attainment
Overall, Millennials and Generation Z are still interested in education. With sixty six
percent of Generation Z and fifty two percent of Millennials indicating their top priority in life
being finishing their education. Leaving the falling number of Evangelicals that are still
interested in higher education generally, and biblical higher education specifically with primarily
secular options that may or most probably serve as a catalyst for their falling away from the
church.690
Van Ingen and Moor’s research provides substantial evidence that “tertiary education is
clearly the most powerful predictor of changes in church attendance over time.”691 The more
educated one becomes, post-high school, the odds of religious switching or disaffiliation
occurring increases. This does not suggest that lower levels of education are synonymous with
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unaffiliation as CCES data shows the current unaffiliated population has lower levels of
educational attainment compared to religious populations. However, this data does suggest that
for the religiously affiliated, the more education attained the odds of disaffiliation increase, even
if minimally.
The importance of this discussion is the dumbing of the Christian mind has deadened
with greater degrees the ability of each successive generation the ability to think critically.
Currently, more Americans trust the media692 more than the Church and those within the church
are ever-increasingly unable to adequately articulate the very basic tenets of the Christian faith.
Data provided by Barna confirms the predicament that only ten percent of those classified as
born-again Christians hold a biblical worldview. Further, an overwhelming majority (eighty one
percent) of Southern Baptists have no college degree and perhaps more alarmingly, eighty six
percent of the 18-29 year old cohort have no college degree.693 The shifting of America’s
religious landscape and the undeniable absence of critical thinking skills among every generation
pose insurmountable obstacles to a resurgence of men and women who can confidently articulate
truth in various cultural arenas.
Loss of Evangelistic Zeal
Each period of resurgence, especially the Awakenings, was preceded by intense,
concerted prayer for God to move in a new way. Perhaps the most obvious activity birthed in
each period of increased religious devotion was a zeal for evangelism characteristic not only of
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the preachers of the period but also of the laity. Regrettably confirming the poor prognosis of the
Evangelical church in America, Mohler summarizes the most recent data that confirmed the
continued declining membership as being a direct result of a loss of evangelistic zeal when
lamenting, “The most obvious insight is that we do not care as much about reaching lost people
as we once did…”694
As explained in Chapter 3, the most accurate way of measuring the effectiveness of local
congregations is by examining year over year baptismal data which should be most reflective of
the number of conversions as a core Evangelical doctrine is “believer’s baptism” where
conversion must precede and is a prerequisite of baptismal eligibility. To illustrate the waning
effectiveness of Southern Baptist congregations, Clift W. Brannon lamented in the 1995
Southern Baptist Convention meeting that more than 10,000 Southern Baptist Churches failed to
report at least a single baptism during the previous year.695
The numbers have not gotten any better. The 2018 number is about fifty five percent of
the record year for baptisms, 445,725, set in 1972. With twice as many churches in 2018 in the
Convention than in 1944: 51,541 vs 24,165 respectively. Southern Baptist baptisms broke the
300,000 plateau in 1948 and remained above that level every year until 2015.696 It was after
approximately the year 2000 that the number of new churches began surpassing the number of
baptisms each year. The reality that there are more Southern Baptist Churches now than ever
and fewer baptisms per year than forty years ago when there was only a fraction of the number of
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churches aggrandizes the anemic zeal for evangelism in the American Evangelical church. The
data illustrate the bleak reality that each successive generation has cared less about evangelism
with each cohort engaging in evangelistic activities less than their parents’ generation.

Figure 4.3 Number of SBC Churches vs Baptisms per Year (1883-2016)697
Prior to the 1960s the growth rate of the Southern Baptist Convention astronomically outpaced
the U.S. population growth rate.698 Though membership growth percentage, year over year, had
declined steadily since the 1960’s falling below five percent growth in 1990 to less than three
percent in 2000, membership itself began to experience negative numerical growth more than a
decade ago.
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This prolonged reduced growth precipitated the forming of an Evangelism Task Force699
in 2017 provided a compilation of recommendations at the 2018 annual meeting. Chairman of
the task force, Adam Greenway summarized the collective ethos of the group, "The
evangelization of the world remains our top priority as a convention of churches, and the prayer
of all of us serving on this task force is that God will use our efforts to help bring us together by
renewing our passion for and increasing our effectiveness in bringing people to Christ,"700The
Task Force provided a list of twelve affirmations and denials precisely defining what evangelism
is and is not and a list of eight recommendations for how Southern Baptist churches could
accomplish the aim of increasing converts and baptisms. Two recommendations in particular
speak to the revisited necessity of evangelizing the next generation and the responsibility of the
individual, parents, and churches to do so, recommendation 8a and 8b state,
A) All parents, church leaders, pastors, and denominational entities renew with great
urgency the priority of evangelizing the next generations, adapting our methodology
without changing our theology. B) God-called evangelists be utilized as a wonderful
asset in evangelistic endeavors of various kinds, since while all Christians are called to be
personal evangelists, God has always given some individuals unique giftings with respect
to evangelism.701
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The renewed focus on intentional evangelism to the next generations via urgent
involvement of the family is reminiscent of the The Annual Report for the 1980 Southern Baptist
Convention which outlined three primary projects for the Convention as a whole to focus on
accomplishing by 1985. One of the three primary projects was to strengthen families through two
primary methods: 1). Opening the Word together, which consisted of a three year project to
enlist church families in daily Bible study and family worship at home. 2) Marriage: Growing in
Oneness, which consisted of a two year project to strengthen husband/wife relationships and
bring Christian enrichment to family life.702
Task force member Doug Munton admitted, “We know that we need a fresh wave of
evangelistic passion, but we also need the presence and power of God.”703 Still, some
experienced in matters concerning the Southern Baptist Convention believe the efforts and
recommendations will do very little to “move the needle on SBC baptism numbers.”704 This
proposal in 1980 was much more robust of an exhortation for the heightened involvement of the
family to evangelize and disciple the next generation than the subpoint dedicated to it by the
2017 Evangelism Task Force. However, the focused strategy in proposed in 1980 failed to
produce any lasting fruit. In fact, the vine has continued to wither. “Only disciples who are
training, and training others, to follow the narrow Way of Christ will stay the course- and our
churches need help to make such disciples.”705
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Recent Barna data show that Generation Z teens receive the most spiritual guidance and
encouragement from their mothers in six categories.706 Interestingly, it was the father and
grandparents more so than siblings, friends, other relatives, and other non-relatives who provided
the most guidance and encouragement second to the maternal influence. In five of the six
categories it was the grandparents that provided more guidance and encouragement than the
fathers.707 An individual’s worldview is typically set by the time they reach the age of thirteen as
Barna highlights the significance of this reality,
In essence, what you believe by the time you are 13 is what you will die believing. Of
course, there are many individuals who go through life-changing experiences in which
their beliefs are altered, or instances in which a concentrated body of religious teaching
changes one or more core beliefs. However, most people’s minds are made up and they
believe they know what they need to know spiritually by age 13. Their focus in absorbing
religious teaching after that age is to gain reassurance and confirmation of their existing
beliefs rather than to glean new insights that will redefine their foundations.708
Echoed by Collins-Mayo “if they are not religiously inclined in their youth, they are unlikely to
become so in later years.709
The conclusive fact is Christian women are continuing to have children at a higher than
national rate and those children are not being successfully evangelized by the family or the
church. These children have and are continuing to disaffiliate from the Christianity of their
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family and/or childhood and are not returning as they reach adulthood as previous generations
have.710
According to Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme disaffiliation is most frequently,
linked back to a family context where each generation progressively became less
religious and as a result religion was not that salient during one’s upbringing (even if one
was exposed to religious belief/practice for a period of time), and often comes to fruition
when the individual becomes more independent in mind and body from the original
family household (when religion becomes seen as a choice, when intellectual
disagreements arise with religion, when the individual enters into contact with less
religious friends, and with life transitions).711
America appears to be following the same trajectory as the UK regarding parental interest
in passing on their faith to their children. When asked whether they would want their children
“to hold the same beliefs about whether or not there is a God or Higher Power as me when they
are older”, less than a third (thirty one percent) of British parents agreed, and nearly twice as
many (fifty nine percent) disagreed. Passing on faith was not a priority, and this translated into
parents’ answers when asked whether it was important “to actively pass on beliefs about whether
or not there is a God or Higher Power to [their] children” – the same proportion (thirty percent)
saying it was important, compared with twice that number (sixty percent) saying that children
should make up their own minds on this topic “independently of their parents”712
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However, those that attended religious services regularly were much more likely to want
to pass on their faith to their children. The same balance was seen when the data were analyzed
by attendance: regular attenders713 were most likely to want to pass their beliefs on (seventyseven), non-attenders hardly at all (fifteen percent). Insight can be gained here regarding the
importance of intentionality, or lack thereof, of parents regarding intentionally engaging their
children in discussions of matters of faith. Data show that more than two thirds of all parents said
that they would feel “confident” in having a conversation on the subject with their children, and
the same proportion (sixty nine percent) said they would feel “comfortable” in doing so. It was
simply that the subject rarely came up, with only forty percent of parents saying they had had a
conversation with the aim of passing on their beliefs about whether there is a God or Higher
Power with their children – although again the more seriously the parents took their faith, the
more likely they were to have spoken about it.714 It is clear, intensity of belief of the parents and
their intentionality in passing on the faith has clear correlations to the levels of spirituality and
beliefs of those children as they reach adulthood. Where, “adults who say religion was an
important part of their life growing up are more likely to say they now have the same religious
affiliation as their parents.”715
This being the case, it is imperative that the American Evangelical Church begin focusing
efforts and discipleship action in evangelizing and discipling the youngest two generations for
any hope of stopping the religious bleed and cultivating a fertile environment capable of
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producing resurgence. This is a significantly consequential responsibility that should not be
pawned off on the church, however. Evangelizing and discipling children is the primary
responsibility of the parent. And, when this is done intentionally and effectively, albeit not
necessarily dependent upon but in partnership with a local church, children (successive
generations) are more likely to stay engaged with the faith that was passed on from their family.
As Mark affirmed, “despite the perceived strength of other social and cultural forces, ‘faith’s’
most effective ‘not-so-secret’ weapon in passing on beliefs and practices to the next generation
remains parents.”716
Chapter Summary
It is clear from the research presented here that the current state of American Christianity
experienced by contemporary generations is in dire straits compared to previous periods of
American religious history. The rapid increase of Nones and the corresponding decrease in those
that identify as Evangelical as evidenced by the rapidly diminishing membership and baptism
numbers in the Southern Baptist Convention should cause concern that these trend lines might
continue growing further apart with the population of Nones continuing to increase and the
number of Evangelicals in America continues to dwindle.
The population of Nones in America has outgrown the number of Evangelicals in
America in the last five years.717 Likewise the rate of growth among the None population has
significantly outpaced those that are identifying as Evangelical. The problem for Evangelicals is
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the rapid increase in those with no religious affiliation is not only dramatically outpacing the
growth of those that identify with Evangelicalism, it is apparent the increase of Nones is ignoring
generational lines. Indeed, though the increase in those that self-identify as Evangelical is
greatest among those younger than 40 years of age (from seventeen percent to twenty one
percent from 1972 to 2018 years)718 that increase is negligible compared to the over one third of
those in the Millennial and Generation Z cohorts that have no religious affiliation. There is also
a two-fold issue surrounding effective Evangelical leadership in the coming years. Not only are
there fewer clergy in the pipeline being trained to lead Evangelical churches,719 those that are
being trained and released to lead churches are failing to provide the answers to the questions
attendees are asking.720
Reminiscent of Decker’s proclamation that the Nones are “winning,” Evangelicalism is
rapidly losing influence, relevancy, and interest in each subsequent generational cohort. Though
there are several hypotheses proposed by sociologist for this seemingly recent phenomenon such
as it being a natural result of the secularization of the American culture, the intermingling of
politics and religion, higher education attainment, etc. an examination of the data from the
Southern Baptist Convention provides insight into the waning appeal of Evangelical ethos among
each subsequent cohort. Moreover, even though Christians, and Evangelicals specifically have
higher fertility rates compared to the religiously unaffiliated population that biological growth is
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not translating into conversions to Evangelicalism. This confirms that Evangelicals have failed,
and it appears are continuing to fail at successfully passing on the faith to their children.
As a result of a loss of evangelistic zeal, fledgling evangelistic efforts, and a diminishing
emphasis and interest in biblical higher education it is clear that Evangelical numbers will
continue to decline. Consequently, if the recent surge in those that are choosing to identify as
religiously unaffiliated continues to increase with the same speed as has been experienced since
the last decade of the twentieth century the population of Nones in America will be significantly
larger than the population of those that identify as Evangelical.721
In this course of this chapter the research presented is vital because there have been
periods of significant religious disinterest throughout American religious history; however, and
most importantly, religious zeal has rebounded time and time again. What has been presented
here highlights the necessity for parents and Evangelical churches to partner in a concerted effort
to religiously socialize the next generational cohorts albeit this is no small undertaking. To
successfully reverse the current trend Evangelicals must be calculated in their efforts to
rigorously train the next cohort of leaders and intent in reaching and training families (mothers
and fathers) with the knowledge to be able to effectively pass on the faith and answer the
questions of the next generation.
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If the average church should suddenly take seriously the notion that every lay member man or
woman is really a minister of Christ, we could have something like a revolution in a very short
time. - Elton Trueblood
Chapter 5 - Conclusion
The objective of this project has been to evaluate the major periods of American religious
history for the purpose of identifying similar periods of religious disinterest and what, if any,
characteristics were present that facilitated, encouraged, or resulted in religious resurgence. This
historical survey served as the plumb against which the current rapid increase of the religiously
unaffiliated could be evaluated in context to ideally suggest if a reversal of the current trend and
a resurgence in American Evangelicalism is possible. As explained in Chapter 1 the aim of this
project has not been to provide answers to “why” there has been a recent surge in the number of
Americans that are choosing to identify as religiously unaffiliated. Instead, the aim has been to
examine past periods of high and low religious interest in America which includes the present,
rapid increase of religiously unaffiliated to conclude whether a resurgence is possible. As a result
of this examination, it has been seen that there have been other periods of high and low Christian
affiliation in American religious history. Christianity in America has always shown a resiliency
with each ebb reversing into a high tide of religious interest and evangelistic zeal resulting in
growing numbers. Corresponding to those surges were increased primacy given to the preaching
of the gospel, the authority of Scripture, rigorous biblical education and training, and missionary
fervor which has more often than not resulted in civil engagement with the hopes of transforming
society.
The research presented here reveals that there have indeed been other periods in
American religious history where there was a significantly low interest in Evangelical
expressions of Christianity. One such period was the religiously dispassionate in Colonial
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America. Though the London Company launched for the New World in 1607 to propagate the
Christian religion those that followed the New World had more worldly aspirations, even the
clergy. Chapter 2 highlighted estimates that showed only ten percent of Americans were church
members in 1776. From there, America experienced a significant increase in membership growth
during the nineteenth century that lasted until the late twentieth century. Adherents increased
from approximately ten percent at the beginning of the nineteenth century to over half of
America being religiously affiliated at the turn of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the
importance of religion was significant to the founding of the new nation though religious
affiliation was minimal allowing for significant evangelistic efforts through missions to the new
frontier and intentional biblical education through formal education and distribution of literature.
This two headed approach obtained its desired results in exponentially increasing the number of
churches and qualified clergy in the young nation. With each surge in the intensity of interest in
Christianity there was a corresponding increased interest in higher education for training minds
to go out and accomplish the Great Commission. Additionally, an increase in evangelistic fervor
to the unreached i.e. Indians, Blacks, unchurched resulted from the primacy of preaching in local
congregations leading to larger events. Not the other way around. In other words, the emphasis
was on the responsibility of the local church not large events.
There have been other periods where interest in religion and Christian, evangelistic zeal
has waned but as explained early in this project, religion in America, particularly Evangelical
forms of Christianity has been persistent even though intense religiosity is currently declining.
The cause of great ebbs in religious interest and affiliation throughout the history of
American Christianity has not necessarily been the secularization of culture, but it has been the
secularization of the Church. After the Church experiences a great period of resurgence it has
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tended to establish and institutionalize organizations aimed at institutionalizing the primary
facets of the resurgence in attempt to secure the moral reform of society. Then, the Church
abdicated its responsibility to preach the gospel to the individual for the conversion of the
individual so the individual can multiply that new life in the family primarily and society
secondarily. This responsibility tends (often but not always) to be abdicated through the process
of politicization with hopes that Christian values may be threaded into the fabric of society
through legislation. As a result of this abdicated responsibility, there is a diminished importance
of the local church and a corresponding diminishing of the authority and reliability of Scripture
to speak to the whole life of the individual. Finally, there is a diminished confidence or certainty
in religion in general and Evangelical expressions of Christianity specifically.
Regarding the current increase in religious Nones, those that have never affiliated with a
religion in their lifetime have not consistently grown as a share of the unaffiliated population. In
fact, the greatest growth in the never affiliated relative to the disaffiliated occurred prior to 2000.
After 2000, the percentage of respondents who were never affiliated leveled off, whereas the
percent who were disaffiliated has grown substantially. This means that the primary threat to
Evangelicalism is not the population growth of those who have never affiliated with a religion
from either being raised in a non-religious home. Instead, the threat is from those who are
leaving Evangelical churches as a result of ineffective religious socialization and parents
allowing their children the autonomy to choose to construct their own religious identity.
Currently, disaffiliation is the most common contributor to the increasing number of
Nones. As highlighted throughout this project, those that are choosing no religious affiliation are
primarily the ones who were reared in religious homes. This confirms the primary mechanism
for this ebb in religious interest is the Evangelical church’s failure of familial religious
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socialization and abandonment of emphasizing the preaching of the gospel, rigorous education
which sharpens critical thinking skills and results in more certain beliefs.
The results of intentional religious socialization by successfully passing on the faith to
the next generation produces a healthier culture for the gospel to be received. Conclusive
evidence has been provided indicating those that disaffiliate from their religion report the poorest
mental health and well-being. This data is significant because it parallels what is occurring with
American Evangelicalism contributing to the growing population of Nones. The None population
is currently growing primarily through religious switching, or disaffiliation, and America has
never experienced such low levels of mental health and resulting negative, often catastrophic,
consequences.
The current population of those that have no religious affiliation has now surpassed the
number of those that identify as Evangelical presenting interestingly precarious scenarios
regarding political ramifications which leads to discussions regarding the sanctity of life,
abortion, LBGTQ rights, etc. Also, of concern with this rapidly growing population is the quality
of mental health among those with no religious affiliation generally and an ambiguous Christian
affiliation especially. There is good news however, Nones are drastically more likely to defect
from their religion to a Protestant religion than the other way around (forty to forty eight percent
of Nones and Agnostics vs only ten percent of Protestants). Though the population of those that
identify with Evangelicalism is shrinking as a result of religious switching and many of those
becoming religious Nones, hope for the American Evangelical church is not lost.
Evangelicalism can rebound but it will not survive by relying on current methods which have
resulted in a weakened, almost unrecognizable orthodox theology where currently only dismal
number of the adult born-again possess a biblical worldview.
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The opening chapter of this project asked what needs to happen with(in) the American
church to prevent further apostasy and initiate a period of resurgence of Evangelical American
Christian affiliation? The research presented speaks to the necessity for the Evangelical church to
once again dedicate its efforts to clearly communicating biblical doctrine and the necessity of
developing critical thinking skills among Evangelicals. This informed thinking must come from
rigorously trained clergy who can sufficiently transmit that faith once and for all delivered to the
saints through means of intentional discipleship to parishioners and parents so that they can in
turn model that faith for the next generation. There has been an apparent failure of the church in
intentionally training parents and exhorting them of the necessity of “training” their children in
the way they should go or they will depart from it, which is exactly what has been occurring in
America for the past two decades.
The alignment of Evangelical convictions with political agendas has created a symbiotic
relationship between the church and state that has caused produced a church that has become
indiscernible from Republican values. The Evangelical church must cease to abdicate its
responsibility to the American government for the transformation of society.
Instead of aiming to influence the morality of American society through electing
individuals who construct and communicate campaigns that most closely align with ever-shifting
Evangelical convictions, the Evangelical church should begin to communicate once again the
necessity of a rigorous education, developing critical thinking skills, and a life devoted to the
pursuit of life-long learning. This would allow the church to raise up learned, influential disciples
who know how to critically think and how to strategically communicate and apply the gospel in
any cultural context.
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The research provided here brings the Evangelical to consider whether or not the current
trend is simply a natural result of a secularizing culture and is the trend irreversible? If all things
continue as they have been in the Evangelical community generally and the Southern Baptist
Convention specifically then, yes, the continued rapid decline of American Evangelicalism is
indeed inevitable. Nonetheless, as this research has highlighted, though there is a rapid decline in
religiosity generally and Evangelical expressions of American Christianity specifically, as
American religious history has evidenced, reversal of religious disinterest is not only possible but
perhaps, probable. The data and the analysis provided throughout this project suggest that there
is not only a possibility of reversing the current trend of a rapidly shrinking population of
Evangelicals, but the reversal is probable as history has shown, but how Evangelical churches are
training families must change.
The alignment of Evangelical convictions with political agendas has created a symbiotic
relationship between the church and state that has caused produced a church that has become
indiscernible from Republican values. The Evangelical church must cease to abdicate its
responsibility to the American government for the transformation of society.
It must commit itself to the preaching the gospel for the conversion of the individual for
the multiplication of that transformational message. This commitment would be a correction of
current trends among Evangelical churches to devote considerable resources to production and
audio-visual effects to enhance the church experience. As mentioned above, this preoccupation
with entertainment-style church service is pushing younger generations away because they are
not receiving adequate answers to the questions and uncertainties they carry with them.
As presented above, each subsequent American generational cohort is becoming less
religious and each Evangelical generational cohort is becoming less certain of their beliefs and

224

increasingly less able to accurately communicate traditional doctrines of the Evangelical faith.
With the Evangelical church becoming increasingly uncertain of their beliefs there is a
corresponding increase in mental health issues with each American generational cohort in
general and Evangelical generational cohort specifically. If there is to be hope for a future
resurgence of Evangelical influence in America, the church must let go of current approaches
and examine its current operation in light of its historical existence.
There is an additional area of further research this research project would like to suggest.
This project did not set out to provide a detailed explanation of the mechanisms that will create a
resurgence among American Evangelicalism. Nonetheless, to be clear, mechanisms such as
prayer, rigorous teaching of Christian doctrine, a high view of the authority of Scripture,
certainty of belief, and evangelistic zeal have been present immediately prior to, during, and
immediately following each major resurgence in American Evangelicalism. One area of research
that is greatly needed is further investigation into the process of religious socialization in the
home especially throughout Evangelical history.
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